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Abstract
This thesis presents a unified computational framework for the study of emotion that
integrates several concepts and mechanisms which have been traditionally deemed
to be integral components of intelligent behavior. We introduce the notion of affect
programs as the primary theoretical constructs for investigating the function and
the mechanisms of emotion, and instantiate these in a variety of embodied agents,
including physical and simulated robots.
Each of these affect programs establishes a functionally distinct mode of opera-
tion for the robots, that is activated when specific environmental contingencies are
appraised. These modes involve the coordinated adjustment and entrainment of sev-
eral different systems-including those governing perception, attention, motivation
regulation, action selection, learning, and motor control-as part of the implementa-
tion of specialized solutions that take advantage of the regularities found in highly
recurrent and prototypical environmental contingencies.
We demonstrate this framework through multiple experimental scenarios that ex-
plore important features of the affect program abstraction and its function, including
the demonstration of affective behavior, evaluative conditioning, incentive salience,
and affective learning.
Thesis Supervisor: Rodney A. Brooks
Title: Panasonic Professor of Robotics
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Chapter 1
Introduction
There can be no knowledge without emotion. We may be aware of a truth,
yet until we have felt its force, it is not ours. To the cognition of the brain
must be added the experience of the soul.
- Arnold Bennett (From The Journals of Arnold Bennett (1932), entry
for 18 March 1897)
Imagine for a moment what would your life be like if you could not experience the joy
of rewarding events or the fear that warns you about dangerous contingencies. What
would happen if the events you experience in the world had no particular significance
to you? What if you did not, or better put, could not prefer some things over others,
nor could you choose among them? What if you would never experience the impulse
or motivation to act upon this world or decide a course of action based upon events
presented to you? Imagine this world where all events and stimuli were presented
simultaneously to you, and you had no means for selectively attending to them other
than using sensory-perceptual properties such as how close to you they appear to be,
how much they move, or what their shape is, but with no information as to whether
they are important to you or not. What if you could not derive meaning and learning
from the relationships between these events? What if it was impossible for you to
determine what your current state is, in relation to this world, nor signal this state
to others? Such a world would be one devoid of emotion. An affective flatland that
would be so strange and detached from our usual perceived reality that it is certainly
difficult to imagine, and perhaps even more difficult, if not impossible, to live in.
This thesis presents a unified computational framework for the study of emotion,
and affective phenomena in general, based upon the construction of computational
models that integrate several concepts and mechanisms that have been traditionally
deemed as integral components of intelligent behavior. Our approach is based on
the notion of Affect Programs, adaptive biological schemas that have proven useful,
throughout our evolutionary past, in helping us deal with life and survival-related
fundamental situations.
Given what we have learned thus far with respect to the disparate set of phe-
nomena referred to as emotions and affect, the time is now ripe for computational
approaches that supplement and reflect upon many of the more theoretical issues that
have been addressed by research in other disciplines, such as Philosophy, Psychology,
and more recently Neuroscience, where the emotions have had a more salient interest
among researchers.
A computational approach to emotions offers us the opportunity to study these
phenomena, with the appropriate scientific rigor, yet without many of the challenges
that accompany their study from the perspective of other disciplines. Furthermore,
through the construction of models and mechanisms, including building robots em-
bodied in the real world, we have the opportunity to test hypotheses and even ques-
tion our deepest assumptions with respect to affective phenomena, their functions,
and their underpinnings, all of which might ultimately prove useful in our quest for
engineering intelligence.
1.1 Multiple Stages for Affective Learning
Based on evidence stemming from multiple disciplines that have studied affective
phenomena from very different standpoints, we propose that affective learning occurs
in a sequential set of events that take place when an organism is exposed to signals or
cues that predict affectively significant events, which by our definition of affect, thus
correspond to biologically significant events (i.e., events that are somehow related to
fundamental life tasks). The proposed model is depicted in Figure 1-1. This model
indicates: (a) the hypothetical psychological constructs that occur at each stage;
(b) possible behavioral correlates; and (c) the computational components that are
associated with, and support the events in each stage. Although the model suggests
a sequential order, the fact that the behavioral components follow this order is not
meant to imply that the brain mechanisms underlying these different behaviors and
stages also function in a sequential order. In fact, quite the contrary occurs and
depending on what is being studied, parallel processing (and even competition) occurs
in the underlying brain mechanisms. The main issue that we want to point out with
this model is that the formation of associations based on affectively significant events,
produces predictable behavioral changes that are associated with multiple learning
systems involving a variety of processes. Describing these processes is what will
occupy the rest of this thesis.
First, however, a general description of the model is in order. The first stage
shown in Figure 1-1 represents an "attention" (also often called "arousal") stage
that involves the response to novel stimuli, most usually associated with "orienting
responses" (ORs). In addition to the relational behavior associated with the ORs,
novel stimuli also elicit complex autonomic changes (e.g., changes in heart rate and
blood pressure, hormonal release into the bloodstream). If the eliciting stimulus is
not of affective significance (either directly or because it has been associated with a
stimulus that is), the OR habituates until it is no longer generated. In contrast, the
co-ocurrence of otherwise neutral stimuli with affectively significant ones, would elicit
specific behaviors associated with the next stage. This second stage corresponds to
the first step in the development of associative affective learning. In this stage, neutral
stimuli acquire affective significance and thus become important to the organism, as
they become reliable predictors of events of biological importance. The development
of affective significance associations is related to the appearance of learned specific and
non-specific responses, as will be discussed in more detail later. Non-specific responses
have been referred to as preparatory, since they occur regardless of the nature of
the learning contingencies and presumably in order to prepare the organism for the
specific events that will follow. For instance, predicting the presence of a predator
through signals in the environment, might trigger a set of preparatory responses that
include accelerating the heart rate, releasing specific hormones such as adreno-cortisol,
and sending blood to the limbs, all in preparation for escape. Specific responses, on
the other hand, have been referred to as consummatory, as they end the preparatory
phase of behavior and consist of actions that are specific to the affective event (e.g.,
escaping once the predator is actually detected). Thus this second stage is perhaps the
most important stage in affective learning, as it is in here that stimuli are "coded" with
affective value and meaning is ascribed, at its simplest level, to the events occurring
in the world. In the third stage, this same kind of meaning is ascribed, but this time
to actions. In this stage, flexible responses are learned based on the association of the
outcome of an action (in affective terms), and the action itself. This stage comprises
a set of highly complex events for which there is yet no complete understanding.
However, we do know that the learning of more flexible responses starts to occur
and when the events that led to this learning are repeated in a predictable manner,
learning reaches asymptotic levels and the production of these responses become
habitual. Finally, in the fourth stage, these habitual responses are organized into
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Figure 1-1: A multi-stage model of affective learning.
behavioral "chunks" composed of sequences of behaviors that represent the highest
form of sensorimotor integration.
The scope of this thesis is limited to the first two stages of affective learning,
and part of the third phase. The chapters that follow will describe these stages in
more detail and will propose the use of the affect program abstraction as the primary
construct to implement and understand these stages from a computational standpoint.
1.2 Contributions
This thesis makes the following contributions:
1. From a theoretical perspective, and perhaps one of the main contributions of
this work, is a reconceptualization of the notion of emotion. We depart from
traditional accounts that focus on the experience of emotion, which view emo-
tions as states organisms can be in, and instead offer a perspective on emotion
that describes these phenomena as functionally distinct processes which imple-
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ment specialized solutions to prototypical situations that organisms (or robots)
face regularly in their environments.
2. We present a unified computational framework for the study of emotion that
accounts for different affective phenomena, including a variety of emotions and
emotional behavior, as well as simple notions of moods and temperament. This
framework further integrates these phenomena with several notions traditionally
deemed to be integral components of intelligent behavior.
3. As the main component of this framework, we introduce a novel computational
construct for an affect program as a biologically plausible abstraction for emo-
tion. The primary function of affect programs is to mediate, control and syn-
chronize the activities and interactions of several subprograms, including those
that govern perception, attention, physiological regulation, goal selection, motor
control, expressive social communication processes, action selection and learn-
ing, and so forth. Each of these affect programs establishes a mode of operation
for the robot, which involves the coordinated adjustment and entrainment of
these subprograms (responses) so that the whole system exhibits coherent be-
havior as a response to the confrontation with specific eliciting situations.
4. We present a model for incentive salience, which attributes motivational prop-
erties to stimuli and actions that signal the occurrence of events of emotional
(biological) significance. An incentive salience approach contrasts with other
views that propose that reward or incentive learning, as mediated by the brain's
mesolimbic dopamine systems, is based upon global teaching signals that code
for the errors in the prediction of reward. These views have found further ac-
ceptance in the neurosciences given that elegant computational counterparts,
such as the reinforcement learning models, seem to work in a similar manner.
However, an incentive salience approach, such as that proposed in this thesis,
provides an alternative explanation for the activity of these same brain systems
and through simple and localized learning rules, together with the organizational
principle that separates action into preparatory and consummatory behaviors,
can account for some of the evidence seen in experimental paradigms. Some-
thing that reinforcement learning models, at least in their original form, cannot
account for.
5. We propose an agent architecture that follows an affective-based decomposi-
tion and which provides a novel alternative to the control of intelligent robotic
systems. In this approach we suggest that a different organization of action
is pursued, one based not upon the desired external behaviors of the robots,
but rather on the set of prototypical fundamental situations that the robot will
encounter and view these as affective situations for which a set of coordinated
responses dan be made available which deal with (and perhaps solve) such situ-
ations, much in the spirit of these biological schemas we have referred to herein
as the affect programs.
6. Finally, we suggest a multi-stage model of affective learning that ties evidence
from psychology and neuroscience regarding classical paradigms of associative
learning and bridges these notions with a possible computational substrate, in
the form of the affect programs abstraction.
1.3 Methodology
The primary goal of this research is to investigate affect from a computational perspec-
tive. We will argue throughout this thesis that robotics research can address scientific
questions about the nature of affective processing in humans and animals. To this
end, we presents a novel methodology for building robots that follows an affect-based
decomposition. This methodology, which extends previous work on behavior-based
robotics (Brooks, 1986) and humanoid robotics (Brooks, Breazeal, Irie, Kemp, Mar-
janovid, Scassellati & Williamson, 1998), stresses the use of computational models
of affective processing to build and control intelligent systems that are capable of
performing a variety of complex behaviors in the real world.
Underlying this research is the notion that affect is inherently intertwined with
several attributes that we associate with intelligent behavior, such as multimodal
sensory integration, natural social interactions, and development (Brooks et al., 1998).
This idea is supported by surmounting evidence regarding the pervasiveness of affect
in perception, memory, attention, behavior selection, and learning (Damasio, 1999;
Gallagher & Chiba, 1996; LeDoux, 1996; Graybiel, 1998; Packard & Teather, 1998;
Panksepp, 1998).
1.3.1 Integration
Work in this thesis argues for the need to build complete systems that go beyond
shallow models of emotion, but rather include deep models of affect that act as the
main programs that mediate perception, attention, motivation, behavior, learning,
and motor control. The integration of such a variety of systems is without a doubt
a difficult challenge to overcome. Thus, appropriate abstractions and encapsulation
mechanisms are necessary. As suggested above, this thesis proposes the idea of an
affect program as a useful abstraction that offers a natural decomposition for this task.
Affect programs, which are defined in more detail in Chapter 2 and an implementation
is described in Chapter 6, integrate a variety of sensory information and synchronize
a number of functions in response to biologically significant events. Thus, it argues,
they are well suited to act effectively as an integration mechanism by which activity
in many different systems is bound together in a coherent manner.
1.3.2 Natural interaction
In a similar manner, this work argues that the expressive components of affect play an
interesting role in communicating internal states and promoting natural interactions.
By endowing our robotic systems with such expressive skills we can capitalize on
people's natural abilities to support social interaction. This provides a more natural
way for human-machine interaction as well as novel approaches for learning (Breazeal
& Velasquez, 1998) and opportunities to understand the nature of affective signals
(Velisquez, 1999). Supporting these ideas, Breazeal (2000) has made a compelling
case in demonstrating the power of affect as a modulator of social interaction.
It should be noted however, that these communication signals and their applica-
bility to social interaction, is but one of the many responses integrated by affective
processing. While we consider this an interesting research problem, the work in this
thesis rather focuses on deeper issues related to the computational problems that
organisms must face when dealing with biologically significant events in their envi-
ronments, and how affective processing is useful for integrating and coordinating a
set of responses that deal with such situations.
1.3.3 Development
Development is an extensive and gradual process by which organisms acquire increas-
ingly elaborate behaviors and new abilities. Recent work in robotics has begun to
deal with issues of cognitive development (Scassellati, 1998). Affective development,
on the other hand, is a new challenge that lies at the core of this thesis.
This work focuses on different learning mechanisms that allow the affect program
abstraction to be extended and used as a building block for the construction of action
repertoires (Graybiel, 1998). These learning mechanisms depart from the norm of
traditional learning theory in the sense that they are not general-purpose, but rather
biased mechanisms that learn about emotionally significant aspects of the world that
are relevant to any given affect program. It further argues that these constructions
(basic affective processing with extended learning mechanisms) may account for some
of the apparent cognitive-affective interactions that are believed to be part of the so-
called higher order emotions.
To this end, this thesis investigates the use of different learning strategies, includ-
ing both nonassociative and associative learning to promote development. It proposes
an architecture that incorporates multiple learning mechanisms that are distributed
in functionally meaningful ways across the affect programs framework. Of particular
interest, as it is described below, is the use of affective learning schemes such as in-
centive learning and reward-based learning, which can focus the organism's attention
and reduce the learning space by providing information concerning when to learn and
what to learn.
1.3.4 Inspiration from Biology
This work draws upon ideas from different disciplines that have a longer tradition of
studying affect, such as ethology, psychology, and neuroscience. Furthermore, it at-
tempts to integrate and reconcile knowledge derived from each of these disciplines into
computational models and abstractions that are biologically plausible and facilitate
the understanding of affective processing in humans and animals.
In particular, it reviews and draws upon work concerning the possible neural
substrates for some of the main issues considered in this thesis, such as the functional
roles of the basal ganglia, hippocampus, amygdala, and other brain structures, in the
processing of affect, behavior selection, and learning (Damasio, 1994; LeDoux, 1993;
Graybiel, 1995; White, 1997).
However, it is important to note that while it is interesting to examine these
findings and models, the rapid progression of research in this area means that it is
likely that many of these findings will be reevaluated or even dismissed. Thus, while
this work is related to experimental studies of the nervous system, an effort has been
made not to fall into the details of modeling particular structures or systems. In
other words, the purpose of this work is not to provide a model of any of these brain
structures, but rather to make use of our knowledge on these systems to support the
ideas and models behind this research.
1.4 Studying Affect from a Computational Per-
spective
Emotion has traditionally been studied by trying to make experimental participants
feel emotions or experience parts of emotion in the laboratory, and then measuring,
through self-report and other methods, its different components, and indicators. How-
ever, given ethical guidelines and technological constraints, the induction of emotion
in subjects is challenging (e.g., one must not exceed the intensity or kind of emotion
that a subject would experience in everyday live). Thus, studying emotions, at the
different levels of abstraction and at extreme ends of the affective range can pose
difficulties which require new approaches.
1.4.1 Computational Models
For anyone who restricts the notion of emotion to that of the experience of emotion,
it may seem strange and perhaps even impertinent that we commit to exploring the
underlying computational architecture of emotions.
As Cosmides & Tooby (2000) have recently indicated:
It may strike some as odd to speak about love or jealousy or disgust in
computational terms. "Cognition" and "computation" have affectless, fla-
vorless connotations. In everyday language, the term "cognition" is often
used to refer to a particular subset of information processing-roughly,
the effortful, conscious, voluntary, deliberative kind of thinking one does
when solving a mathematics problem or playing chess: what is often called
"cold cognition". - Cosmides & Tooby (2000, p. 98)
However, considering the definition of emotions put forward above (and detailed
in Section 2.2.4), it should be apparent that studying emotion from a computational
perspective is not only possible, but also appealing, given that by doing so, we should
be able to delve deeper into the set of computational problems that organisms face
while surviving in their environments, and devise new computational methods and
models that contribute to the understanding of such important aspect of our lives.
Computational modeling of emotion, to the extent that it can allow us to explore
questions that would otherwise be unethical or difficult to address in experiments
with humans and animals1 , presents itself as an excellent tool and as the primary
theoretical method for investigating the function and the mechanisms of emotion,
and affective processing in general. These models allow us to capture the essential
features of emotional systems at multiple levels of abstraction as well as at several
spatial-temporal scales, from the inner workings of emotional appraisal, to the net-
work coupling between emotional systems and the coordination and modulation of
other systems be they motivational, attentional, learning or motor control.
By drawing inspiration, and tying together into our computational models the
results and evidence gathered from multiple disciplines that have consistently studied
1Note, however, that recent approaches in the field of affective computing have introduced clever
ways for elucidating the mechanisms of affective processing without causing harm, in the emotional
sense, to the subjects that participate in such experiments (Picard, 1997). Likewise, advances in
neuroimaging have also allowed for other, less intrusive, ways to study the neural underpinnings of
such processing.
emotion over the years, such as Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience, and Ethology,
we can speculate and test hypotheses that can be directly verified by past or current
experiments in any of these disciplines. Furthermore, as it has been the case with
computational modeling in other fields (e.g., Neuroscience), through a computational
perspective we may be able to provide new perspectives to many of the problems that
are being currently addressed, and to devise new methods and models that can be
further confirmed through future experimentation.
1.4.2 Affective Robotics
In this thesis, we attempt to avoid the many general theoretical debates that have
surrounded the study of emotion over the years and instead focus on understanding
specific problems, such as understanding specific emotions and their conditions, what
they are, how are they implemented, and how do they interact with other emotions
and processes we usually attribute to intelligent behavior. To this end, it is not
surprising that we adhere to the views that argue for the existence of discrete and
biologically determined emotions, such as the Affect Programs theory described in
Chapter 2, which views emotions as the mechanisms that allow organisms to deal with
very fundamental life- and survival related tasks that have been recurrent throughout
our evolutionary past. The main issue that stands out from this view is that it
considers emotions to be functionally discrete, information-processing systems whose
integrated mode of operation functions as a solution designed to take advantage of
the particular structure of recurrent situations or triggering conditions to which the
emotion corresponds (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000).
From this perspective, in order to understand specific emotions, however, we need
to understand the class of problems faced by organisms as they are situated in their
environments, evaluating events, interacting and selecting significant stimuli, and de-
termining solutions for the multiple contingencies they face. It is in this respect, that
the use of robotic platforms provides an ideal experimental platform for a computa-
tional approach to the study of emotion. Robots are situated in the real world, which
is often uncertain and dynamic, they have to deal with noisy sensors and actuators,
and constantly face multiple and complex challenges, including the tasks of attend-
ing to and selecting relevant stimuli, determining the best course of action given any
situation, and deciding when and what to learn about their environment in order to
adaptively achieve (or maintain) some specific goals. These are precisely the class
of problems that constitute emotions and represent their functional purpose. Thus,
Affective Robotics may lead to a great number of scientific payoffs, as we will hope
to describe some of them in the following chapters of this thesis.
1.5 Overview of the Thesis
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:
Chapters 2 and 3 provide the conceptual background regarding the notion of
affect and emotion and what their possible function is, as it has been described by
researchers in the field. These chapters set up the stage and the conceptual framework
upon which the rest of this thesis is based.
Chapter 4 reviews some of our current knowledge with respect to the neural mech-
anisms underlying emotional processing and affective learning.
Chapter 5 briefly describes the robotic platforms used as testbeds for all of the
ideas that comprise the computational framework that is proposed in this thesis.
Chapter 6 presents our approach to engineering affect. It describes the main
computational abstractions that comprise the Cathexis framework and introduces
the notion of the affect program.
Chapter 7 builds upon the previous chapter in order to demonstrate how the
proposed framework can account for different affective phenomena, and how it can
be used in the organization and control of behavior.
Chapter 8 describes our multi-stage model for affect learning, which includes both
nonassociative and associative learning strategies that build upon the activity of affect
programs to learn relationships between the different contingencies that organism face
as they interact in their environments.
Chapter 9 demonstrates how affect can be used to modulate attentional processes,
by means of the interactions between different affect programs and relying upon
incentive salience properties as implemented in our computational framework.
Chapter 10 ends with a summary of the contributions of this thesis. It also exam-
ines related work in the synthesis of affect and affect-related models, especially those
concerned with reward or incentive learning, and outlines possible extensions to the
proposed framework as part of future work. Finally, in this chapter we speculate on
a number of theoretical issues in the engineering of affect, and how the reconcep-
tualization of emotion proposed in this thesis might lead to different views of the
mind.

Chapter 2
The Nature of Affect
What characterizes the class of things we commonly refer to as emotion? What are
their distinctive features? What elicits them and how are they produced? How do
they differ from those of other affective phenomena such as moods and temperament?
How can we study these phenomena? These are some of the questions posed by
researchers of emotion and by those who have been interested in obtaining an integral
understanding of the mind. Many different answers have been proposed, some of
which seem to be in agreement with our folk use of affective terms, and yet others
which seem ill-defined unless they are construed within the same specific stream of
thought in which they were first produced.
A difficulty in reaching consensus in the characterization of affect and emotion
is due, in part, to the ample scope of these affective phenomena, which opens up
a definition space that can be explored through many different perspectives, and
results in varied descriptions at multiple levels of abstraction. Ultimately, whatever
characterization of affect is chosen, it usually shares the aim of understanding the
phenomena and the conditions for their occurrence, but defining clear boundaries
that distinguish one phenomenon from another has been, and still is, problematic.
It is not uncommon to find researchers using the same terms (e.g., "emotion") to
refer to the study of very different classes of things, or to find others who provide
new terms and definitions, when they are in fact studying the same kind of affective
phenomena.
We would argue that the class of things that we commonly refer to as emotion
comprises a set of disparate phenomena that have been grouped together mainly by
our folk use of the term. However, this grouping is not necessarily due to the fact that
all of these phenomena share distinct features, or can all be characterized in the same
way, but rather because doing so is useful for our social communication as it offers
explanatory parsimony with respect to our everyday understanding of ourselves (i.e.,
our "folk psychology"). This is not to say that some of these affective phenomena do
not share distinct features at all. They do, and in fact the approach presented in this
work is based precisely on the notion that some of the emotions can be characterized
in such a way, and thus are amenable to study from a computational perspective.
This chapter aims to propose some answers to the aforementioned questions,
thereby setting the conceptual framework upon which the work on this thesis is built.
It briefly reviews some of the most common approaches to the study of emotion, focus-
ing on the affect program theory, which, from our perspective, is the most compelling
theory of emotion that resolves some of the issues involved in the characterization
of the phenomena and provides an appropriate level of abstraction that is suitable
for computational modeling. Readers amply familiar with the different models and
theories of emotion, their explanatory power and limitations, may wish to skip this
chapter.
2.1 Defining Affect and Emotion
There is very little agreement about the definitions and terminology used to describe
emotion, especially as they arise from different disciplines such as Philosophy, Neu-
roscience, Psychology, and more recently Artificial Intelligence. As an example of
this, Kleinginna & Kleinginna (1981) described the lack of consensus with respect to
the definition of emotion, while they considered 92 different definitions given by re-
searchers, together with 9 skeptical remarks-indicating that emotion is not a useful
concept-and organized these according to different categories, ranging from their re-
lation to physiological components or emotional/expressive behaviors, to definitions
based upon motivational and adaptive views. For such a "commonly understood"
and used term, the differences in the researchers' perspectives is simply astonishing!
To reduce the level of complexity of this definition space, researchers often decom-
pose whatever notion they hold of emotion into basic features that are more suitable
to study, and thus use these features as the indicators sine quibus nons of emotions
and of how they should be measured. For instance, some researchers define emotions
as feeling states, and thus measure these states by asking the subjects about the
"level" of emotion they are experiencing (Scherer, 1984). Other common definitions
of emotions include those based on the physiological reactions that they produce in the
peripheral nervous system (Ekman, Levenson & Friesen, 1983) or those that consider
the overt behavioral responses that they generate, including facial expressions and
their feedback (Ekman & Friesen, 1986; Ekman, 1994c; Izard, 1971; Izard, 1994; Za-
jonc, 1985). Finally, the large majority of modern researchers of emotion, define them
in terms of a set of cognitive appraisals, attributions and judgments which are also
measured through self-report and introspection (Frijda, 1986; Roseman, Spindel &
Jose, 1990). Suffice it to say, the approaches that rely upon the use of introspective
measures and self-reports can be problematic, as they make the important assump-
tion that the results of emotional processing are accessible to the individuals who
experience them (i.e., they are conscious), and that these individuals can reflect upon
them and quantify their intensity. Not to mention that there is no guarantee that the
reflections being made correspond in fact to the occurring emotions, and not perhaps
to the results of other mechanisms, such as evaluative or language processes, to name
a few possibilities. Notwithstanding, these are by far the most common approaches
used in experimental and social psychology to measure emotions. Obviously, the ap-
proach is limited to humans, as it is easily seen how this would be difficult to replicate
with other species (but see Section 3.3.1 for possible approaches to this end).
Another important difference among definitions of emotion lies upon the distinc-
tions made with respect to its causes. As it will be described in section 2.2 below,
some researchers believe that emotions are elicited by processes of evaluations (called
appraisals) and attributions that relate environmental contingencies to the ongoing
needs and goals of the organism making the appraisal (Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 1993).
Other researchers believe that all organisms are biologically "prepared" to respond to
specific objects and situations with specific emotional responses (Darwin, [1859]/1998;
Izard, 1977; Ekman, 1992; Ohman, 1986). Finally, still other researchers see emotions
as being elicited by a combination of these (Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992).
Considering that such markedly different phenomena can be labeled as emotions,
and that many definitions exist for these, we will attempt to avoid confusion by
providing some distinctions among the different terminology. In this thesis, we shall
refer to"affect" in the most general sense. That is, we will use this term to imply
that notion which encompasses all of emotional phenomena1 . Therefore, emotions,
moods, motivations and other affective phenomena will be classified herein as specific
kinds of affect.
We still need to operationalize these terms further so that our attempts to describe
these phenomena from a computational perspective have some grounds for our future
discussions. As a general notion, we will define affect as the set of processes that incite
action, based upon the evaluation of biologically significant contingencies, and thus
1Notice this usage departs from the colloquial use of the term, which usually refers to the feeling
of an emotion.
are motivational. As we progress downward in our analysis, we will supplement this
definition with other basic features that will help us further in our characterization
of specific kinds of affect, and in particular of emotion.
2.1.1 Emotions, Moods and Temperament
Emotion, moods, and temperament are all terms that have been used to describe
different features of affective phenomena. Often, however, these terms are used in-
terchangeably, which is a common source of confusion. In this thesis we shall try to
avoid that confusion by drawing some distinctions among them.
For many, the primary distinction between moods and emotion lies in their dura-
tion. Emotions are thought to be brief, while moods are seen as lasting much longer.
This is certainly not the only criterion for distinguishing between these phenomena.
Other distinctions include the notion that when compared to the component view of
emotions, moods might not include some of these components, such as a prototypical
facial expression. For instance, it would be common to observe multiple "angry" faces
when someone is in an "irritable" mood, and not necessarily a specific one as it would
usually be the case with an emotion. Also, when considering the eliciting causes of
emotion described in the previous section, it is clear that emotions have specific elicit-
ing conditions, and from an intentional stance, an object of interest as well. However,
this is not necessarily so for moods, which, perhaps due to their duration, is more
difficult to ascertain such causes, assuming they exist in the first place. In addition,
there seems to be important interactions between emotions and moods. Emotions can
lead to particular moods and moods seem to either lower the threshold, or potentiate
the arousal, of compatible emotions. For instance, when a person is in an irritable
mood, the person might become angry more readily than usual (Ekman, 1994b).
Davidson (1994), suggests that the main distinction between emotions and moods
might be a functional one. While emotions are directly linked to, and may serve the
purpose of biasing action, moods might be more tightly related to cognition:
The primary function of moods, on the other hand, is to modulate or bias
cognition. Mood serves as a primary mechanism for altering information-
processing priorities and for shifting modes of information processing.
Mood will accentuate the accessibility of some and attenuate the acces-
sibility of other cognitive and semantic networks (p. 52).
Although this will be described in more detail in Chapter 6, it should be noted
this is precisely the view we ascribe to when distinguishing between emotions and
moods. Moods are modeled as the tonic activation of the same mechanisms that,
when phasically activated, would correspond to emotions.
Finally, temperament refers to those long-term trait-like constructs that modulate
an individual's reactivity to affectively significant events. It is likely that tempera-
ment is associated with differences in the nervous system that can persist over longer
periods of time, such as differences in the quantity of receptors for certain neurotrans-
mitters, differences in reuptake mechanisms, or differences in the interactions between
the neural mechanisms that support emotion and other neural systems with which
they communicate (Davidson, 1994; Panksepp, 1994) . Whatever the case, it is clear
that the notion of affective style, as temperament is often called, relates to the emo-
tional traits of individuals that are thought to be largely biologically inherited, and
as such, partially predetermined. Some emotional tendencies clearly have heritability
components, and this has been shown many times in genetic research with animals
that are bred for different emotional features. For example, breeding selectively for
aggression, fearful reactivity or even higher curiosity is successful in just a few gen-
erations (Robertson, Martin & Candy, 1978; Pecifia, Cagniard, Berridge, Aldridge &
Zhuang, 2003).
2.1.2 Emotions as Processes
Given the prominence and frequency of emotions in our everyday lives, it is not
surprising that our "folk psychology" has led us to label them using verbal expressions,
mostly single words, that in most languages correspond to nouns. Thus, in describing
the emotions we usually treat them as "things". These things have come to represent,
from a traditional standpoint, a set of internal physical states of an organism that
are usually accompanied by physiological and behavioral changes in the body. For
instance, during a state of fear, you might feel tense and agitated, your face will
change, your brows will be raised and drawn together, the skin around your mouth
will tighten and your lower lip will be compressed and inverted, your vocal expression
will also be modified to increase its pitch level and range, as well as increasing your
speech rate, your heart will beat faster, your muscles will tense, your breathing will
change, your perspiration will increase and your overall skin temperature might feel
colder, as blood is sent to the limbs in preparation for a response.
As we have suggested before, labeling emotions as states is useful from a social
communication standpoint, but the analysis of emotions at a functional level might
be better off if they were treated as the variable results of active processes (Mandler,
1984). When we see emotions as processes, the relationships between the different
components of emotion become more amenable to study. We can more easily describe
how the different components are organized, synchronized and controlled. Think of
the previous example with the emotion called "fear". Instead of focusing on the state
of the organism, we can focus on the organization and synchronization of the different
processes that control muscle tension, mediate blood pressure and heart rate, release
hormones into the bloodstream, generate prototypical facial expressions, modulate
vocal expression, and more importantly, motivate action while biasing attention and
promoting learning. In addition, several basic questions can be addressed, such as
which processes are connected to other processes? Which of these connections are
due to the same eliciting conditions, and which are simple correlations? Which are
functionally dependent, and which are the effects of a central command system, as
the view of affect programs suggests?
Furthermore, this perspective facilitates the distinction between emotions and
moods suggested above. When we view emotions in terms of processes, rather than
states, we avoid needless discussions about the different category boundaries between
these affects. Thus, the question of whether something is a mood or an emotion is
readily solved when we think of these affective processes as being graded in inten-
sity. This turns the distinction between emotions and moods into a continuum of
"emotionness" and "moodness" (Scherer, 1984; Frijda, 2000).
Finally, the view held by some that suggests that emotions must be conscious
(Clore, 1994), which has been rightly challenged by many (see Zajonc (1994) and
Winkielman & Berridge (2004) for examples), becomes a less relevant issue when
emotions are considered as processes2. Let us clarify this idea further. When we
restrict the notion of emotion to that of the experience of the emotion (commonly
referred to as feelings), we discard all of its other components, which are by no means
less important.
Consider for instance the component that corresponds to the emotional evaluation
(i.e., the evaluation of stimuli significance). This process undoubtedly lies at the
center of emotions as it forms the basis of the elicitation, control and the expression
of emotion. Furthermore, there is ample evidence that suggests this process occurs
non-consciously, and at least for certain events its neural underpinnings have been
localized-mostly to structures that are not considered to play important roles in the
2This is not to imply that the conscious experience of an emotion is not an important compo-
nent. It most definitely is, and it has even been proposed by some researchers that without these
experiences or feelings, the learning that comes about as part of emotional processing would not be
possible in humans, nor in other species (Panksepp, 2005).
kind of processes that cognitive scientists would deem as cognitive processes, such
as the amygdala. Thus, emotional experiences are largely the result of unconscious
emotional processing in brain systems specialized in mediating the various evaluation
processes as well as the physiological and behavioral responses that are characteristic
of each emotion. This appears to be a general principle of consciousness-that the
content of consciousness is greatly determined by processes that are themselves not
accessible to consciousness (Kihlstrom, 1987; Johnson-Laird, 1988). In this respect,
LeDoux (1994) proposes:
[... ]unconscious processing is the rule and conscious processing is what
needs to be proven. If this view does nothing else, it shows how it is possible
to study emotion similarly in organisms that have defensible consciousness
(humans) and those for which consciousness cannot be proven (human
infants and nonhuman animals)(p. 292).
Aware of its controversial nature, we extend this notion to advocate that it is possible
to study emotional processing from a mechanistic perspective, and thus we believe
it is also possible to provide our robots with mechanisms that serve the functional
purposes of emotion that have usually been reserved only to humans, without entering
in unproductive (for now) discussions on the conscious nature of this processing.
2.1.3 The Structure of Emotion
What are the basic elements of emotional phenomena? Can we reduce emotions into
something else? If so, how should we call these elements? In the search for irreducible
elements of emotion, the most prominent accounts correspond to those that view the
range of emotional phenomena as a set of discrete emotions, and those which take on
the perspective that emotions can be further reduced into specific dimensions, such as
valence (pleasantness) and arousal (activation). We will briefly review these accounts
in the sections that follow.
Dimensional Accounts
Many researchers argue that any given emotion, such as anger, is reducible to a small
number of underlying dimensions. Earlier accounts proposed bivalent views of a single
dimension, such as pleasure. Nowadays, most researchers who follow this approach
take a two-dimensional view of emotion in which the two dimensions correspond to the
degree of pleasantness and activation to which an emotion is experienced. Thus, an
emotion is considered to be either pleasant or unpleasant (also labeled as positive or
negative), and also experienced as activated or deactivated (also labeled and aroused
or sleepy, and engaged or disengaged) (Russell, 1980; Reisenzein & Hofmann, 1990;
Reisenzein, 1994; Barrett & Russell, 1999).
One of the main proponents of this view is Russell (1980) who argued for two
independent bipolar dimensions that define the structure of all emotions. In his
model, which results in the circumplex illustrated in figure 2-1, all emotions can
thus be described as a combination of pleasure and activation. For example, an
emotion such as sadness would be considered as highly unpleasant and moderately
deactivated, whereas anger might be characterized as being moderately unpleasant,
but highly activated.
It has been objected that a circumplex is only observed when many states that are
affective, but not necessarily considered to be emotions are used in the analysis (e.g.,
"tired" and "relaxed" in figure 2-1) (Scherer, 1984). Another important criticism on
these accounts is that most of the evidence supporting them is based upon self-reports
and introspection. As we have suggested before, analyses based on self-report are not
always reliable, as the individuals reflecting on their experiences might alter them as
part of the process and thus generate differences in their reports. Furthermore, it
is possible that what it is being modeled is not necessarily the structure of emotion
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Figure 2-1: A multidimensional scaling solution for 28 affect words resulting in a cir-
cumplex. This figure illustrates Rusell's circumplex model based on two dimensions,
valence and arousal, and the scaling that results after affective terms are modeled.
Reprinted with permission from Russell, J. A., (1980). A Circumplex model of affect.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 1161-1178.
per se, but rather the structure of evaluations, linguistic processes, or something
even more basic than emotions, such as "core affect", which has been defined as
"a neurophysiological state that is consciously accessible as a simple, nonreflective
feeling that is an integral blend of hedonic (pleasure-displeasure) and arousal (sleepy-
activated) values" - Russell (2003, p. 147).
In addition, given the level of subjectivity involved in the creation of such a
model, the information provided by these dimensional models is rather vague at times.
Whereas an emotion such as anger might be considered to be highly unpleasant by
some (and reported as such), others report this level of activation to be quite pleas-
ant. Where in this two-dimensional space should anger be localized then? Also, when
thinking of the structure of emotion with the purpose of modeling it computationally,
which is the main objective of this thesis, one has to think at a much lower level of
abstraction, which implies that at some point it is necessary to be able to relate these
emotions and their localization in this two-dimensional space in terms of some mea-
surable feature of the body, or reveal something about the kind of behavior that these
emotional experiences result in, such as approach or avoidance. Given that a rela-
tionship is presupposed between pleasurable affect and approach, as well as between
negative affect and avoidance, what should we think of emotions such as anger or
fear? In these accounts these emotions are determined to have a negative valence (be
unpleasant), and thus, presumably, they would instigate avoidance behavior. Such is
the case of fear, in most cases, but not necessarily that of anger (e.g., approaching
a conspecific in an attacking behavior). Given such distinctions, such characteriza-
tion is problematic. How to explain the fact that we sometimes seek these emotions?
For instance, when we see terror movies, or ride in roller coasters? The explanatory
power of these accounts, at least with respect to our specific goal, is diminished. The
reductionist view of all emotion into these dimensions results far too impoverished to
explain the host of available data. An account such as this is coherent, however, with
approaches that are primarily concerned with the expression of emotional states, such
as Breazeal (2000), in which a computational model of emotional expression based
upon these views was compellingly shown.
The Basic Emotions Account
It seems clear to many that there exist at least some range of paradigmatic emotions
which would include instances that hold some correspondence to the English terms
"fear", "anger", "surprise", "joy", "sadness", and "disgust". This is the set of so-
called basic emotions3 , about which we will have more to say later on. For now,
3 The specific list of elements varies somewhat, depending on the proponent. We will expand this
set in Chapter 6
let us just mention that there are three main ways in which the notion of basic
emotions has been used in the literature (Ekman, 1999; Ortony & Turner, 1990).
The first use suggests that there are a number of discrete emotions that differ one
from another in important ways. For instance, fear, anger, and joy differ in their
eliciting conditions, as well as in their usually associated behavioral and physiological
characteristics. This perspective posits a marked contrast to other views (described
below) that treat emotions as being essentially the same constructs, which differ only
in terms of activation or pleasantness.
The second meaning argues that these emotions are fundamental and sufficient
elements to describe all emotional phenomena. The term basic applies to them in the
sense that they constitute the building blocks for all emotions. By themselves, these
emotions are descriptive of the most common emotional phenomena, and when com-
bined, they can produce other more complex emotions-such as "guilt" or "shame"--
much in the same way basic colors would be combined to produce composite col-
ors (Izard, 1977; Plutchik, 1994). For instance, according to Plutchik (1994), one of
the better known proponents of this view, fear and surprise would generate "awe"
when combined, whereas joy and fear would result in "guilt". Figure 2-2 illustrates
Plutchik's model of emotion and emotion blends. His three-dimensional circumplex
model of emotions describes relations among the different emotions in a manner anal-
ogous to the way colors are represented in a color wheel. Folding the model into a
cone, its vertical dimension represents the intensity of the emotion, whereas the cir-
cles represent degrees of similarity among the different emotions. According to this
model, there are eight primary emotion dimensions defined as four pairs of oppos-
ing emotions. The emotions in the blank spaces correspond to blends of two of the
primary emotions (Plutchik, 2001).
Finally, the third meaning of the basic emotions suggests that these discrete emo-
tions have a biological basis, and as such they are basic for the organism. This view
Figure 2-2: Plutchik's circumplex model of emotions and emotion blends. This three-
dimensional circumplex model describes relations among emotions in a manner analo-
gous to the way colors are represented in a color wheel. Folding the model into a cone,
its vertical dimension would represent the intensity of the emotion, whereas the circles
represent degrees of similarity among the emotions. According to this model, there
are eight primary emotion dimensions. The emotions in the blank spaces correspond
to blends of two of the primary emotions. Adapted from Plutchik (2001).
suggests that these emotions evolved due to their adaptive value in helping organisms
deal with recurrent, fundamental life- and survival related tasks. Thus, the char-
acteristics shared by these emotions are largely biologically determined (Tomkins,
1962; Tomkins, 1963; Izard, 1977; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992; Ekman, 1992; Ek-
man, 1994a; Cosmides & Tooby, 2000). It is this meaning which has been more widely
A
used, but it is not without controversy.
Table 2.1: A Selection of Lists of "Basic" Emotions Based on Ortony & Turner (1990).
Reference Fundamental emotion Basis for inclusion
Arnold (1960) Anger, aversion, courage, Relation to action tenden-
dejection, desire, despair, cies
fear, hate, hope, love, sad-
ness
Ekman, Friesen & Anger, disgust, fear, joy, Universal facial expressions
Ellsworth (1982) sadness, surprise
Frijda (1986) Desire, happiness, interest, Forms of action readiness
surprise, wonder, sorrow
Gray (1982) Rage and terror, anxiety, Hardwired
joy
Izard (1971) Anger, contempt, disgust, Hardwired
distress, fear, guilt, interest,
joy, shame, surprise
James (1884) Fear, grief, love, rage Bodily involvement
Mowrer (1960) Pain, pleasure Unlearned emotional states
Oatley & Johnson- Anger, disgust, anxiety, Do not require propositional
Laird (1987) happiness, sadness content
Panksepp (1982) Expectancy, fear, rage, Hardwired
panic
Plutchik (1994) Acceptance, anger, antici- Relation to adaptive biolog-
pation, disgust, joy, fear, ical processes
sadness, surprise
Tomkins (1984) Anger, interest, contempt, Density of neural firing
disgust, distress, fear, joy,
shame, surprise
Watson (1930) Fear, love, rage Hardwired
Weiner & Graham Happiness, sadness Attribution independent
(1984)
Not surprisingly, the specific list of emotions that are considered to be basic varies
from researcher to researcher. Table 2.1 describe some of the lists proposed by the-
orists. Regardless of these differences, the important aspect of this definition is the
reference to a biological determinism and a functional account, as Oatley & Johnson-
Laird (1996) declared:
The precise number of basic emotions is less important than the hypothesis
that each kind of emotion has specific functions and that mechanisms that
evolved to serve these functions map diverse events into a small set of
emotional modes. - Oatley & Johnson-Laird (1996, p. 365)
The account for basic emotions is appealing to most researchers, even if the third
meaning of its usage (i.e., that they have a biological origin) is not appealing to
others (Ortony & Turner, 1990; Turner & Ortony, 1992). As it will be described in
the following sections, we follow a similar view of basic emotion programs in this
work.
2.1.4 Nature Versus Nurture
Are affective phenomena completely due to the design, the constraints, and informa-
tion processing styles of affective mechanisms provided by nature to organisms? To
what extent is affective processing the result of individual learning about the different
conventions, models, and roles provided by our cultural and societal environments?
Given the amount of compelling evidence for a neurobiological substrate (Panksepp,
1998), some of which is described in more detail in Chapter 4, it is difficult to dispute
the idea that emotions have a biological basis. However, the exact nature of what
these mechanisms remains an open question.
In any case, it should be clear that the capacity for emotion is deeply ingrained in
many species. Furthermore, the processes of emotional evaluation, by which signifi-
cant stimuli come to elicit emotions, are also thought to rest upon innate capabilities
(LeDoux, 1996). There is also strong evidence that there exist innate dispositions re-
lated to specific emotions, or at least to forms of stereotypical behavioral tendencies
given specific and recurrent situations such as facing an immediate danger, fighting for
resources or a mate, experiencing an irrevocable loss, working toward a goal, falling in
love, escaping predators, and so on. Some of this evidence comes from neuropsycho-
logical findings (Panksepp, 1998), as well as the findings of universality of such action
patterns (Cosmides & Tooby, 2000), including but not limited to facial expressions
(Ekman, 1994c).
Biological and evolutionary explanations can go terribly wrong when they ig-
nore development and cultural determinants, and we know that developmental and
evolutionary explanations are essentially complementary. Still, it is not clear how
biological dispositions interact with culturally determined traits. It is also unclear
how emotions that have an important cognitive component, such as regret, relate to
biological mechanisms and dispositions based on the basic emotions described abvove.
How does a mechanism such as learning make use of what is being provided in the
environment? Does what is given constrain what is learned? These questions have
hardly been treated with any depth, in part because it is so difficult to do so from
a traditional experimental perspective. A computational approach to emotions may
provide the basis for such an endeavor. Starting from Chapter 6, and in those that
follow, this thesis lays an initial foundation from which some of these questions can
be explored.
2.2 The Quest for the Affect Abstraction: Looking
at Emotion Theories
Providing a complete account of the major theories of emotion is beyond the scope
of this work. We will however provide a general overview of each theory that will
be sufficient for us to lay a basic conceptual framework useful for understanding the
reasons behind some of the main design decisions considered in our computational
approach to emotion. For a much more comprehensive overview of the different
theories of emotion, the reader is referred to Cornelius (1996).
Although no particular agreement exists upon a general strategy to investigate
affect, most of these different theories do seem to fit into any of three main schools
of thought concerning the study and categorization of emotion: Cognitive appraisal
theories, social constructionist theories, and evolutionary theories. Depending on
which theoretical approach is adopted, the specific methods to study emotion, the
various levels of detail applied, the class of phenomena studied, the way in which
emotions are though to be elicited, and the particular biases, goals and application
of the findings of the research, the results will most certainly vary.
2.2.1 Cognitive Appraisal Theories
Research on the psychology of emotion has been dominated by cognitive perspectives,
of which, appraisal theory is perhaps the most representative approach (Arnold, 1969;
Ortony, Clore & Collins, 1988; Roseman et al., 1990; Lazarus, 1991; Johnson-Laird
& Oatley, 1992).
The main idea behind cognitive appraisal theories is that emotions are generated as
people evaluate or appraise the many different events that occur in their environments.
This appraisal process requires some form of evaluative cognition, which depend on a
person's attitudes, attributions, beliefs and desires, and which ultimately determines
what emotion, if any, should be experienced on any given situation. Therefore, this
means that different individuals might actually experience different emotions given
the same event or stimulus. Consider for instance the event in which a vacation you
had planned several months in advance to the sunny Caribbean is thwarted a couple
of days before traveling due to a category F5 hurricane that hits the islands where
your hotel was located. In such an event, some people might experience sadness for
not being able to travel, while others might experience anger, and still others might
experience fear of the imagined conditions, even if the events did not touch upon them
directly. This variability in the experience of emotion, which according to these views
depends on the cognitive evaluations made by the individuals, was one of the main
motivations for the development of these theories and became an argument against
biologically relevant events and hence biological theories.
One of the main implications of cognitive appraisal theories is that emotions are
not necessarily produced from hardwired constructs in response to certain, biologically
relevant stimuli, but that the emotional significance of the events and objects depends
on the goals and the coping strategies of each individual in any given situation.
In general, the main assumption of these theories is that it individuals, whether
consciously or not, can assess the degree to which events are positive or negative,
whether these events are in accordance to the individual's expectations, whether they
obstruct or facilitate goals that the individual may have, whether they are under the
individual's control or not, whether the events are familiar or novel, and whether
the responses will be manageable or on the contrary overwhelming. All of these
evaluations are then organized into taxonomies that reflect the different patterns of
evaluation and thus the discrete emotion that the individual would experience.
For instance, Figure 2-3 illustrates the taxonomy proposed by Roseman (1984). In
it, an emotion such as fear would be evoked after a cognitive appraisal has been made
by the individual reflecting a pattern in which the event occurs under circumstances
that are beyond the control of the individual, it would implicate the absence of a
reward or the presence of a punisher, and the individual expected that the event is
undeserved.
Given the amenable implementation of these taxonomies into production rules of
the IF-THEN kind, it is not surprising that cognitive appraisal theories have become
the favorite picks of most computational approaches proposed to date. However, an
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Figure 2-3: Appraisal Patterns According to Roseman. This figure illustrates Rose-
man's hypothesized appraisal constructs that elicit emotion. Reprinted with per-
mission from Roseman, I. J., Spindel, M. S., and Jose, P.E. (1990). Appraisal of
emotion-eliciting events: Testing a theory of discrete emotions. Journal of Personal-
ity and Social Psychology, 59, 899-915.
important assumption made by supporters of this perspective is that emotions can be
explained by studying and understanding how people come to these evaluations about
their world. To this end, researchers rely on self-report and introspective techniques
as the main tools to develop these cognitive accounts and identify the relationships
between different appraisal configurations and the category of emotion they elicit.
Considering the main purpose of this research, we would argue that symbolic
representations of the qualitative observations of people's emotional experiences are
useful to study how people interpret and reason about those experiences, but they do
not necessarily provide much more information with respect to how the emotions are
actually processed and elicited in the first place, and much less about the underlying
neural mechanisms.
In addition, and from a methodological perspective, it has been shown, both
through experimental and clinical studies, that we often do not properly understand
and verbalize the causes of our own behavior (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Gazzaniga
& LeDoux, 1978). Thus, one must remain cautious of approaches that rely on in-
trospection to provide information about causal knowledge (see Farthing (1992) for
review). The main concern in this case is of access to the proper kind of information.
These approaches assume that introspection on emotional experiences has access to
the same kind of information used by the brain in producing those emotional expe-
riences in the first place, which, again, has been shown this is not always the case
(Gazzaniga, 1998).
2.2.2 Social Constructionism
The apparent differences in emotions among various cultures is one of the main mo-
tivations of the social constructivist perspective. Embedded within a broader social
constructionism research program, this approach to emotion aims at understanding
how different aspects of culture including social practices, moral structures, and lan-
guage, influence and ultimately determine the different manifestations of emotional
phenomena.
The analysis of cultural differences in language for emotion is one of the main
influencers for the social constructionist approach (Lutz, 1988). As a general rule, this
approach rejects the notion that there are biological truths in the sense described in
section 2.1.4 and further on. To the contrary, it suggests that most human processes,
conditions, and states are constructions of society that serve in the end certain goals of
the same society it created them. Thus, from this perspective, emotions are products
of any given culture that are constructed by the culture and in essence to serve the
culture (Gergen, 1985)
Averill (1980), one of the main advocates of the social constructivist approach,
defines emotions as being:
[...]a transitory social role (a socially constituted syndrome) that includes
an individual's appraisal of the situation and that is interpreted as a pas-
sion rather than an action. - Averill (1980, p. 312)
Two main aspects of this definition, shared by other proponents of the social
constructionism of emotion, are the notions of social concepts and social roles. The
first notion, as in the cognitive appraisal theories, suggests that emotions are the
product of a person's evaluations of events in the world. The main difference, however,
is that the types of judgements performed by a person are not naturally, but rather,
culturally determined. In other words, culture, mores, and social structures in general,
shape the contents of those beliefs, attitudes and judgements. The second notion
refers to the set of rules that allow a person to define what is the "proper" way of
responding to a given situation.
According to this view, social concepts and social roles are not simply influenced by
culture, they are the product of culture, thus explaining the wide variety of emotional
phenomena and the characteristic patterns of behavior found in different societies
(Averill, 1984; Armon-Jones, 1986). As a somewhat radical perspective, the social
constructivist view has been intensely debated, especially by other researchers working
on more biological and evolutionary approaches to emotion, which is the topic of the
following section.
2.2.3 Affect Programs Theory
The affect program theory of emotion puts forward the idea that some emotions are
pancultural "programs" enabled by biological capabilities acquired throughout our
evolutionary past. The term "program" indicates that they are coordinated collec-
tions of complex biological responses that occur together in response to prototypical
and recurrent situations for which adaptive solutions have been found.
Like other psychoevolutionary approaches, the affect program theory has its ori-
gin in Darwin's The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (Darwin,
[1859]/1998). In this seminal work, Darwin studied and reported on the various
facial and bodily expressions concerning distinct emotions. Moreover, he suggested
what their possible functions could be, and alluded to homologies to responses in
other species.
Darwin's approach to emotion influenced most modern work on emotional ex-
pression (Izard, 1971; Ekman & Friesen, 1986). These recent theories, together with
objective analysis of subjective human experiences, and recent evidence of specific
brain systems (LeDoux, 1996; Panksepp, 1998), have led researchers to believe in the
existence of a small set of discrete primary 4 emotional systems, or affect programs.
Affect programs can be defined as executive, operating systems that generate
and coordinate short-term, stereotypical responses that allow organisms to deal with
biologically significant events in ways that promote survival.
These responses involve a variety of elements such as facial and behavioral expres-
sions, arousal of the Autonomic Nervous System (ANS), vocal expressions, modula-
tion of attention, and affective feelings. It is important to note that no one of these
elements constitutes the essence of an emotion. In particular, and contrary to other
views, emotion feelings are no more central to the identity of a particular emotion
4 Primary or basic, in the sense of being fundamental and biologically determined, not in the sense
that it can be combined with other emotions to form secondary ones.
than is its characteristic facial expression.
Different theorists have various reasons to classify affect programs as basic. These
include different arguments such as the fact that some of these response patterns are
pan-cultural and homologies can be found in related species (Ekman, 1992; Izard,
1994), and ample neuroscientific evidence suggesting the existence of several intrinsic
emotional systems in the mammalian brain, including those mediating fear, anger,
separation distress, interest, play, sexual lust, and disgust (Flynn, 1967; LeDoux,
1996; Panksepp, 1998).
In preliminary work, described in further chapters, we have found the affect pro-
gram paradigm to be both a compelling argument on the nature of affect, and a useful
abstraction to implement and examine affective processing from a computational per-
spective.
2.2.4 Revisiting the Definition of Emotion
In the previous sections we defined affect as the set of processes that incite action, and
thus are motivational. At the same time, we reviewed some of the basic issues involved
in the analysis of emotion, including the ideas of discrete emotions versus dimensional
accounts of emotion, states or processes perspectives, and biological determinism
versus cultural development.
Building upon these ideas, we can further characterize our view on emotion, basing
our definition on the affect program theory and in that of Panksepp (1998), who is
one of the main proponents of this view, and a pioneer in the recent field of Affective
Neuroscience. From this field's perspective, we define emotions (in the affect programs
sense) as systems that:
1. Are biologically predetermined and designed to respond unconditionally to stim-
uli arising from major life-challenging circumstances.
2. Organize diverse behaviors by activating or inhibiting, and synchronizing sen-
sorimotor subprograms and concurrent autonomic-hormonal changes that have
proved adaptive during our ancestral past
3. Change the sensitivities of sensory systems and modulate attention in a manner
relevant to the behavioral sequences that have been activated
4. The activity arising from these programs outlasts the circumstances that elicited
them in the first place
5. Can come under the conditional control of emotionally neutral environmental
stimuli through local learning systems
6. Have reciprocal interactions with the brain mechanisms that elaborate higher
decision-making processes and consciousness.
7. These emotion circuits, constitute local learning systems that bias the organism
to pay attention to and learn about the environment whenever the eliciting
circumstances have activated the circuits. In other words, these circuits, when
active, bias the organism for learning, indicating what to learn and when to
learn it.
In the following chapters, we describe how, through a computational approach,
we take the explanatory power of the affect programs theory and convert it into a
computational abstraction of what an emotion is and how it is implemented.
2.3 Summary
This chapter introduced some of the most commonly debated issues related to the
study of emotion, including the contentious definition of this construct, its structure
and the different levels of abstraction at which it can be studied.
We briefly reviewed the main approaches proposed by different theorists with re-
gards to the study of emotion, and focused on a psychoevolutionary approach that
provides the most compelling theory of emotion, from our perspective, while at the
same time addresses many of the issues involved in the characterization of the phenom-
ena and provides an appropriate level of abstraction that is suitable for computational
modeling.
Finally, we introduced the notion of affect programs, as the primary theoretical
constructs for investigating the function and the mechanisms of emotion, and which
correspond to biologically predetermined operating systems that generate and coordi-
nate short-term, stereotypical responses that allow organisms to deal with biologically
significant events in ways that promote survival.
Chapter 3
The Function of Emotion
In the previous chapter, we alluded to the notion that all organisms possess a set
of discrete emotions that serve specific purposes. What are these purposes? Why
do we have emotions? In this chapter we address these questions from a functional
and operational perspectives. At the functional level, and following the affect pro-
gram theory, we propose that emotions (affect programs) exist due to the need that
all organisms have to deal with fundamental life-and survival-related tasks, such as
avoiding danger, finding mates, securing shelter, seeking resources and solutions to
satisfy physiological needs, guarding these resources, and so forth. Of course, dealing
with complex tasks such as these, and doing so in dynamic and uncertain environ-
ments, must involve the activity of a variety of mechanisms that operate at various
levels. We suggest that the coordination and synchronization of these mechanisms is,
at an operational level, the main reason for emotion.
In the sections that follow, we will describe some of the mechanisms that are
coordinated, modulated and synchronized by the set of affect programs described
before. These interactions will set up the stage for the computational models that
will be described in further chapters.
3.1 Emotion and Cognition
Since early times, emotion has always been separated from cognition. When William
James wrote and published his seminal paper on 'What is an emotion?' (James,
1884), his descriptions were certainly such that this separation between cognitive
processes and emotions seemed more than reasonable. From a Jamesian account, we
are afraid because we escape from danger, or sad because we cry. Our perception of
all bodily changes involved in the processing of affect, according to James, determine
how we feel, and thus the emotion that we experience. James and Lange's ideas led
theorists to set out with the task of understanding the set of bodily changes and
processes associated to emotion. One consequence of such line of thought was that
emotion was kept a separate entity from mind processes, as they referred only to
cognition. Emotion was thus reduced to visceral sensations, and further separated
from thought and rational processes. This was further exacerbated with the dawn
of behaviorism, which almost completely removed the topic of emotion from the
studies of the mind. Whereas cognitivism implicated the thoughts and beliefs of
an organism as determinants of its actions, behaviorists dealt with objective and
observable measures only, which had no place for emotions and other psychological
constructs that were "unmeasurable" from an objective standpoint.
Much time has passed since then and many advances have elucidated new avenues
of thought in this respect. In particular, recent work in the neural substrates of
emotion have allowed insight into otherwise "obscure" mind processes and as a result
it has increased the interest in undertaking the study of emotion, which directly or
indirectly, involve examining the relation between emotion and cognition.
The work by Damasio (1994), for instance, has been paramount in raising interest
in understanding emotion, and affective processing in general, from a mind perspec-
tive. His work argues that contrary to popular belief, emotion and reason go together,
hand in hand, in the processes that generate coherent and intelligent behavior. Based
on studies with patients that had lesions in the frontal lobes, particularly in the ven-
tromedial and orbitofrontal cortices, he suggested that emotion was more than just a
disruptor of rational thinking, and that in fact it was a necessary influence for rational
decision-making and other processes we tended to associate only to higher-level cog-
nition. The work of Damasio, together with the pioneering work by (LeDoux, 1996)
in elucidating the specific mechanisms for fear conditioning, have certainly brought
emotion and cognition to the forefront, and most importantly, back together.
Although reviewing the whole spectrum of interactions between affect and cog-
nition is beyond the scope of this work, it certainly is important to recognize the
fact that affective and cognitive processes are intertwined in many interesting and
unknown ways. Some of these interactions include the emotional modulation of mem-
ory and learning, the relationships between emotions and the planning and execution
of goal-directe behaviors, the influence of evaluative processes in early information
processing, the influences and modulation of emotion in perceptual fluency, and the
relationship between emotions and the darlings of cognitivism: beliefs and goals. In-
teractions between emotion and cognition are aplenty! The following sections focus
on just two of these interactions, as they are an integral component of this work:
affect and motivations and goals, and the interactions between affect and attention.
3.2 Emotion and Motivation
Perhaps one of the main interactions that need to be discussed is that between emo-
tions and incentives. Incentives or motivations refer to those events and objects in
the world that elicit or have a tendency to elicit actions, as they are of biological
significance to organisms.
The relations between emotion and motivation constitute a great area for debate.
As it is the case for the term "emotion", "motivation" suffers from a similar polysemy.
As Minsky (2006) suggests, these are "suitcase" words that can be used to refer to
many different situations and phenomena. One can view motivation as a cause of
emotions, as one of its major aspects, and as one of its consequences. Here, we will
attempt to make distinctions between these terms in order to avoid confusion. In
principle, we will argue that a specific kind of affect program, the Seeking system, is
the main emotional system that deals with the incentives of the world.
3.2.1 A Brief History of the Study of Motivation
The concepts related to incentive motivation came about as the notions related to
drives, and drive reduction theories (Hull, 1943), fell from grace in the 1960s. Multiple
advances in the understanding of brain function led theorists to reject the views
that posited how drive and drive reduction theories explained the way incentives
came to promote behavioral responses and learning. Based upon the arguments
that seeking and learning about rewards could not operate under these principles,
new theories were developed, and some of these theories incorporated the notion of
incentive motivation (Bolles, 1972; Bindra, 1978; Toates, 1986).
In particular, Bolles (1972) proposed an account for these phenomena based on
incentive expectancies. He suggested that organisms were motivated, and learned
about rewards, not by any reinforcement produced by the reduction of a particular
drive (e.g., hunger or thirst), but rather because they had learned to expect the
occurrence of particular hedonic rewards. In other words, he argued that organisms
learned associations between a neutral stimulus (S), such as a light or sound, and a
hedonic reward that followed (S*), such as a palatable food. He called them S-S*
associations to suggest that the S would elicit an expectation for the S*, which was
of motivational significance before the association was formed (Bolles, 1972). He also
suggested that organisms learned R-S* associations, namely that their own response
(R) became useful predictors for the occurrence of the S*.
This expectancy relationship was questioned by others with respect to its moti-
vational value. That is, why would an expectancy association cause motivation? To
overcome these shortcomings, Bindra (1978) extended Bolles' account, but otherwise
rejected his notion that it was this expectancy alone the main cause for incentive
motivation. Bindra suggested that a stimulus that predicts a reward (the S in Bolles'
terms) does not simply create an expectation, but rather it also elicits a motivational
state of the hedonic reward itself (the S* in Bolles' terms). Thus, the learned asso-
ciation implies not only a cognitive expectation of the reward, but also causes the
organism to perceive the stimulus (S) as if it were the hedonic reward (S*). In other
words, the S takes on, or is attributed, specific affective and motivational properties
that otherwise would normally belong to the S* itself.
Bindra's claim that neutral stimuli become the same as incentive stimuli as a
function of their association did not go without criticism, however. Critics questioned
that if neutral stimuli simply became incentives because of learning, then they would
always elicit responses, much as incentives do, regardless of the physiological states
that an organism would be in (Gallistel, 1978). Physiological mechanisms do regulate
the motivation for incentive rewards, and one normally seeks out food when hungry,
water when thirsty, or a mate when sexually aroused. Thus, some link was missing
which would connect the ideas of physiological states to those of incentives.
Incorporating these concepts further into incentive motivation, along came Toates
(1986), who extended the Bolles-Bindra accounts and incorporated the notion that
physiological drives and regulatory mechanisms could mediate the affective and mo-
tivational value of stimuli. One of his most interesting propositions was that physio-
logical or drive mechanisms did not need to drive motivation directly, but they could
have multiplicative effects on the hedonic value and the incentive value of rewards.
Likewise, by the same mechanisms suggested by Bolles and Bindra, they could also
enhance the affective and incentive value of the stimuli that predicted these rewards.
Thus, an interesting set of interactions was now accounted for, which would consider
the effects of physiological mechanisms, the affective and motivational properties of
incentives, and the learned associations between predictive stimuli and rewards.
An important addition to these concepts was Toates' position with respect to
cognitive expectancies. He suggested that Bolles' cognitive expectancies and Bindra's
basic incentive motivation processes might be active simultaneously and would act in
different ways to control the behavior of an organism via two different pathways: a
stimulus-bound one and a goal-directed one (Toates, 1986).
These ideas were later taken up most notably by Berridge and colleagues, and by
Dickinson and Balleine, among others, and developed further into what is currently
known as Incentive Salience and Incentive Learning theories which constitute the
foundation for the motivational accounts included in this thesis (Berridge & Robinson,
1998; Berridge, 2000; Dickinson & Balleine, 2002).
3.3 Emotion and Rewards
To many, the term reward is often used as a substitute for conscious pleasure. That
is, something that is consciously liked in the hedonic sense. However, is conscious
pleasure really necessary for an incentive to be considered as rewarding? While this
might be an obviously positive answer for some, it turns out to be incorrect. Despite
the many accounts that argue for the impossibility of affect without awareness (Clore,
1994), there is evidence to the contrary suggesting that unconscious affect is possible,
as shown by the experiments of Winkielman & Berridge (2004). What does this
mean for those theories that account for reward only with respect to their hedonic or
affective value?
Reward has been treated as a unitary concept in psychological terms, however
recent evidence suggests that this notion in fact does not correspond in reality to a
monolithic process, nor to a unique underlying brain mechanism. Recent studies have
shown dissociations of multiple reward components, as well as several different neural
circuits that may very well code for and process reward-related information(Berridge
& Robinson, 2003; Schultz, 1998).
As it will be described shortly, the notion of reward corresponds to multiple psy-
chological components (see Figure 3-1), and not only to the affective component that
reigned in psychological traditions. Hence, when we discuss about reward it is im-
portant to explicitly refer to which of these components we are referring to in order
to avoid unnecessary confusion.
A first component clearly identified by the experiments of Schultz and colleagues
(Schultz & Romo, 1990; Schultz, Dayan & Montague, 1997; Schultz, 1998; Schultz,
2002; Schultz, 2006), relates to learning. That is, considering rewarding events, how
can we learn about relationships among stimuli and about the consequences and
outcomes of our actions? A second component is of an affective nature: obtaining
and consuming rewards can produce affective reactions in the hedonic sense. Finally,
how do we choose a course of action? What events and objects in the world are
significant for us to pursue and how do we obtain the impulse or motivation to act
upon them and learn from them? In other words, a third component of reward relates
to its motivational aspects. Thus, at the very least, there are three interrelated
components of reward that must be considered when studying and discussing about
reward. Although the interactions between these components is still an open question,
as it is the precise identification of how brain circuits mediate these constructs, it is
clear that we should be more precise when referring to reward and reward-related
processes.
It is important to note that the affective and motivational components of reward,
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Figure 3-1: Multiple Components of Reward. This figure illustrates the different
components of reward: learning, motivation and affect. Each of these components
can be consciously experienced, but implicit accounts for each of these components
do exist as well. Reprinted with permission from Berridge, K. C. and Robinson, T.
E. (2003), Parsing reward, Trends in neurosciences, 26(9), 507513.
as described in Figure 3-1, can exist even without conscious awareness. These implicit
processes are interesting to the study of reward because if core reward processes can
be dissociated from their subjective feeling, they might be better suited to objective
measurement in brain manipulation experiments (Berridge & Robinson, 2003).
Let us consider each of these implicit components separately. First, recall the
Bolles-Bindra-Toates multi-theory reviewed above. This theory suggests that learned
incentive stimuli have both affective and motivational consequences. That is, they can
be both 'liked' and at the same time 'wanted'. The use of quotes surrounding these
terms was proposed by Berridge and colleagues, to refer to the objective measures
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of each construct. Hence, when referring to conscious pleasure as the subjective
affective feeling the term is used without quotes (liking), but an objective measure of
an affective reaction would thus correspond to what is referred to as 'liking'. Similarly
with respect to 'wanting'. When speaking of the conscious and subjective notion of
desire, the term is used without quotes (wanting). However, the objective motivation
process, which we will describe later on as incentive salience, would be referred to as
'wanting'.
Liking and wanting are fairly standard terms that are sometimes used interchange-
ably. While some causality might be implied, this is not necessarily so, but most
people would think that incentives (rewards) whenever they are liked they are also
wanted. Berridge (2000) and colleagues have taken these ideas further and suggested
that these concepts actually correspond to two very different incentive processes as
it will be described in the following section.
3.3.1 'Wanting' versus 'Liking'
Incentive salience or 'wanting' follows the Bindra-Toates rules for incentive learning
but identifies separable brain substrates for 'liking a reward versus 'wanting the same
reward. The incentive salience model was proposed by Berridge & Robinson (1998)
as a way to reconcile the different and competing theories about brain dopamine
function (which will be described in more detail in Chapter 4). In particular, the
model intended to reconcile the fact that dopamine sometimes seemed to mediate
sensory pleasure, like Wise and others suggested (Wise, 1996; Wise & Rompre, 1989;
Wise, 2002), when in fact this might not be the real case.
'Liking' is essentially hedonic impact or affective value of a reward--the brain
reaction underlying sensory-pleasure triggered by immediate receipt of reward such
as a sweet taste, as measured in objective terms. While these reactions are usually
triggered by so-called unconditioned stimuli, 'liking' can also be produced by pre-
dictive, conditioned stimuli, following the same principles suggested by Bindra, and
described above (Bindra, 1978). On the other hand, 'wanting' or incentive salience,
corresponds to the motivational incentive value, rather than the affective value, of
the same reward (Berridge & Robinson, 1998).
Why did brains evolve separate 'wanting' and 'liking' mechanisms for the same
reward? As Berridge & Robinson (2003) suggest, perhaps 'wanting' evolved after
more primitive 'liking' so as to provide a common currency shared by all rewards
which could be useful in order to compare and decide between the certainly different
'liking' choices for food, sex or other incentives. Through some clever and elegant
brain manipulations, Berridge and colleagues have shown dissociations of these two
incentive processes, which as we mentioned before, normally function and go together,
but which can be split apart (Wyvell & Berridge, 2000; Berridge & Robinson, 1998;
Berridge & Robinson, 2003).
'Liking' can be produced without eliciting 'wanting', and vice versa, 'wanting'
without 'liking'. 'Liking' without 'wanting' occurs when brain manipulations are per-
formed in such a way as to suppress the neurotransmission of mesolimbic dopamine.
For instance, disruption of mesolimbic dopamine systems, through neurochemical le-
sions of the dopamine pathway that projects to the Nucleus Accumbens (NAS) or
by receptor-blocking drugs, dramatically reduces incentive salience or 'wanting to
eat a palatable reward, but does not reduce affective expressions, including orofacial
expressions such as tongue protrusions, of 'liking' for the same reward (Berridge &
Robinson, 1998; Berridge, 2004). Such disruption of dopamine systems leaves the
individuals nearly without any motivation for any incentive at all, whether con-
ditioned or not, and be it food, water, sex, and even drugs (Brauer, Goudie &
de Wit, 1997; Smith, 1995; Berridge, 2006). Strikingly, however, 'liking' of these same
incentives, remains intact, as it can be assessed by either affective facial expressions or
subjective ratings in the case of humans (Pecifia, Berridge & Parker, 1997; Berridge
& Robinson, 1998).
Conversely, 'wanting' without 'liking' can be produced by several brain manip-
ulations, including electrical stimulation of the lateral hypothalamus (Berridge &
Valenstein, 1991; Panksepp, 1998), which makes rats 'want' more of any incentive
that is presented to them. Similarly, 'wanting' without 'liking' can be triggered by
microinjections of amphetamine that activate dopamine neurons in the NAS. The
presentation of a Pavlovian CS for food causes rats to work even harder than normal
in order to obtain food. The enhanced 'wanting' obtained by the microinjections
of amphetamine into the accumbens is not accompanied by increased 'liking', as evi-
denced by the microinjections failure to increase positive hedonic patterns of behavior
elicited from the rats by a sweet taste (Wyvell & Berridge, 2000). Likewise, mutant
mice whose brain receptors receive more dopamine than normal due to their genetic
mutation also show excessive 'wanting' of sweet rewards. Interestingly enough, these
same rats seemed to 'like' sweet taste less than normal mice do (Pecifia et al., 2003).
many have suggested that drug addiction in humans may elicit similar processes,
as drug addicts often report drug cravings even when they do not derive much pleasure
from them. Consider for instance tobacco related addiction. Nicotine generally does
not elicit substantial pleasure in most people, but can still be quite addictive.
So what is 'wanting' if it is not 'liking'? According to Berridge and colleagues,
'wanting' is an incentive process mediated by mesolimbic dopaminergic systems that
can essentially "tag certain stimulus representations in the brain. When incentive
salience is attributed to a reward stimulus representation, it makes that stimulus
attractive, attention grabbing, and a target for action in the Bolles-Bindra-Toates
sense described above (Berridge, 2006).
'Wanting' and 'liking' are both necessary for an incentive to be perceived as a
normal reward. 'Wanting' without 'liking' would constitute a "fake" reward, devoid
of any affective pleasure. Perhaps not unlike what alexithimia produces in certain
people. Notwithstanding, 'wanting' is an essential component of reward, without it,
'liking' would simply be an affective reaction. For an incentive to be experienced as
a reward, both 'wanting' and 'liking' need to be present. The process of incentive
salience, which forms the foundation for the model described in Chapter 8, is the
one that makes a specific stimulus or an action the object of desire, and that tags a
behavior as the rewarded response (Berridge, 2004).
3.4 Emotion and Attention
Affect certainly influences attention, whether at a low level, by promoting saliency to
stimuli that are of affective significance, and thus reducing the attentional space to
only those stimuli that are of biological interest to the organism, or at a higher level
by promoting coherence in behavior, helping reduce dithering between behavioral
responses when motivational conflicts arise.
In this work, we will operationalize the notion of attention to mean the collection
of processes that serve to provide coherent control of action. Organisms regularly
face a variety of stimuli, each of which may trigger different responses which may
compete for the ultimate control of the organism's resources. Affective behavior, as
we will describe in this work, depends on the ability to selectively use elements of
these stimuli, while ignoring others. This is known as selective attention, and as we
will see later on, this process proves essential in the ability to produce coherent and
adaptive behavior.
Recent research suggests that neural structures, such as the amygdala, which
have long been implicated in the coordination of emotional behavior and emotional
information processing, are also implicated in attentional processes. First, affective
processing, through the amygdala, has been implicated in the modulation of orienting
responses by associative learning; and second, the enhancement of the associability
(increased lilkelihood that a neutral stimulus will be learned and associated to an
incentive) of particular contingencies (Holland & Gallagher, 1999).
Based upon evidence relating amygdala functioning to the modulation of atten-
tional processes, this work will propose a mechanism by which the Surprise and the
Seeking affect programs, interact and mediate affective processes, essentially acquiring
the ability to interrupt ongoing stimulus processing when novel or significant stim-
uli are detected and to habituate to those that have no affective significance, thus
promoting coherent behavior.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter we have described some of the most important interactions between
affect and many other constructs and mechanisms we have considered to be part of
intelligent behavior, and which have mostly been ascribed to higher cognitive pro-
cesses.
We argue, however, that in order for affect programs to implement many of the
solutions required to promote and sustain life, its activity is necessarily intertwined
with these other processes, in fact, coordinating, synchronizing and regulating them
as part of the functional mode of operation each affect program promotes.
We have discussed two such interactions, namely, that of affect and motivation
and affect and attention. Further chapters build on these ideas as we attempt to
design and build deep models of affect.

Chapter 4
Neural Substrates of Emotion
In Chapter 1, arguments were made questioning traditional assumptions of intelli-
gence, which have resulted in a set of methodological principles that have guided the
construction of our robotic systems and, in general, our approach to understanding
intelligent behavior (Brooks et al., 1998). This chapter complements these arguments
from an affective perspective and provides a synopsis of the lessons learned regarding
the neural substrates of emotion that all other levels of analysis in emotion research
may have to consider if they are going to fully comprehend the nature of emotions.
4.1 No Monolithic Emotional System
Undoubtedly, there are appraisal mechanisms in the brain, which assess the biologi-
cal and affective significance of events as processed by perceptual systems. Contrary
to these views, however, the notion of a single, one-for-all system of emotions is
not supported by evidence from neural science. Recent brain studies suggest there
is no single "motivational" system in the brain, and there is no monolithic "emo-
tional" system either. In fact, the evidence rather indicates that there are many
brain circuits, mediated by numerous neurochemistries, that coordinate and mediate
the set of processes we have referred to as the emotions (Panksepp, 1993). Fur-
thermore, it is well known that these systems, be they the dopaminergic, the no-
radrenergic, cholinergic or serotonergic systems, influence and modulate each other
(Panksepp, 1986; LeDoux, 1996; Introini-Collison, Dalmaz & Mcgaugh, 1996; Gill,
Sarter & Givens, 2000), thus resulting in a set of distributed systems, perhaps inter-
acting with each other, and at moments orchestrating the many different internal and
external responses we have come to know and define as affective.
4.2 Emotional Systems of the Brain
This section reviews some of the aforementioned evidence regarding the existence of
specific circuits situated in intermediate areas of the brain that have been conceptu-
alized as sensorimotor emotional command systems, based upon earlier and excellent
reviews by Panksepp (1998) and Panksepp (2000).
4.2.1 The Fear System
The fear system is perhaps the most studied emotional system in the brain. Interest
in the neural substrate for the fear emotion emerged from studies of the Kliiver-Bucy
syndrome, a complex set of behavioral changes caused by damage to the temporal lobe
and related structures in primates (Kliiver & Bucy, 1939). Animals that have such
kind of lesions suddenly lose their fear to stimuli that were previously considered to
be threatening. They also exhibit an increased frequency of oral and sexual behaviors
(i.e., they eat many different things that "normal" animals would find unpalatable and
they attempt to copulate even with members of other species). Subsequent studies
by Weiskrantz (1956) showed that lesions confined to a specific area of the brain called
the amygdala 1 produced the emotional aspects of the Kliiver-Bucy syndrome.
A very basic circuit has now been identified that extends from the amygdala
through the anterior and medial hypothalamus to the lower brain stem (through the
periaqueductal gray (PAG)-a large structure in the midbrain, consisting of small to
medium neurons surrounding the aqueduct of Silvus, otherwise known as the cerebral
aqueduct and which has been thought to be involved in protection and defensive
reactions, notably distress calls and affective defense), and then to specific autonomic
and behavioral output components of the lower brain stem and spinal cord (Davis,
Rainnie & Cassell, 1994). Fear behaviors can be elicited by artificially activating
this circuit, and conditioned fears can be developed by pairing neutral stimuli with
unconditioned stimuli that normally evoke this system. It is likely, however, that this
is only one of the many circuits mediating fear.
The neurochemistry that controls this system includes the excitatory neurotrans-
mitter glutamate and a variety of neuropeptides, including corticotropin releasing
factor (CRF), neuropeptide Y, NPY, and the endogenous enzodiazepine-type system
each of which may eventually be found to modulate slightly different kinds of fears
(Fanselow, 1994).
Most of the current work on the fear emotional system has focused on the paradigm
of fear conditioning, analyzing how learned inputs from the convergence of thalamic
and cortical inputs into a nucleus of the amygdala called the lateral nucleus (LA),
which then sends information concerning the cues that predict aversive events to the
central nucleus (CeN) and down to various integrative and output components in
the centromedial diancephalon and mesencephalon (LeDoux, 1996). It is well known
that other forms of information, such as the contextual cues associated with aversive
events enter the system through the hippocampus (Kim & Fanselow, 1992) and yet
'This set of subcortical nuclei was named the amygdala due to its almond-like shape
others from other higher areas of the brain.
4.2.2 The Anger System
It makes good evolutionary sense for the systems mediating fear and anger to be
intimately related, for one of the functions of anger is to provoke fear in competitors,
and one of the functions of fear is to reduce the impact of angry behaviors from
threatening opponents. Thus, the brain circuits mediating this type of emotion are
not surprisingly located close to those mediating fear (see 4.2.1. Some of the main
circuits identified run from medial zones of the amygdaloid complex, through the
lateral hypothalamus (LH) and down through the PAG, where further organization
onto the output components of the brain stem and spinal cord is observed.
4.2.3 The Lust System
Sexuality, as an emotional system, has been widely neglected in emotion research.
Nonetheless, many emotion theorists agree that this is a short-sighted view of the
general concept of affect, which surely should involve the situations and responses
related to sexual behavior.
Recent evidence from behavioral neuroscience suggests the existence of differ-
ent neural circuits that mediate male and female sexuality in all mammalian species.
These systems are dissociated, and in the case for male sexuality, they involve the pre-
optic areas of the hypothalamus. In the case for female sexuality, the same structure
is implicated, namely the hypothalamus, only its ventromedial components (Becker,
Breedlove & Crews, 1992) as cited by (Panksepp, 2000). Each of these systems, as
it is with most of the systems organization throughout the neuroaxis, is modulated
by higher circuits, especially those that stem from the medial amygdala, septal area,
and the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis.
Likewise, the neurochemistries of the Lust male and female systems have a variety
of components, including many hormonal regulators that we are just starting to elu-
cidate and comprehend. However, it is well known that male sexuality is principally
mediated by the hormone vasopressin, whereas female sexuality is mostly regulated
by the hormone oxytocin and the leuteinizing hormone-releasing hormone (LH-RH)
systems (Moss & Dudley, 1984). In terms of the orgasmic component that is at a
center stage of the Lust system, and perhaps an important contributor to the learning
of sexually related responses, many question still remain, but preliminary evidence
suggests that when this component occurs and is experienced, it is regularly accom-
panied by release of oxytocin as well as endogenous opioid release within the brain
(Petersen, Caldwell, Jirikowski & Insel, 1992).
4.2.4 The Care System
A very important system, especially as it relates to social organisms is that which
mediates responses directed at caring for each other. It has been proposed that
these affective urges evolved from preexisting sexual circuits (Panksepp, 2000). Thus,
the hormone oxytocin, which as we reviewed plays an essential role in regulating
female sexuality (see Section 4.2.3), is also a key player in the initiation of maternal
behaviors (Panksepp, 1998). Oxytocin also plays a fundamental role by mediating
the circuits that help deliver milk to babies when they are nursing. The stimulation
of the mother's breasts is relayed as somatosensory signals that involve neurons in
the hypothalamic paraventricular nucleus, which connect to the pituitary gland, thus
releasing the hormone (Panksepp, 2000). This is not the only oxytocin system in the
brain that regulates the Care system. In fact, multiple other systems exist, some of
which have already been elucidated. As Panksepp (2000) describes:
For instance, if first-time mothers (at least of the animal variety) cannot
feel the surges of their brain oxytocin systems, then they do not rapidly
develop maternal competence (Petersen et al., 1992). Indeed, the ancestral
form of this hormone-namely, vasotocin-already helped deliver babies
long time before mothers cared for their offspring. - Panksepp (2000, p.
148).
It is interesting to note that the same hormones that control different aspects of
giving birth, as well as those related to feeding the young, are also essential for gener-
ating "care" feelings in the mother. How exactly these hormones control the affective
feelings and responses associated to the Care system remains an open question, but
knowing that there are specific brain circuits mediating social bonds provides further
evidence for the existence of basic affect programs.
4.2.5 The Distress System
This system has been referred to as the Panic system by others (Panksepp, 1998;
Panksepp, 2000), as it relates to the panic that comes about from separation distress
or anxiety. The circuits for separation distress have been mapped in the brain by
identifying those sites that produce the cries that young animals make when isolated
from social companionship (Jiirgens, 1976; Panksepp, 1998).
In the forebrain, the circuits are located in the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis,
dorsal preoptic area, and ventral septal area. In the diencephalon, the circuits are
concentrated in medial thalamic areas, and in the mesencephalon, in the dorsal parts
of the rostral PAG. If one continues to descend caudally through the PAG, the areas
that generated distress calls begin to produce cries of pain, which might suggest that
separation distress emerged from more primal pain mechanisms (Panksepp, 1998).
In the cortex, the anterior cingulate has been implicated in the higher integration
of social feelings (MacLean, 1990). Presumably, this system is involved in generating
a special psychic energy to social motivation. It is as if it psychologically hurts to be
alone.
There are several interactions among these circuits, many of which are not yet
known, but whose neurochemistries have been mostly identified. These systems
can readily be activated by injections of glutamate and blockade of the same neu-
rotransmitter receptors significantly reduce the calls produced by separation distress
(Panksepp, 1.995; Panksepp, 1998).
Another important elicitor of this affective system is CRF, while many other
peptides have been implicated in the reduction of distress calls, especially opioids,
oxytocin, and prolactin, which seems to make sense from an evolutionary perspective,
given that these mediate social bonds as it was described in Section 4.2.4 (Panksepp,
2000).
4.2.6 The Play System
Although play systems have not been generally accepted in neuroscience or psychology
as affective systems, we do briefly describe them here as they might be the precursors
for systems mediating what we would refer to as Joy (Panksepp, 1993).
There is substantial evidence that systems mediating what could be called "rough-
and-tumble" play exist in the mammalian brain. Many of the neural aspects behind
this system are not well understood, but the evidence so far seems to indicate that
critical components are directly related to the separation distress systems (see Sec-
tion 4.2.5), which is reasonable from an evolutionary standpoint. The processes that
may constitute basic systems for what we commonly refer to as Joy and Sadness
should be closely intertwined in the brain.
These circuits have been located in the parafasicular area-which integrates so-
matosensory signals that promote play-and ventrorostral areas of the PAG, where
positive affective responses can be generated with brain stimulation. Conversely to
separation distress systems, opioids increase the activity of Play circuits (Panksepp,
1995).
Several other systems exist. In fact, Ikemoto & Panksepp (1999) have described
an important one which deals with issues of seeking out the resources that organisms
need, in order to survive. This system has been called the Seeking system, and we
will defer its discussion for later chapters, as it forms the basis for our notions on
incentive salience (see Chapter 8).
4.3 Affective Strategies for Learning:
Multiple Systems
In the previous section we reviewed some of the known neural substrates involved in
affective processing, as emotional circuits of the brain akin to the affect programs we
described in Chapter 2. Let us now focus on some of the things we know about the
neural substrate for learning.
It is now a common view to identify a variety of aspects of learning and memory
involving independent and perhaps parallel neural systems in the brain. For instance,
a system involving the hippocampus is thought to be necessary for tasks that require
the use of information about relationships between stimuli. A separate system involv-
ing the amygdala seems to mediate the formation and selection of behaviors based
on the association of neutral stimuli with biologically significant stimuli that have
affective connotations. This system is often seen as a simple associative learning sys-
tem that acquires associations of the type stimulus-stimulus (S-S). Finally, a system
including some of the different structures of the basal ganglia (e.g., ventral and dorsal
striatum) is thought to mediate incentive learning and the formation of reinforced
stimulus-response (S-R) associations. The latter is also considered to be an associa-
tive learning system in which neutral stimuli come to release specific behaviors due
to the repeated strengthening of the association between these stimuli and behav-
iors that have rewarding consequences (McDonald & White, 1993; Packard, Cahill &
McGaugh, 1994; Packard & McGaugh, 1996).
A very interesting and open question relates to how these learning systems inter-
act, working in parallel, in normal organisms. In an effort to obtain a better under-
standing of some of the issues involved, experimental studies have been developed for
the analysis of information processing in these neural systems. Most of these studies
involve the use of different approaches and tools, including electrolytic or neurotoxic
lesions, transgenic techniques, as well as imaging technology. In contrast, very few, if
any, have relied on the use of computational approaches.
The work proposed in this thesis attempts to contribute toward this end. Specifi-
cally, it focuses on the interactions among multiple learning systems, especially those
with parallel associative learning schemes that are triggered by, and require the in-
tervention of affectively significant (or unconditioned) stimuli. This includes those
types of learning commonly referred to as incentive learning and habit learning, but
excludes other types of learning that do not seem to require the presence of uncondi-
tioned stimuli, such as those described above which are mediated by the hippocampus
and related structures.
4.4 Reward and Incentive Learning
Many stimuli and events in the environment have affective significance as they may
bring beneficial or harmful consequences for an organism. According to the behavioral
response they evoke, these stimuli have been labeled appetitive (rewarding) or aversive
(punishing).
As elaborated by Thorndike (1911), and more recently by Schultz (1998), ap-
petitive or rewarding stimuli have three important and distinct functions: (1) they
interrupt behavior and elicit approach and consummatory behaviors; (2) they act
as positive reinforcers, increasing the frequency of behaviors leading to them, and
maintaining these learned behaviors by preventing extinction; and (3) they induce
subjective feelings of pleasure (hedonia) and.positive emotional states. Conversely,
aversive stimuli elicit avoidance responses, act as negative reinforcers by increasing
and maintaining avoidance behavior, and induce subjective feelings of displeasure
and/or distress (Schultz, 1998).
An essential aspect of associative learning relates to the abilities of certain sensory
stimuli to predict the occurrence of affectively significant stimuli. Predictions provide
information about future events before they actually happen, allowing the organism to
choose and prepare appropriate behavioral responses (e.g., stopping current behavior
and initiating approaching or avoidance responses) in order to deal with the stimulus
in an effective manner.
Many of the details on how this "affective tagging" process occurs are not com-
pletely understood, but it is known to involve the contingent presentation of a stim-
ulus, just prior to the presentation of unconditioned stimuli. Notwithstanding, new
findings from neuroscientific studies are providing evidence suggesting some of the
neural substrates that mediate the prediction and processing of rewards.
4.4.1 Neural Substrates: The Dopamine System
The dopamine (DA) system appears to be one of the main actors involved in me-
diating incentive and reward-based learning. This system originates primarily from
DA-containing neurons, henceforth referred to as dopaminergic neurons, in the sub-
stantia nigra (SN) and the ventral tegmental area (VTA), and projects to frontal
cortex and various structures of the basal ganglia, including the nucleus accumbens
(NAS) and the dorsal striatum (DS). Supporting these ideas are the results of a va-
riety of experimental studies that include selective lesions of the dopamine system,
electrical self-stimulation, selective use of DA receptor agonists and antagonists, and
self-administration of major drugs of abuse, such as cocaine, amphetamine, and al-
cohol (Wise & Rompre, 1989; Robbins & Everitt, 1992; Wise, 1996; Schultz, 1998;
Chiara, 1999).
In the sections that follow, we will take a closer look at the DA system and
review some related hypotheses of its function, as they provide interesting and useful
ideas with respect to learning that have influenced and motivated some of the work
proposed in this thesis.
4.4.2 Characteristics of Dopaminergic Neuron Responses
Dopaminergic neurons in SN and VTA of monkeys exhibit short, phasic responses to a
variety of rewarding and reward-predicting stimuli (Romo & Schultz, 1990; Ljungberg,
Apicella & Schultz, 1992; Mirenowicz & Schultz, 1994). These responses are fairly
homogeneous regardless of the type of appetitive stimuli. In other words, dopaminer-
gic neurons do not discern between various appetitive stimuli, such as food or liquids,
nor between different sensory modalities, or between primary rewards and conditioned
appetitive stimuli.
Responses of dopaminergic neurons to aversive stimuli have not been fully char-
acterized. Mirenowicz & Schultz (1996) have shown that dopaminergic neurons
do not respond in a similar and consistent way to aversive stimuli (Mirenowicz
& Schultz, 1996). Other research seems to indicate they do (Trulson & Preus-
sler, 1984; Abercrombie, Keefe, DiFrischia & Zigmond, 1989; Young, Ahier, Upton,
Joseph & Gray, 1998). These contradictory results suggest that more research is
needed before reaching a conclusion in this regard.
Dopaminergic neurons are also activated by novel and salient stimuli (Horvitz,
2000). This response, however, habituates rapidly when the stimulus is repeated
without any emotional and behavioral consequences. That is, the stimulus neither
corresponds to, or predicts, a reward or punishment. An interesting aspect of this case
is that activity of dopaminergic neurons seems to be correlated with overt behavioral-
orienting responses (Schultz & Romo, 1990; Strecker & Jacobs, 1985).
The responses of dopaminergic neurons appear to be very dependent on the un-
predictability of stimuli. If the presentation of a primary reward is repeated in a
predictable manner, dopaminergic neurons do not exhibit a response at the time of
the presentation of reward, instead, their activity is gradually transferred to the earli-
est reward-predicting stimulus (Figure 1A). In contrast, when a fully predicted reward
does not occur, the activity of dopaminergic neurons exhibit a reliable depression that
occurs at exactly the time of the expected reward delivery (Figure 1B).
In addition to the responses described above, dopaminergic neurons respond to
stimuli that do not predict rewards, but which resemble reward-predicting stimuli in
the same context (Ljungberg et al., 1992; Schultz, 1997). Schultz and colleagues inter-
pret these responses as a stimulus generalization property of dopaminergic neurons.
Usually, these responses are lower in magnitude and are followed by an immediate
depression that is further ensued with activity after the occurrence of reward (Figure
1C), or no response in its absence (Figure 1D).
4.4.3 Hypotheses on DA Function
A variety of hypotheses that account for some of the experimental data relevant to
DA function have emerged recently. Three of the most influential yet different inter-
pretations of these data, all of which are relevant to this thesis, are briefly reviewed
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Figure 4-1: Responses of Dopamine Neurons
in the following sections.
The Effective-Reinforcement Hypothesis
A recent hypothesis that relates DA activity to formal theories of learning (Rescorla
& Wagner, 1972) and to computational approaches in machine learning (Sutton &
Barto, 1981; Sutton, 1988) has been proposed by Schultz and colleagues (Schultz,
1998; Schultz, Romo, Ljungberg, Mirenowicz, Hollerman & Dickinson, 1995; Schultz
et al., 1997). According to their view, DA activity encodes expectation of reward, or
more precisely, an error in the prediction both in time and magnitude of reward.
Reflecting on the characteristic DA responses summarized above in 4.4.2, they
note that dopaminergic neurons emit a positive signal (activation) when an event
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is better than predicted, a negative signal (depression) when an event is worse than
predicted, and no response when the event is fully predicted. Therefore, dopaminergic
neurons in the substantia nigra and VTA, suggest Schultz and colleagues, report
primary rewards relative to the difference (or error) between the actual occurrence
and the prediction of reward. By doing so, they may act as a global teaching or
effective-reinforcement signal that is sent to other neural mechanisms, such as the
striatum and prefrontal cortex, where it can mediate associative learning, as well as
the consolidation of reinforced behavior learning and subsequent action selection.
This hypothesis has received increased attention in the last several years. Schultz
and colleagues have provided supporting evidence, and have linked it to computational
approaches in reinforcement learning. In particular, they note that the temporal-
difference (TD) learning algorithms (Sutton, 1988), resemble in all major respects the
responses of DA neurons and, to some extent, the basic anatomy and connectivity of
the basal ganglia (Schultz, 1997).
Nonetheless, and based on the same data reviewed in 4.4.2, objections to this
effective-reinforcement hypothesis have been raised. Of special interest are the find-
ings relative to the responses of dopaminergic neurons to novel and salient stimuli,
as well as the less characterized responses to aversive stimuli. In the case of the
former, it is reasonable to assume that a novel event may be appetitive (involving
reward), aversive (involving punishment), or it may be insignificant (no affective con-
sequences). Considering that according to this view dopaminergic neurons encode an
error in prediction of reward, why would all novel stimuli be evaluated as initially
rewarding? That is, better than predicted? Moreover, this also means that behav-
iors that are active at that moment, or some time before that, will be reinforced or
maintained, which might not be appropriate.
Along these same lines, Redgrave, Prescott & Gurney (1999b) make a compelling
argument against this hypothesis when they note that the response of dopaminergic
neurons, presumably corresponding to the evaluation of the affective significance of
a stimulus, occurs before or during the saccadic response that is made to foveate the
stimulus for further analysis (Redgrave et al., 1999b). This observation is significant
because it means that any computations made by dopaminergic neurons signaling the
evaluation of a novel object would have to be performed even before the object has
been "looked at".
Now, with respect to the case involving responses to aversive stimuli, if DA neurons
encode information about effective reinforcement would it not be also reasonable to
expect that their activity show some depression when aversive contingencies occur?
In view of these issues, we will consider other hypotheses that have been suggested
with respect to the involvement of DA neurons in reinforcement, incentive, and habit
learning.
The Switching Hypothesis
A different interpretation of the data has been presented, which suggests that the
dopamine signal is an essential component in the processes that are involved in real-
location of limited attentional and behavioral resources necessary to deal with unex-
pected, salient (biologically significant) stimuli (Oades, 1985; Redgrave, Prescott &
Gurney, 1999a).
Underlying this view is the notion that for an organism to deal with a rewarding
stimulus in an effective manner, it must first interrupt ongoing behavior and switch
attentional and behavioral resources. Thus, it is suggested that the basal ganglia
act as a central selection device evolved to resolve conflicts between different systems
competing for limited cognitive and motor resources. In the appropriate contexts, the
basal ganglia would implement their selection processes by disinhibiting sensorimotor
connections of winning systems and inhibiting those of losing ones (Redgrave et al.,
1999a). At the core of such implementation would be the activity or depression of the
DA signal, which would promote switching in the first case, and focus on currently
selected resources in the second one.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the DA signal may also be useful in
binding salient stimuli to a selected action. Once this link is created, it may be
strengthened or weakened depending on subsequent signals indicating outcome. Ac-
cording to this, dopamine activity would have a more general role in associative
learning and it would not be limited to rewarding contingencies as it is the case with
the effective-reinforcement perspective.
The Incentive Learning Hypothesis
A final theory on DA function to be considered in this thesis corresponds to that
of Ikemoto & Panksepp (1999), who argue that ascending meso-accumbens DA sys-
tems (i.e., projections from VTA dopamine neurons to the NAS) constitute a general
purpose system that is important in sensorimotor integrations that facilitate flexible
approach responses to a variety of salient stimuli (Ikemoto & Panksepp, 1999).
The functional role of NAS DA signaling is divided into two main phases: activa-
tion of flexible approach-seeking responses and incentive learning. This refers to the
notion that NAS DA may first be involved in facilitating exploratory activities (ap-
proaching stimuli for investigation) and more gradually in signifying importance of
novel stimuli because of their association to opportunities for consummatory behavior
(incentive learning).
It should be noted that from this perspective, incentive learning is not limited
to appetitive events, but also includes aversive ones. In such contexts, NAS DA
facilitates avoidance responses, only these are reformulated as approaches toward
"safety". Thus, the same flexible approach systems are at play in both appetitive
and aversive contingencies.
Another interesting aspect of this view is the recognition of two separate types
of approach responses: a flexible response system, as described above, which op-
erates when organisms are learning about incentive contingencies, and a habit re-
sponse system that operates based on over-learned incentive responses. This habit
system allows organisms to acquire and maintain procedural performance. The ni-
grostriatal L)A system appears to be an important structure involved in habit for-
mation and stimulus-response learning (Knowlton, Mangels & Squire, 1996; Gray-
biel, 1998; Hikosaka, 1998).
From the three theories discussed above, this approach-seeking view seems to ac-
count for the most evidence with respect to some of the possible roles of DA signaling.
In addition, 'it fits perfectly well with the idea of affect programs described earlier: the
approach-seeking system integrates and coordinates attentional, perceptual, affective,
behavioral and learning processes needed for adaptive approach toward goals.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter we have briefly reviewed some of the emotional brain circuits that exist
in the mammalian brain. We have also reviewed current knowledge regarding the
neural substrates for learning, emphasizing on the mesolimbic dopaminergic system,
which has been widely implicated in the process of incentive salience.
Several theories regarding the function of this dopamine system were reviewed.
Work on this thesis suggests that these theories are not necessarily fundamentally
contradictory, and depending on the issues considered nor do they need to be mutually
exclusive. The following chapters describe the implementation of affect programs
that include many of the ideas represented in each of these views, including separate
sensorimotor pathways for preparatory and consummatory behaviors, systems for the
detection of novel and salient contingencies, an organization in which the detection
of natural (unconditioned, innate) stimuli automatically promotes learning, and a
system in which the predictions of affectively significant stimuli play an essential role
in the specification of contexts and the gradual occurrence of stimulus-response or
habit learning.
Chapter 5
Experimental Platforms
Earlier we described our overall goal as one of understanding emotions from a com-
putational perspective. We have argued that in order to achieve this goal, we should
focus not on the general theoretical debates that have traditionally occupied the field
of emotions, but rather on understanding specific problems, such as understanding
specific emotions and their function as solutions to particular situations that organ-
isms face in their environment. In particular, we are interested in understanding how
affect programs act as the main glue that bind together, in a coordinated fashion, a
variety of subprograms that govern perception and attention, motivational priorities,
action selection, learning, and motor control.
To this end, it is necessary to be able to understand the computational problems
faced by organisms situated in their environments, evaluating events, interacting and
selecting significant stimuli, and determining solutions for the multiple contingencies
they face. In recent years, we have developed a number of robotic platforms, both
physical and simulated, that allow us to accomplish this. We have created several
robots and situated them in the physical world (or a high fidelity simulation of it)
where they face an uncertain and dynamic environment, dealing with noisy sensors
and actuators, and constantly facing multiple challenges, including the tasks of at-
tending to and selecting relevant stimuli, determining the best course of action given
any situation, and deciding when and what to learn about their environment in order
to adaptively achieve (or maintain) some specific goals.
This chapter describes these robotic platforms and the world they inhabited. Both
these robotic platforms and their environments constituted our experimental plat-
forms where different scenarios, which are described in further chapters, were instan-
tiated and evaluated, in our efforts to achieve our primary goal of understanding the
underlying computational architecture of emotion.
5.1 Yuppy, an Ugly Pet Robot
Over the last several years, the Humanoid Robotics Group at the MIT Computer
Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory has been building a variety of robots
that have humanoid forms or that are otherwise human friendly in the sense that
they posses an increasingly complex behavioral repertoire that includes human-like
competencies. One of the first robotic platforms used to experiment with the notion
of affect programs was a mobile robot named Yuppy, shown in Figure 5-1. This robot
was designed as a proof of concept to test the validity of some of the concepts behind
the use of computational models of emotion as the basis for robotic control.
This robot was intended to be a personal pet robot, albeit an ugly one. Yuppy was
used as the initial testbed for the computational model of emotion called Cathexis
(Velisquez, 1996) and some of the ideas involved in emotion-based robotic control
(Velhsquez, 1998b), that will be discussed with more detail in Chapter 6.
Yuppy, which has been since then decommissioned, had a number of onboard
sensors, including two color CCD cameras, one of which was mounted on a two
degrees of freedom head that was used for both navigation and for "looking" at
objects of interest. It also included an active stereo audio system consisting of two
Figure 5-1: Yuppy, an affective robot built at the MIT Computer Science and Artificial
Intelligence Laboratory
microphones mounted on Yuppy's ears (which, it our commitment to ugliness,, decided
to place in the robot's body, instead of its head). Yuppy's sensory modalities also
included eight IR proximity sensors mounted ar und the robot's body. Furthermore,
a pressure sensor that simulated a patch of touch-sensitive skin was placed on top
of its body. Likewise, a pyro-electric sensor us d to detect changes in temperature
due to the presence of people was mounted in .uppy's head. Finally, a system that
sensed changes in head and body orientation and alignment was used as a simple
proprioception system.
5.1.1 Computational Platform
The robot used a commercial mobile platform (RWI B12) which has a synchronous
drive system that allowed it to translate and rotate. The drive system included three
wheels that are kept parallel all the time. These three wheels are all driven, providing
appropriate traction for locomotion.
The B12 platform includes an on-board NEC 78310 microcontroller. This micro-
controller controls the motors and the battery system. The motor control for steering
and driving uses optical feedback from the motors' encoders and pulse width modula-
tion (PWM) to power them. The microcontroller also reads the voltage and current
from the batteries. Communication to the base is achieved through an RS-232 se-
rial interface using ASCII commands. The command format is given by a two letter
mnemonic command and a hexadecimal number. The commands allow the robot
to read the status of the base and to change the motors' positions, velocities, and
accelerations. Information about the commands can be found in The B12 platform
includes an on-board NEC 78310 microcontroller. This microcontroller controls the
motors and the battery system.
5.2 Coco, a mobile baby gorilla robot
An aesthetically more pleasing robotic platform was later built to continued develop-
ing and testing the ideas presented in this thesis. This robot was named Coco, and
was modeled after the morphology of a baby silverback gorilla. The robot, illustrated
in Figure 5-2, was intentionally designed to be small (approximately 0.5 meters in
length weighing 9.1kg). In order to maximize both mobility and the possibility of
approaching humans in a fairly realistic manner, the robot was quadrupedal. The
characteristic long forelimbs and shorter hind legs of the gorilla were accentuated in
Coco to provide duality of usefulness in walking and the possibility of generating ex-
Figure 5-2: Coco, a baby gorilla robot
pressive gestures. Coco had two degrees of freedom in its shoulders and one degree of
freedom in each hip, knee, and elbow. Coco also had a five degree-of-freedom vision
head. The robot's design took into account the need for on-board DSP control that
actuates servos for each degree of freedom. A serial link provided high-level position
commands to the robot from an off-board computer array. Coco was designed to be
modular so improvements to actuators and sensors: could be made incrementally. The
limbs and head bolt into a monocoque body chassis that housed the motor-control
electronics.
Vestibular System
The human vestibular system plays a critical role in the coordination of motor re-
sponses, eye movement, posture, and balance. The human vestibular sensory organ
consists of the three semi-circular canals, which measure the acceleration of head
rotation, and the two otolith organs, which measure linear movements of the head
and the orientation of the head relative to gravity. To mimic the human vestibu-
lar system, Coco used a three-axis inertial sensor from Intersense (www.isense.com).
The sensor consisted of a single integrated remote package and a processing module.
The remote sensor is mounted on the robot's back in a position that allowed it to
move with the robot's head but remain stationary when the eyes were moving (sim-
ilar to the positioning of our own vestibular organs). The sensor delivered both the
angular accelerations in roll, pitch, and yaw and an absolute angular measurement
in two dimensions with respect to the gravity vector. The sensor processing mod-
ule communicated through a standard serial RS-232 interface to the main processing
system.
5.2.1 Computational Platform
Coco's computational platform included a network of off-the-shelf PC computers. As
part of the experiments described here only 10 processors were used, ranging in speed
from 600 MHz to 1 GHz, but the cluster was expandable to many more nodes. Pro-
cessors were interconnected by a 100 Mbps ethernet. Each processor ran Windows
NT as the main operating system. MPI, a message passing standard, was used to
create a flexible C++ code base that provided robust interprocess communication
over the network. MPI has been used by the high-performance computing commu-
nity to write parallel applications for large cluster of computers (Forum, 2002). The
robot was connected to this computational platform through commercial video digi-
tization boards and through commercial motor control boards (MAX2000TM 3-axes
distributed motion controllers from Agile Systems, www.agilesys.com).
5.3 Marvin, a Simulated Robot
All of the experimental scenarios that were instantiated and tested with the two
robotic platforms just mentioned were also replicated in a simulated environment. A
robot named Marvin, was developed in a computer graphics 3D world, using a physics
based engine named ODE and a variety of simulation tools, based upon the Gazebo
simulation engine.
Gazebo is part of the Player and Stage projects that originated in the Robotics
Research Labs at the University of Southern California. Player is a networked device
server, and Stage is a simulator for large populations of mobile robots in 2D envi-
ronments. Gazebo, created by Koenig & Howard (2004), is a high fidelity outdoor
simulator that provides a realistic environment for robotic simulations in a 3D world.
Similar in nature to its 2D counterpart, Stage, Gazebo can simulate a population of
robots, objects and sensors. Since both Gazebo and Stage are compatible with the
Player environment, client programs written using one simulator can usually be run
on the other with minor modifications (Koenig & Howard, 2004)
Gazebo, was designed to be able to accurately reproduce the dynamic environ-
ments a physical robot would encounter in the real world. It is capable of providing
realistic sensor feedback, and simulate several of the physical properties of the robotic
models it uses. All simulated objects have mass, velocity, friction, and other attributes
that allow them to behave realistically when pushed, pulled, knocked over, and so
forth. All robots in this simulated world are dynamic structures composed of rigid
bodies connected via joints. Forces, both angular and linear, can be applied to sur-
faces and joints to generate locomotion and interaction with an environment. The
world itself is described by landscapes, extruded buildings, and other user created ob-
jects. Almost every aspect of the simulation is controllable, from lighting conditions
to friction coefficients (Koenig & Howard, 2004).
Figure 5-3: A Pioneer 2DX Robot in the Gazebo Simulator. Gazebo is a high fidelity
robotics simulator for 3D environments that is capable of providing realistic sensor
feedback as well as an accurate dynamic environment, such as those that physical
robots would face in the real world. This figure illustrates how a physical robotic
base such as the Pioneer 2DX system can be simulated in the this engine. Adapted
from (Koenig & Howard, 2004)
Marvin was modeled as a Pioneer 2DX robot, by using some of the features avail-
able in Gazebo and ODE. The robot model, illustrated in Figure 5-4, was equiped
with several sensory systems, including a SICK LMS200 scanning laser range-finder,
and a Stereo Vision Head, which was used to obtain visual information of the simu-
lated world. A variety of algorithms for visual processing, such as blobfinding, and
stimuli saliency, were implemented by using open-source tools including OpenCV and
CMVision.
5.3.1 Marvin's World
The world Marvin inhabits, depicted in Figure 5-5, is an open-ended simulated world
with blocks and objects -that represent different objects in Marvin's environment,
ranging from resources, to predator-like agents, or simple obstacles.
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Figure 5-4: Marvin the Affective Robot. Marvin is a simulated robot that has been
endowed with affective systems in the form of affect programs.
5.4 Summary
Several robots were built and simulated at the Humanoid Robotics Group at the MIT
Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory as the main experimental
platforms to explore and address some of the issues related to the involvement of
affect in intelligent behavior, and which go beyond the regulation of social interaction
through emotional expression. Yuppy was primarily used to explore the involvement
of affect in behavior regulation. On the other hand, both Coco, with a gorilla-like
morphology, and some human-like sensorimotor systems, and Marvin, a simulated
robot, were useful platforms for exploring a more integral and comprehensive compu-
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Figure 5-5: Marvin's World. The world Marvin inhabits is a simulated 3D world
with open spaces where every so often it may encounter a variety of objects, some
of which are of significance to the robot, some others which are simply obstacles
or objects that have no pre-determined significance. This figure illustrates some
of these objects, including the main affective stimuli which correspond to Marvin's
predator (the Evil Pool Pony) and Marvin's recharging station (the Yellow Block,
which represents foodstuff). Grabbing this Yellow block will increment Marvin's
battery level to some determined value. Likewise, other neutral stimuli, such as the
purple blocks or the red spheres, also form part of this simulated world.
tational model that places affect as the cornerstone in regulating behavior, attention,
perception and learning. All of these robots were used to support the work described
in the following chapters.
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Chapter 6
Engineering Affect:
The Cathexis Framework
The question is not whether intelligent machines can have any emotions,
but whether machines can be intelligent without any emotions. I suspect
that once we give machines the ability to alter their own abilities we'll
have to provide them with all sorts of complex checks and balances.
- Marvin Minsky (1986, The Society of Mind)
As one of the main contributions of this thesis we propose a unified computational
framework for the study of affective phenomena which attempts to capture the es-
sential features of emotional systems at multiple levels of abstraction, as well as at
several spatiotemporal scales, from the inner workings of emotional appraisal, to the
network coupling between emotional systems and the coordination and modulation
of other systems be they motivational, attentional, learning or motor control. This
chapter describes the main issues and design decisions involved in the implementation
of this computational framework, as well as its implementation details and some of its
first applications in the control of robots. The framework, named Cathexis', extends
1From the Greek kathexis meaning holding or retention. The term was introduced into the
literature as a translation of Freud's term "besetzung", which connotes a concentration and transfer
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previous work (Velisquez, 1996; Velisquez, 1997; Velisquez, 1998a), and has been
used to create a variety of affect-based systems that have proven useful in providing
insights about the inner workings of emotional systems and their interaction with
other psychological constructs we tend to associate with intelligent behavior.
6.1 Scope and Design Principles
Our main challenge focused on the development of a computational framework that
could be used as a tool to explore and study different theories, concepts and models
related to affect. Our main motivation for such endeavor highlights our interest
in understanding affect from a computational perspective, as we expressed in our
introductory remarks (See Section 1.4). Consequently, this thesis focuses on the
problem of building the computational (and in some cases the physical) infrastructure
needed to support these sorts of tasks.
Greatly influenced by the work reviewed in the previous chapters, which involved
different perspectives on affect from evolutionary psychology, ethology, and the neural
sciences, this work integrates theories and concepts from these diverse viewpoints to
build a synthetic model of affect that observes the following design principles2 .
6.1.1 Deep Model of Affect IDP 1
As we have reviewed in the previous chapters, affect involves a wide variety of complex
phenomena, most of which is not completely understood. Considering the design and
evaluation of a computational model that synthesizes affect, this poses a problem
of emotional energy onto an object or idea.
2These design principles have been captioned with IDP NUMBER . Throughout this thesis,
whenever a description of the implementation or evaluation of the Cathexis model relates to any
specific design principle this will be made clear by including the design principle's caption in such
description.
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with respect to deciding what makes such a model "good" or "appropriate". In
Section 10.3, we review several different models and architectures related to this
work which have been proposed for a variety of applications. Clearly, affect can be
studied at many different levels, and all approaches offer different insights into this
complex set of phenomena. Undoubtedly, there is no "silver bullet" with respect to
models of affect. Different models will work best in different domains, and thus, how
appropriate they are depends greatly on their specific goals and purposes.
Notwithstanding, given our main goal of contributing work that will get us one
step closer to understanding affect from a computational perspective, our main de-
sign principle is to build a deep model of affect that is as comprehensive as possible.
By deep we mean a framework that delves farther down into many of the computa-
tional issues that individuals (or robots) face while situated in their environments,
attempting to maintain any particular set of goals. If you recall, these were the set
of problems that constituted the emotions as we defined them in Chapter 2. Thus,
our main goal is to contribute toward a computational framework that allows us to
explore many of these computational issues, attempting to understand the sorts of
representations (at various descriptive levels) of the prototypical situations or prob-
lems that the individual (or the robot) will address, and the different programs of
specialized solutions, that will be implemented as the synchronization of appraisal
mechanisms, action arbitration strategies, attention modulation algorithms, learning
models and motor control subprograms. In relation to this, Picard (1997) suggests
that a comprehensive model would account for some of the following phenomena:
Emergent Emotions and Emotional Behavior IDP 1.1]
A computational model might not explicitly synthesize emotions. That is, it might
not have explicit abstractions representing emotions or any other kind of affective
phenomena. Notwithstanding, such a model might be able to generate behavior that
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appears to arise from emotion processes or is otherwise perceived as emotional. An ex-
ample of such kind of mechanism can be seen in Braitenberg's vehicles3 (Braitenberg,
1984). This notion of emergent affect is a very interesting one, and one that is widely
exploited in most systems that use emotions as the main mechanisms to mediate social
interaction. These emergent emotions rely heavily not on the underlying emotional
mechanisms, but rather on the individual observers of the "emotional" behavior. As
such, much of the power comes from the observer, and not from the models them-
selves.
Primary Emotions IDP 1.21
Besides emergent emotions and emotional behavior, a comprehensive computational
model should be able to produce fast, emotional responses to specific situations. These
emotions correspond to the more primitive, innate or pre-organized kind of emotions,
which some refer to as the primary emotions (Damasio, 1994). From our theoretical
standpoint, we defined this kind of emotions in Chapter 2 as the affect programs.
Thus, a computational model for this kind of primary emotions should account for
a set of domain specific programs, each functionally specialized for solving different
adaptive problems (e.g., avoid danger or seek out resources to solve impending internal
motivational problems) and which become active by a different set of environmental
situations.
3Braitenberg's vehicles are machines--described by Valentino Braitenberg in his book: Vehicles:
Experiments in Synthetic Psychology-in which the direct coupling of sensors to actuators (e.g.,
direct connections, cross-wired or inhibitory), produces "creatures" that are extremely simple, but
which, to an observer, give the appearance of exhibiting emotions, such as "fear", "aggression",
"love", or "affection".
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Secondary Emotions IDP 1.31
Primary emotions do not describe the full range of emotional phenomena that complex
organisms exhibit. Some emotions involve much more detailed cognitive processing
of the different contingencies that arise in an organism's environment. These more
cognitively generated emotions may involve an evaluation of the event especially as
it concerns the organisms's goals, beliefs, attitudes, and expectations. Emotions of
this kind have been referred to by many as secondary emotions (Damasio, 1994),
and correspond to the lines of thought reviewed in Section 2.2.1 (Ortony et al., 1988;
Roseman, 1984; Lazarus, 1991; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992)
Emotional Experience I DP 1.4
A system that synthesizes emotion can also address the many issues related to the
emotional experience per se, which may involve awareness at many different levels
including an awareness of the cognitive and physiological changes produced by an
emotion episode as well as the corresponding subjective feeling.
Addressing this issue would involve addressing the many complex and open ques-
tions related to consciousness, which despite of their interesting and important nature
lie outside of the scope of the current work4
Integration With Other Phenomena IDP 1.5
From our perspective, affect is believed to be a central point of coherence for the
integration of the many different mechanisms that help an organism exist and survive
in its environment, obtain energy, reproduce, and pass on its genes onto the next
generation. More specifically, affect is inherently intertwined with many different
4It is interesting to note, however, that some researchers have recently claimed that emotional
mechanisms might also be responsible for some of the aspects involved in what we would call con-
sciousness (Damasio, 1999; Panksepp, 2005).
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processes and mechanisms involved in the generation of intelligent behavior. A deep
model of affect should address or at least point to possibilities for addressing some of
these interactions, which include, but are not limited to:
* Differences between emotions and other affective phenomena, such as moods
and temperament
* Affect-mediated action selection and the generation of goal-directed behavior
* Affect and regulatory mechanisms (e.g., motivational systems such as hunger
or temperature regulation; interactions with immune systems)
* Affective Learning
* Affective-Cognitive interactions
- Affect-mediated attention
- Affect modulation of memory
- Influences of affect in perception
- Affect and high-level decision-making (as opposed to low-level which we
consider to be related to the choice of actions)
One of the main ideas put forward with this work is precisely that affect can be an
appropriate "glue" that ties together and coordinates many processes and constructs
involved in generating intelligent behavior. Thus, as it will be explained in the fol-
lowing sections, the proposed model interacts with and regulates other systems that
mediate perception, attention, behavior, learning and motor control
6.1.2 Applicability to Robot Control DP 2
Aside from being useful to explore concepts, models and theories of affect, we believe
that affect is a good abstraction to decompose the problem of high-level control of
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an agent, be it a software agent or a physical one, such as a robot. In other words,
affective processing is well suited to act effectively as an integration mechanism by
which activity in many different systems is bound together in a coherent manner. This
has been defined elsewhere as Emotion-Based Control-the control of autonomous
agents that relies on, and arises from, emotional processing (Velisquez, 1998a).
6.1.3 Biological Feasibility DP 3
As a final design principle, and considering our main interest of understanding af-
fective processing in humans and animals, we approached this work with the goal of
developing a computational model of affect that was biologically plausible. In partic-
ular, we were interested in the possible neural substrates for some of the main issues
considered herein, such as the functional roles of the basal ganglia, hippocampus,
amygdala, and other brain structures, in the processing of affect, behavior generation
and selection, motivation, and learning. For that we drew inspiration from much of the
evidence stemming from different disciplines, and especially from research in Psychol-
ogy and Neuroscience (LeDoux, 1993; Graybiel, 1995; White, 1997; Panksepp, 2000).
6.2 The Affect Program Abstraction
What is an appropriate computational abstraction to represent an emotional system?
As alluded to before, the answer to this question depends greatly on the kind of
application and purpose of the model that would involve such an abstraction. Keeping
the aforementioned design principles and issues in mind, our approach to this end
follows a psychoevolutionary perspective to the study of affect, based upon the notion
of affect programs defined in Section 2.2.3 (Darwin, [1859]/1998; Izard, 1971; Ekman
& Friesen, 1986; Panksepp, 1998; Cosmides & Tooby, 2000).
We defined affect programs as executive, operating systems that generate and
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Figure 6-1: A Fear Affect Program. This figure illustrates an instance of a fear affect
program as thought to exist in the mammalian brain. Different brain structures are
involved, most notably the amygdala, which is thought to mediate the evaluation of
the affective significance of threatening stimuli and the further coordination of various
responses associated with the brain emotional system mediating fear. A threatening
stimulus is detected by perceptual systems. This information is sent to the fear control
center (roughly corresponding to the lateral (input) and central (output) nuclei of the
amygdala), which then activates and coordinates a variety of responses mediated by
different brain centers. Adapted from LeDoux (1996) and Iversen et al. (2000).
coordinate short-term, stereotypical responses that allow organisms to deal with bi-
ologically significant events in ways that promote survival. These responses involve
a variety of elements such as facial and behavioral expressions, arousal of the Au-
tonomic Nervous System (ANS), vocal expressions, modulation of attention, and
affective feelings.
As described in Chapter 4, several affect programs of this kind have been sug-
gested to exist in the mammalian brain, including circuits that mediate paradigmatic
emotions such as fear, anger, surprise, joy, sadness and disgust, and other not so
paradigmatic such as incentive seeking, maternal care, and separation distress.
Figure 6-1 illustrates an example of the fear affect program which is thought to
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Figure 6-2: An abstraction for affect programs. This figure illustrates the main ab-
straction of the Cathexis framework: the Affect Program. An Affect Program couples
sensors and actuators through affective processing. It consists of a set of filtering
mechanisms, named Releasers, which provide information about the different stim-
uli in the robot's environment, an Affective Evaluation Unit that assesses the affec-
tive significance of said stimuli and coordinates appropriate actions, named here as
Preparatory and Consummatory Behaviors. Information through this affective process-
ing mechanism flows from left to right.
be mediated by the amygdala. Affect programs of this kind constitute the primary
theoretical constructs in our approach to understanding affect from a computational
perspective.
Drawing inspiration from these theoretical constructs, we propose the Affect Pro-
gram5 as the primary abstraction that comprises the computational framework de-
scribed in this thesis. This abstraction is illustrated in Figure 6-2.
An Affect Program couples the robot's sensors and actuators through affective
processing. It consists of a set of filtering mechanisms, named Releasers, an Affective
Evaluation Unit that assesses the affective significance of the perceived stimuli and
coordinates the issuing and control of an associated set of specific responses, name
here as Preparatory and Consummatory Behaviors.
5Throughout this thesis, we use a different notation in order to distinguish among the different
abstractions and elements of the framework, and the theoretical constructs that carry the same
name. Consequently, an Affect Program would refer to the model's abstraction, whereas an affect
program (no formatting) would refer to the concept
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Each of these components will be described in more detail later, but for now let
us mention the general flow of information for an Affect Program:
1. Releasers filter sensory data and detect relevant contingencies that are relevant
to the Affect Program they are associated with.
2. Information about the detected contingencies is sent to the Affective Evaluation
Unit which assesses the affective significance of such contingencies (i.e., deter-
mine whether a stimulus is biologically significant-or of importance to the
agent's goals).
3. If the contingency is distal (in space or time) the Affect Program's control deter-
mines the response that would prepare the agent to deal with it. This is done
through Preparatory Behaviors which are described in more detail later.
4. If the contingency is proximal the Affect Program's control determines the spe-
cific response or Consummatory Behavior that would deal with it appropriately,
based on the sensory-specific properties of the event.
5. The appropriate behavior is selected (based on the two immediate points above)
and executed.
6.2.1 Relation to the Affect Program Concept
The Affect Program abstraction has a direct correspondence to the theoretical concept
defined in Section 2.2.3. Thus, Releasers correspond to perceptual systems in the brain
that form part of the affect program circuits, and which provide information regard-
ing the different contingencies an organism experiences in the world. The Affective
Evaluation Unit corresponds to the executive, command centers that evaluate the bio-
logical significance of events and coordinate the appropriate responses, if any. Finally,
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Figure 6-3: An instance of a Fear Affect Program. This figure illustrates a specific
instance of the Affect Program abstraction. The Fear Affect Program showed here
includes a set of Releasers that detect a threatening stimulus and determine the level of
the threat depending on whether it is distal or proximal. The Fear Affective Evaluation
Unit, depending on the significance of the stimuli would coordinate the associated
behaviors, which in this case correspond to a Freezing Behavior, a Fearful Expression,
and the internal mediation of mechanisms for Reflex Potentiation
the Preparatory and Consummatory Behaviors, correspond to the set of short-term and
stereotypical responses that are commonly associated with emotional episodes, and
which would involve not only relational behavior, such as emotional expressions and
specific actions, but also internal responses and influences on other systems, includ-
ing the release of hormones in the bloodstream, the modulation of mechanisms of
attention, or the interactions with other affect programs (see Section 6.3.3).
6.2.2 Instances of Affect Programs
Figure 7-3 illustrates a specific instance of the Affect Program abstraction. The Fear
Affect Program shown in the figure has a set of Releasers that include the detection of
a threatening stimulus and determine the level of the threat depending on whether
it is distal or proximal). Given all available information, the command center that is
part of the Fear Affect Program evaluates the affective significance-with respect to
the fear affect programn--of the perceived stimuli. If the stimuli are significant, then a
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coordinated execution of all responses (Preparatory and Consummatory Behaviors takes
place.
As with this Fear Affect Program, several other affect programs representing dis-
crete emotions can be instantiated and modeled as part of the Cathexis framework.
Each instance will thus have its own control and evaluative mechanism, together with
its efferent and afferent connections to Releasers and Behaviors, respectively. Thus,
each Affect Program will receive information from its own set of Releasers, process it in
its own style, and influence behavior. These differences in the information processing
style of each of the affect programs is at the essence of the model.
As part of the three robotic systems that were described in Chapter 5, we instan-
tiated several variations of the following affect programs:
1. Seeking: An affect program that mediates appetitive motivational situations.
It is primarily concerned with leading organisms (in our case the robots) to
pursue goals in their environment. The term Seeking was coined by Panksepp
(1998) to reflect the idea that organisms "seek out" the fruits of their environ-
ment. In this work, we restrict the use of the Seeking affect program to the
notion of seeking solutions to impending goals, such as physiological needs me-
diated by regulatory mechanisms. In Chapter 10, however, we speculate further
with this notion and suggest that a mechanism such as this might be the foun-
dation for seeking solutions and alternatives to other, more abstract, situations
as well.
2. Surprise: This affect program deals mediates the robot's attentional resources.
As such, it responds primarily to novel and sudden stimuli and regulates the
primary active attention responses, which include head and body Orienting
Responses (ORs).
3. Fear: An affect program that synchronizes a variety of subprograms, in response
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to dangerous contingencies or threatening stimuli. Depending on the specific
robot, these threatening stimuli include dark environments where the robot's
vision sensors are of little use, and more material stimuli such as predators (e.g.,
the "evil blue pool pony" described in Section 5.3.1).
4. Joy: This affect program mediates all responses to rewarding stimuli and situ-
ations.
5. Distress: An affect program that deals primarily with punishing stimuli and
separation distress contingencies, when referring to social contexts.
6. Anger: This affect program deals primarily with those situations that restrict
freedom of action for the robot or that impede access to its resources.
6.3 A System-Level View of the Framework
Theoretical constructs can be viewed and described at multiple levels. For instance,
traditional approaches to building control systems for robots decompose the problem
into a set of functional subsystems. Even more recent approaches that are greatly in-
fluenced by behavior-based approaches, such as the pioneering work of Brooks (1986),
and which should then imply a behavior-based decomposition, exhibit nonetheless an
overall architecture that is decomposed not into behaviors, but rather into a series
of functional subsystems that include, in most cases, a perceptual system, a motiva-
tion or drive system, a behavior system, and a motor system (Tyrell, 1994; Blum-
berg, 1996; Breazeal, 2000).
If we consider the main components of the Affect Program abstraction, which will
be described in more detail in the following sections, one could also view the Cathexis
framework from a similar perspective, as illustrated in Figure 6-4. However, such
a functional systems view would only have explanatory purposes as the subsystems
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described in this figure do not really exist as part of the implemented framework.
Instead of a traditional functional decomposition, the Cathexis framework is imple-
mented as a set of Affect Programs that interact with each other, and which reunite all
the functionality that is associated to each of these systems. In other words, the prob-
lem of high-level control of a robot follows an affect-based decomposition approach
in which Affect Programs are used as the main entities that define a complete control
system. This is akin to Brooks' Subsumption Architecture (Brooks, 1986), and other
behavior-based approaches (Maes, 1989; Arkin, 1990; Tyrell, 1994; Blumberg, 1996),
with an emphasis on the following notions:
1. The decomposition is not behavior-based, but rather affect-based. This seem-
ingly trivial difference actually has considerable implications. As an abstraction
for emotion, Affect Programs have a specific information processing style, which
constraints the kinds of evaluations based on the input to each Affect Program
and the kind of outputs it produces. Thus, the organizational principles of the
Affect Program abstraction are at the essence of the computational model. This
difference in organization further suggests that the decomposition is not based
upon the desired external behaviors of the system, but rather on the set of pro-
totypical fundamental situations that the agent will encounter, together with
the set of coordinated responses available and necessary to face such situations,
all of which is captured by the affect program theoretical construct as described
in Chapter 2 and its possible neural underpinnings reviewed in Chapter 4.
2. No layered control is implied by the architecture, although Affect Programs can
build new layers of functionality by adapting their structure both on their input
(adding new Releasers) and output sides (adding new connections to Behaviors)
as it will be described in further chapters.
3. Parallel processing is a specific property of the model that implies that all affect
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Figure 6-4: A Hypothetical Functional Decomposition of the Cathexis Framework.
This figure illustrates a hypothetical functional decomposition of the Cathexis frame-
work. However, this functional decomposition has but explanatory purposes as the
subsystems described in this figure do not really exist as part of the implemented
framework. Instead of following a functional decomposition, the Cathexis framework
is implemented as a set of Affect Programs that interact with each other, and which
reunite all the functionality that is associated to each of these systems. Thus, it
would be more correct to think that each Affect Program internally implements these
functional systems as part of its information processing style.
programs have access to all sensors the agent possesses as well as to all of its
actuators. Naturally, only those sensors and actuators that are relevant for the
affect program solution would require access. This notion furthermore suggests
that Affect Programs compete for control of the overall system in a manner that
will be described in Section 7.1.
6.3.1 The Systems Concept
It is still useful to describe an architecture from a system-level perspective. As we
hinted above, the main systems in the Cathexis framework are not the subsystems
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usually found in traditional decompositions (e.g., perceptual system, behavior sys-
tem), but rather correspond to the set of modeled affect programs. In this framework
we make the basic assumption that normal behavior involves a continuous flow of
information through each of these independent systems (i.e., affect programs). The
systems process (i.e., filter, combine, associate, and even alter) this information. The
resulting output ultimately controls and regulates behavior, either directly or indi-
rectly. It may be the case that under certain situations some part or parts of an
affect program may be changed by the information being processed, and this change
will alter the processing of similar information on future occasions, which results in
a corresponding change in the output of the system. When these changed outputs
result in observable modified behavior, this modification is attributed to the process
of adapting or "learning." We will defer discussion on the ideas of learning an memory
to Chapter 8.
6.3.2 Parallel Processing
Traditional models of affect have been parsimonious in their descriptions of the affec-
tive functions of the brain and are mostly based on a single set of emotional concepts
involving a single processing style (i.e., a single emotion system that generates-
mostly through cognitive appraisal-all possible emotions) (Arnold, 1969; Ortony et
al., 1988; Roseman et al., 1990; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992). As we reviewed in
Chapter 4, there is no such thing as a single monolithic emotional system in the brain,
but rather several distinct systems, each with their own processing style. More than
one affect program continually processes affective information and influences behav-
ior. This idea leads to the concept of parallel processing. As illustrated in Figure 6-5,
this concept means that several independent systems mediate affective information
processing simultaneously and in parallel. These are the systems corresponding to
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Figure 6-5: Affect Programs as systems in the Cathexis framework. This figure illus-
trates a more appropriate system-level view of the Cathexis framework. In this type
of decomposition, all Affect Programs are seen as systems that receive information
and influence behavior. Each of these systems has full access to all of the robot's
sensors and actuators. Despite the vertical organization of the figure, no hierarchy
is implied, but the notion of parallel processing does apply: All systems have access
to the same information and may process it simultaneously, but each system has its
own processing style as described in the text.
specific instances of Affect Programs. In the brain, these would correspond to the
neural circuits described in Section 4.2.
6.3.3 Affect Programs Interactions
The notion of parallel processing suggests that Affect Programs compete for control of
the overall system. Depending on the specific contingencies that the robot encounters
in its environment, specific Affect Programs will become active and will synchronize
and coordinate an appropriate set of responses to deal with any particular situation.
It may be possible, however, that multiple Affect Programs become simultaneously
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Figure 6-6: Interactions Between Affect Programs. This figure illustrates a hypothet-
ical set of interactions (inhibitory and excitatory inputs) between Affect Programs
The framework is general enough that any interaction of this kind can be modeled.
Thus, the Distress Affect Program might contribute to the activity of Anger, whereas
it might inhibit Joy, for instance.
active. To deal with any conflicting situations (e.g., when conflicting affect programs
cannot be co-activated) an arbitration mechanism has been set in place as it will
be described in Section 7.1. Furthermore, Affect Programs can interact by providing
inhibitory or excitatory input to one another. Thus, it is possible to mediate these
conflicts by including inhibitory connections between Affect Programs that could not
be co-activated, such as between the Joy and Distress affect programs for instance,
or even promote other interactions as suggested in Figure 6-6.
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6.4 A Network of Basic Computational Units
Let us lower our descriptive level a bit and consider for a moment the details of
the implementation. The Affect Program abstraction is implemented as circuits of
nonlinear computational units that correspond to the basic processing element of the
framework. Figure 6-7 illustrates the notion of a basic computational unit. Each unit
has a set of inputs, an integrative mechanism that may filter, combine, and alter such
inputs, and a set of outputs that influence other units in the system.
Each computational unit has specific properties that are shared (and in some
cases refined) by all components of an Affect Program. In other words, Releasers,
Affective Evaluation and Control Units, and Behaviors are all implemented by the same
computational elements. Thus, an Affect Program is composed of several of these
elements, connected into specific, functional circuits (e.g., a fear circuit composed of
perceptual systems to detect dangerous contingencies, a command node to evaluate
the affective significance of such events, and several responses (behaviors) to act upon
to them).
The general form of the response or activation of each basic unit is a nonlinear
function of its inputs and the strengths of their connections, or weights, as described
in Equation 6.1
Ai(t) = f (E(Ski(t) -Wki(t))) (6.1)
k
Where Ai(t) is the activation of system i at time t; Ski(t) is the value of input k and
Wki(t) is its associated weight at time t, where k ranges over the set of inputs for
system i. Finally, f is a limiting function, such as the standard ramp and logistic
functions, which limit the activity of these units to be within certain ranges.
The following sections provide detailed descriptions for each of the elements that
compose the Affect Program abstraction and review the main ideas behind the work
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Figure 6-7: Basic computational element. This figure illustrates the basic processing
units that compose the Affect Program abstraction. The same units are used to
implement all components of the abstraction. The main computational properties of
these units are shared by all components. In some cases, however, specific components
may specialize the information processing style of the element.
that influenced and motivated such design decisions. But before delving into details,
let us consider a sample scenario to illustrate the main ideas related to the affect
programs construct.
6.5 Gorillas in Our Midst: A Sample Scenario
Imagine for a moment that you are a well-known primatologist studying the natural
habitat of the Silverback Gorilla in the East African savanna and its surrounding
forests. On a perfect day, you have stationed your safari vehicle behind a set of
trees where an adult Silverback sits down close to two other young gorillas, who are
playfully pushing and shoving each other in a manner typical of "rough and tumble"
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play. Suddenly, a loud crackling noise is heard up above in the tree branches, and both
you and all gorillas direct their attention toward the tree branches in anticipation
of some explanation for the sound. Sure enough, soon after a leopard is revealed
through the :foliage. Its cover blown by the crackling sound of broken branches, the
leopard hesitates to jump to the ground and stays up above in the tree, lurking in the
branches awaiting for the right time to go after its prey. In an instant, the two young
gorillas have initiated an escaping response, while the adult Silverback has assumed a
defensive, yet aggressive posture. You feel shaky, your heart is beating faster and an
urge to escape the situation is all that occupies your mind. Yet, despite the fact that
your body might be telling you otherwise, this urge is inhibited by the realization that
you are safe inside of your vehicle, where you finally stay to capture the moment.
Back to reality. In a scenario like this, a variety of affect programs might become
active at different times and their different components process information from the
environment and coordinate and execute appropriate responses. For instance, a Play
affect program, such as that described in Section 4.2.6 might be the active system
controlling the behaviors exhibited by the two young gorillas at the beginning of
the scenario. When the loud noise occurs, however, activity in this system might
be inhibited by a Surprise affect program that would attempt to gain control of
the animals' attentional resources to identify the nature of the sound in order to
determine whether it was affectively significant or not. The detection of the predator
threat would likely activate a Fear affect program in each of the characters of our
scenario, which would synchronize a variety of responses. In the case of the two young
gorillas, a set of responses preparing them to escape would ensue, whereas in the adult
Silverback a different set of responses which would include a fighting stance would
have been active. Likewise, a different set of responses would have been coordinated
in your case, given our hypothetical scenario.
We will continue exploring this scenario in further sections, as we describe the
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different components of the Affect Program abstraction. Let us start with the notion
of Releasers.
6.6 Releasers: A Window to the Robot's World
Nikolaas Tinbergen (1951) and Konrad Lorenz (1973) suggested possible mechanisms
that trigger stereotypical behavior in organisms6 . An important element of their
work involved the notion of an Innate Releasing Mechanism (IRM), which essentially
corresponds to a hypothetical filter-trigger complex that initially filters a stimulus to
determine if it is a sign stimulus-an external signal that evokes a particular action
and then triggers the corresponding behavior.
The main idea behind the IRM notion is that a stereotypical behavior occurs
only under specific contexts. Thus, when an organism is not under the appropriate
circumstances, the "energy" to motivate the behavior builds up inside its nervous
system. The more it builds up, the easier it is to elicit the behavior. According to
Tinbergen (1951), this energy is held in check by a central neural mechanism that is
under constant inhibition from another center. This other center is the IRM. When
the organism perceives an appropriate stimulus, its corresponding IRM is activated,
which in turn "releases" the inhibition on the central neural mechanism, allowing the
behavior to be executed.
Drawing upon these ideas and building upon previous work (Velasquez, 1997;
Velisquez, 1998b), we implemented the Releaser7 abstraction which corresponds roughly
to an IRM. Releasers may be associated with any other computational elements, such
6This work gave Lorenz and Tinbergen, together with Karl von Frisch, the 1973 Nobel Prize in
Physiology or Medicine for their discoveries concerning organization and elicitation of individual and
social behavior patterns
7 Releasers were previously referred to as "Sensors" or "Elicitors" in Velasquez (1996) and
Velhsquez (1997).
124
as the Affective Evaluation and Behavior units (see Sections ?? and 6.9). In essence,
Releasers filter sensory data and identify special conditions that provide excitatory
(positive) or inhibitory (negative) input to the system they are associated with. Re-
leasers thus act as a mechanism that provides an assessment of perceptual information
detecting specific conditions in particular stimulus which would prove of affective sig-
nificance and therefore should motivate behavior.
To illustrate these ideas further, let us think back to our gorillas scenario. In
this hypothetical example, the gorilla's sensory systems would collect data from the
environment, which in this case would very likely include data regarding the crackling
sound, the leopard, and several other stimuli occurring at that time. Let us further
suppose that the gorillas have a set of Releasers that filter these sensory data and
determine whether sign stimuli are present or not. In this scenario, a Loud Sound
Releaser and a Predator Releaser might be part of the gorillas' Releaser repertoire,
and would determine whether the sensory data regarding the crackling sound and the
shape coming out from the trees actually correspond to the sound and morphology of a
predator, respectively, in which case this information would be fed into the Affective
Evaluation and Behavior units of different affect programs (e.g, Surprise and Fear)
where further processing would ensue in order to determine what responses would be
appropriate under the circumstances.
6.6.1 Kinds of Releasers
As we have discussed above, each Affect Program has associated a set of Releasers that
constantly check for the appropriate conditions that would evoke an affective response.
In contrast to other computational models proposed to date that emphasize the notion
of cognitively generated emotions, we consider both cognitive and non-cognitive kinds
of Releasers for the different instances of Affect Programs. Influenced by Izard's multi-
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system for emotion activation (Izard, 1993), these Releasers have been divided into
four different theoretical groups:
1. Neural: Considers the effects of neurotransmitters, brain temperature, and
other neuroactive agents that can lead to an affective response. Many of these
are regulated and can be affected by hormones, sleep, diet, and environmental
conditions. For instance, there is a great deal of evidence that shows that
decreased levels of norepinephrine and serotonin are associated with depression
(Meltzer & Lowy, 1987). Similarly, it is clear that several chemical agents, such
as carbon dioxide, yohimbine, and amphetamines produce anxiety in humans
by activating the noradrenergic system (Charney & Redmond, 1983).
2. Sensorimotor: This type of Releasers includes sensorimotor processes, such
as facial expressions, body posture, muscle action potentials, and other cen-
tral efferent activity, which are not only important in regulating ongoing af-
fective responses, but can also elicit them in the first place. Some evidence
supporting this type of elicitors comes from neuropsychological studies in which
experimenter-directed manipulation of facial muscles, composing a specific emo-
tional expression, produces the subjective feeling corresponding to that emotion,
as well as emotion-specific patterns of ANS activity (Ekman et al., 1983).
3. Motivational: This system includes all motivations that lead to emotion. In
this model, motivations include the set of regulatory mechanisms discussed later
on in Section 6.7 and which would represent physiological needs and internal
goals. Some examples of elicitors in this system include the innate response to
foul odors or tastes producing disgust, as measured in neuropsychological studies
by (Fox & Davidson, 1986), pain or aversive stimulation causing distress, or the
levels of physiological variables such as blood sugar, temperature, sodium levels
and so forth.
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4. Cognitive: This system includes all type of cognitions that activate emotion,
such as appraisal of events, comparisons, attributions, beliefs and desires, mem-
ory, and so on. Previously, Velasquez (1997), defined this set of Releasers to
correspond to one of the taxonomies popular in the cognitive appraisal theory
view of affect (Roseman et al., 1990). In an effort to adhere to the design
principle of biological plausibility (see Section 6.1.3), the present work does not
explicitly model Cognitive Releasers as a mapping of such a taxonomy, but rather
suggests that these can be acquired as the robot interacts with its environment
and starts making associations between the stimuli it encounters and the dif-
ferent affective responses they might release. A proposed first step toward the
acquisition of this kind of Releasers relates to the idea of incentive learning,
which is the main topic of Chapter 8.
Natural and Learned Releasers
One final distinction we make with respect to Releasers, regardless of the theoreti-
cal group they belong to, is that they can be innate and hard-wired (Natural Re-
leasers), or they can be learned (Learned Releasers). All Releasers discussed so far
(and throughout this chapter) are natural releasers. We use the notion of learned
releasers to represent stimuli that tend to be associated with, and are predictors of,
the occurrence of natural releasers. This type of Releasers and the mechanisms and
processes involved in their generation will be discussed in detail in Chapter 8.
6.6.2 Habituation of Releasers
Nonassociative learning is an interesting, and often overlooked, type of learning in
which an organism acquires information about the properties of a single stimulus by
being exposed to it repeatedly.
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All Releasers in the Cathexis framework posses short-term memory and thus can
habituate to stimuli. To achieve this, we have implemented a model of feedforward
habituation based on the work by Dragoi (2002). This model allows us to produce
suppressive and facilitatory habituation effects depending on the nature of the stim-
ulus. For instance, repetitive presentation of a stimulus that is not affectively sig-
nificant decreases the strength of the output response of the Releaser (habituation
effect), whereas the evaluation of a stimulus as being of affective significance acts
as a facilitatory effect, following the initial presentation of the stimulus, which in-
creases the output response strength (recovery or dishabituation). Much like the
work of Staddon (1993), this model explain rate sensitive properties of habituation
and dishabituation, both of which serve our purposes of modeling the influences of
affect in attentional mechanisms, as it will be described in Chapter 8, where this
property of Releasers (habituation) play a very important role in attention and co-
herence. As we will demonstrate, habituation allows organisms (robots in our case)
to become accustomed to initially distracting stimuli, and to learn to perform more
effectively in an otherwise noisy environment.
The model works by processing each stimulus of interest to the specific Releaser
via two different pathways: one inhibitory and one excitatory. Figure 6-8 illustrates
this idea, with a stimulus X being fed into two different processing units: I and E,
which correspond to these different processing pathways, and the output R (Releaser's
strength), which is sensitive to the difference between inhibition and excitation of
these two units.
The specifics of the model are described by the following set of interrelated equa-
tions describing the activity of both inhibitory and excitatory units and the output
response.
128
E :Excitatory Pathway
I :Inhibitory Pathway
Figure 6-8: Releasers' Habituation Mechanism. This figure illustrates the model of
habituation implemented for all Releasers in the framework. This habituation model
processes a stimulus X through two different pathways: an inhibitory one (that goes
through neuron I) and an excitatory one (that goes through neuron E). The response
R is determined by the set of equations described in the text, and accounts for both
suppressive and facilitatory habituation effects.
(6.2)
(6.3)
I(t) = I(t - 1) - all(t - 1) + a2 X(t)[1 - I(t - 1)]
E(t) = E(t - 1) - OlE(t - 1) + 02X(t)[1 - E(t - 1)]
Where X(t) represents the input stimulus, al and a2 are the decay and increase rate
constants associated to the inhibitory neuron I, and 01 and 12 are the decay and
increase rate constants associated to the excitatory neuron E.
The strength of the releaser's output R is controlled by the difference between the
excitatory and inhibitory units as described in the following equations, where F is a
sigmoid function used to limit the response, where q controls the slope of the sigmoid.
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Figure 6-9: Results of Releasers' Habituation. This graph illustrates the results of
rate sensitive habituation and recovery when a train of stimuli is presented for any
particular Releaser (upper graph). The Releaser's output response R is plotted in the
lower graph. The following parameters where used: X(t) is set to 1 when the stimulus
is present, and 0 otherwise. al = 0.1, a2 = 0.3, 01 = 0.05 and ,2 = 0.08.
R(t) = 1 - F(max[O, I(t) - E(t)])
1 - e- qx
F(x) = e1 + e-±x
(6.4)
(6.5)
Figure 6-9 illustrates the results of the rate sensitive habituation and recovery
model incorporated into the processing of every Releaser. In this example, a train of
stimuli is presented for the Releaser to process (upper graph). The Releaser's output
response R is plotted in the lower graph. The following parameters where used: X(t)
is set to 1 when the stimulus is present, and 0 otherwise. al = 0.1, a 2 = 0.3, 01 =
0.05 and 32 = 0.08.
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Figure 6-10: Regulatory Mechanisms. This figure illustrates the concept of drives or
regulatory mechanisms seen from a control systems perspective. A specific control
system regulates a controlled internal variable (e.g., temperature). When feedback
detectors signal that the variables is above or below the set point an error signal is
generated, which in turn facilitates appropriate regulatory responses. Adapted from
Kupfermann et al. (2000, p. 1000).
6.7 Regulatory Mechanisms
Most models of affect that have been embedded in robot (or agent) control systems
include the notion of drives as part of the main elements of a motivation subsys-
tem (Blumberg, 1996; Caiiamero, 1997; Breazeal, 2000; Konidaris & Barto, 2006).
Breazeal (2000), for instance, relies heavily on homeostatic regulation mechanisms to
regulate social interactions with her robot.
In contrast to these models, we explicitly differentiate between emotions and
drives, not only in terms of their motivational value, but also in terms of how they
are implemented in the framework.
With respect to their motivational value, we follow an approach similar to that of
Tomkins (1962), which suggests that drives are cyclical in nature and are associated
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with and satisfied by a relatively restricted range of stimuli. Emotions, on the other
hand, are not cyclical, they can be related to an enormous variety of phenomena, and
can motivate an equally wide range of cognition and actions. Thus, although drives
(seen as error signals) may appear to ultimately result in controlling responses (e.g.,
behavioral, autonomic, or endocrine) that correct the error, they do so not because
they have intrinsic "motivational power", but rather because they are associated with
specific affect programs that regulate this kind of affective processes.
In Chapter 8, we will argue, based on existing evidence that suggests a functional
role for specific emotional brain systems, that regulatory mechanisms such as those
described here and commonly referred to by many as drives, are mediated by a specific
kind of affect program: The Seeking Affect Program.
To implement drives we follow a control systems approach and model them as
a particular kind of internal Releasers called Drive Releasers. Figure 6-10 illustrates
the notion of a drive seen as an error signal within a regulatory mechanism. In such
a mechanism, a controlled internal variable is first measured through some of the
robot's internal sensors and then compared to a desired value or set point. If its
value does not match the set point, an error signal (the drive signal) is produced.
Since this signal is computed as part of the information processing performed by a
Drive Releaser, it can be sent to whatever system the Drive Releaser is attached to,
where it can be combined with the activity from other Releasers.
6.8 Affective Evaluation
The Affective Evaluation unit is at the core of the notion of affect programs. It
corresponds to the main processing center that evaluates the affective significance
of events and coordinates and synchronizes appropriate responses that deal with such
contingencies and ultimately lead the robot to exhibit robust and adaptive behavior.
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The evaluation of affective significance is also related to the notion of emotion
intensity. This is undoubtedly an open question in the field of emotion research. In
this thesis, we propose that the affective value of events is directly related to the
intensity of the emotional episodes they generate. Thus, we believe these notions
to be equivalent. The evaluation of affective significance of events, for each affect
program, is performed through the same type basic computational units described
in Section 6.4. However, their processing style is extended with functionality that
considers the! excitatory (positive) and inhibitory (negative) input from other Affect
Programs, as well as temporal decay to model how the intensity of an emotional
episode decreases over time. The activity pattern of the Affective Evaluation Units
follows the description of Equation 6.6
Ai(t) = f(g(Ai(t - 1)) + Z(Rki(t) Ws(t)) + E(pili(t) - Al(t))) (6.6)
k 1
Where Ai(t) is the activation of affect program i at time t; Ai(t - 1) is its activation
at the previous time step; g is the function that controls the temporal decay of
the activation of affect program i; Rk~(t) is the value of Releaser k and Wki(t) is its
associated weight at time t, where k ranges over the set of releasers for affect program
i; pli(t) is the strength of the excitatory (positive) or inhibitory (negative) input from
affect program 1, where At(t) is its activation value at time t; and f is a limiting
function such as the standard ramp and logistic (sigmoid) functions.
With respect to our gorillas scenario, the contingencies detected by the gorillas'
Releasers would be assessed by the Affective Evaluation Units of specific affect pro-
grams, such as Play, Surprise or Fear, as described in this scenario. For instance, the
presence of other young gorillas would be affectively evaluated as significant by the
Play affect program. In turn, when the loud crackling noise occured, the Surpirse
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Figure 6-11: Computing the Affective Value of Events. This figure illustrates how
the Affective Evaluation Unit computes the affective value of different contingencies
detected by the affect program's releasers. This affective value is directly related to
the level of activation of the affect program, and thus to the notion of emotional
intensity. The specific activity pattern follows the description of Equation 6.6 in the
text.
affect program's level of activity would be directly related to the affective value as-
signed to this event by its Affective Evaluation Unit. Likewise, the detection of the
predator would be evaluated by the Fear affect program's Affective Evaluation pro-
cessing, which would assign an affective value that would be appropriate to the level
of the threat.
The Affective Evaluation and Control Unit component of Affect Programs bears re-
semblance to some of the aspects in which the interactions between neural systems
involving the amygdala, the hippocampus, and the prefrontal cortices have been con-
sidered to mediate emotions, such as assigning an affective value to different stimuli,
the activation of affective responses, and affective learning (Damasio, 1994; LeDoux,
1996; Panksepp, 1995).
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6.9 Behaviors: Responding to Contingencies
Up until now we have described the input components of the Affect Program abstrac-
tion, and its evaluative and control component. In this section we describe their
output components: Behaviors.
From an ethological perspective, Behaviors correspond to the set of fixed responses
or behavioral repertoire associated to a particular species. These behaviors are com-
mon to all members of the species and are as characteristic of the species as their
structural features would be. Lorenz (1973) and Tinbergen (1951) called these pat-
terns of behavior Fixed Action Patterns (FAP), which, once activated, are performed
in a stereotyped way unaffected by external stimuli (e.g., a frog's prey-catching tongue
flick is performed in the same way whether or not the prey is caught).
Integrating these ideas to an affective perspective, Behaviors in the Cathexis frame-
work are implemented as the highly stereotyped and precise responses that are as-
sociated with a particular affect program, such as the freezing behavior produced
by fear or a courting behavior regulated by the sexual affect program described in
Section 4.2.3. It should be noted, however, that Behaviors do not only correspond
to overt responses like those mentioned previously, but may also involve internal
responses such as activity in the sympathetic and parasympathetic divisions of the
ANS, increased reflexes, or the regulation of stress responses. Figure 6-1, for instance,
illustrated some of the responses known to be associated with the activity of the brain
systems mediating fear. Clearly, in the case of a robot many of these responses are not
yet possibles . However, the Cathexis framework does allow for the modeling of such
type of responses, even if they only exist as simulations 9. For instance, the regulatory
8At least not at the present time, since we have not endowed our robotic systems with real
regulatory (and related) mechanisms that would be analogous to systems such as the reproductive,
immune, or autonomic nervous system. It may be the case, however, that some of these systems
might actually be necessary in order to replicate and better understand living creatures.
9In fact, from an affect perspective, it is the author's opinion that not contemplating these
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mechanisms that model physiological needs rely on this type of simulated responses
to modify the state of the controlled internal variables.
As in many other architectures (Brooks, 1986; Arkin, 1990; Maes, 1991; Blum-
berg, 1994), the Behavior construct corresponds to actions that represent goal-directed
activities an agent can perform given a particular situation. Unlike these architec-
tures, however, Behaviors in this framework depend more heavily on affect to provide a
motivational context that determines their relevance and arbitrates possible conflicts
with other responses.
Through its associated Releasers, a Behavior obtains the necessary information sup-
porting the low-level motor response that is to be issued when the response becomes
active. Although we will defer discussion of this distinction to the following chapter,
it should be noted that Behaviors can either be Consummatory or Preparatory, which
would correspond to stimulus-specific and affectively-general responses, respectively.
Thus, the selection and execution of a Behavior such as "chewing", would depend on
sensory-specific information about food (e.g, is food present in the mouth of the or-
ganism, what are its physical properties?), whereas a Behavior such as "approaching"
the food would merely depend on the general affective information about the food
(i.e., is it a positive or a negative stimulus).
Going one last time to our gorillas scenario, the different gorillas (and you as a
primatologist), had a variety of responses available as part of their behavior reper-
toire. Depending on the specific affective evaluation, the "flight" or "escape" behavior
became active in the case of the two young gorillas, whereas the "fight" behavior was
the selected response for the adult Silverback. The selection of one response over an-
other depends directly on the information provided by the affect program's Releasers
issues (even in robotic systems) is a gross oversight of most existing models of emotions, especially
since many of the elicitors and responses involved in affective processing are related to such type of
mechanisms.
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Figure 6-12: Computing the Value of Behaviors. This figure illustrates how the value
of Behaviors are computed in the Cathexis framework. The value of the different Re-
leasers is combined with the inhibitory or excitatory input from other Behaviors to
compute the value of each Behavior unit. This value will be used in an arbitration
mechanism to select the appropriate Behavior in response to any particular contin-
gency. The specific activity pattern follows the description of Equation 6.7 in the
text.
and the affective value given to the detected contingencies. Considered together, this
constitutes the value of a Behavior as indicated next.
The activation value of Behaviors follows the general pattern of basic compu-
tational units described in Section 6.4, but extends it to incorporate functionality
related to the possible interactions between different Fixed Responses as described in
Equation 6.7
Bj(t) = f ( (Rn (t) -Wnj(t)) + (P Ij(t) . B (t))) (6.7)
Where Bj(t) is the value of Behavior j at time t; Rj(t) is the value of Releaser n
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and Wj (t) is its associated weight at time t, where n ranges over the Releasers for
Behavior j; uzj(t) is the strength of the excitatory (positive) or inhibitory (negative)
input from Behavior 1, where Bl(t) is its activation value at time t.
The value of Behaviors is of special interest as it will provide the basic means
to arbitrate and select between different possible responses within an active affect
program. This arbitration or action selection mechanism will be the topic of the next
chapter.
6.10 Summary
This chapter presented a unified computational framework, named Cathexis, for the
study of emotion and affective phenomena in general, based upon the construction
of computational models that integrate several concepts and mechanisms that have
been traditionally deemed as integral components of intelligent behavior.
This approach is based on the notion of Affect Programs, which we defined in
Chapter 2 as adaptive biological schemas that have proven useful, throughout our
evolutionary past, in helping us deal with life and survival-related fundamental sit-
uations. The Cathexis framework provides a computational counterpart to this the-
oretical construct through the Affect Program abstraction, which consists of a set
of filtering mechanisms, named Releasers, an Affective Evaluation Unit that assesses
the affective significance of events, and a set of Behaviors that are synchronized and
controlled by the Affect Program in response to specific contingencies.
The following chapters will instantiate a variety of these Affect Programs, and
through different scenarios, we will illustrate how they serve many different purposes,
ranging from providing the motivational context that synchronizes and controls the
execution of different behaviors and maintaining their relevance and coherence (Chap-
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ter 7), to the regulation of learning processes by which the robot can learn from past
emotionally significant contingencies and modify its behavior accordingly (Chapter 8),
and finally, to the modulation of attention through different sensory modalities (Chap-
ter 9).
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Chapter 7
Affective Behavior
This chapter demonstrates how behavior can be generated and controlled by the
activity of the affect programs described in the previous chapter. We will also in-
troduce a scheme for the organization of behaviors that is based upon earlier ideas
and observations from psychology which divide action into two different sensorimotor
pathways: one that is concerned with distal contingencies and promotes preparatory
responses to deal with them, and one that deals with proximal events which require
stimulus-specific responses that are generated according to the sensory and affective
properties of the stimulus. As we will describe shortly, we believe that these organi-
zational principles that are widely spread in biological organisms can be useful when
applied to agent architectures that account for the selection and control of actions.
7.1 Arbitration and Action Selection
The concept of parallel processing described in Figure 6-5 implies that information
about all contingencies and ongoing contexts in the robot's world, reaches and ac-
tivates appropriate Releasers, and in turn, may activate several Affect Programs si-
multaneously. How is then coherent activity formulated and coordinated in such
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situations? This question relates to the issue of action selection, which is a fairly
standard research problem in agent architectures. Within the proposed model, ar-
bitration takes place at different levels, following a two-stage activation system as
illustrated in Figures 7-1 and 7-2.
First, all Affect Programs compete with each other for the activation of their Be-
haviors. This is regulated through the levels of activity of each of the Affect Program's
Affective Evaluation Units as described in Equation 6.6 (Figure 7-1). Essentially, the
process is as follows: For all instances of affect programs, their affective value is com-
puted, which depends on the input of the affect program's releasers as they represent
the detection of prototypical contingencies in the agent's world. The affect program
with the highest affective value is selected for execution, which simply means that
this affect program takes control over the agent's resources, as it is about to select
the appropriate set of responses that would deal with the contingencies that activated
the affect program in the first place.
Once an affect program has been activated, which means that its level of activity
has surpassed an activation threshold, an emotional episode is said to occur, and a
set of responses must be now be coordinated and synchronized. This control process
corresponds to the second stage of the action selection process (Figure 7-2), and it
develops as follows: For all behaviors associated to the active affect program, their
value is computed, which ultimately depends on the input of the affect program's
releasers that provide sensory-specific information about the contingencies that ac-
tivated the affect program, and which prove useful in deciding which behaviors and
responses to select and execute. The behavior with the highest affective value is se-
lected for execution, which simply means that this behavior takes momentary control
over the agent's actuators. This second stage of the action selection process will be
repeated as long as the affect program is active, which means that multiple behaviors
can become active at various moments during that time period.
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Figure 7-1: Selection of an Affect Program-First Stage in Action Selection Process.
This figure illustrates the first stage of the action selection process. For all instances of
affect programs, their affective value is computed, which depends on the input of the
affect program's releasers as they represent the detection of prototypical contingencies
in the agent's world. The affect program with the highest affective value is selected
for execution, which simply means that this affect program takes control over the
agent's resources, as it is about to select the appropriate set of responses that would
deal with the contingencies that activated the affect program in the first place.
When dealing with more complex robotic systems that have many degrees of free-
dom and richer sensing abilities, it may be possible however for the robot to engage
in more than one activity at the same time. Thus a separate level of arbitration
takes place at the motor system level as well (not depicted here). Losing Affect Pro-
grams may still issue Behaviors, but their execution depends on the specific actuators
these behaviors compete for. Thus, non-conflicting Behaviors are allowed to be exe-
cuted simultaneously as long as the sensory and motor systems they depend on are
separable.
7.2 Scenarios for Affective Behavior
To illustrate these ideas, consider the following evaluation scenario as implemented
with our simulated robot. We instantiated Marvin's affective repertoire with multiple
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Figure 7-2: Selection of a Behavior-Final Stage in Action Selection Process. This
figure illustrates the second stage of the action selection process. For all behaviors
associated to the active affect program, their value is computed, which ultimately
depends on the input of the affect program's releasers that provide sensory-specific
information about the contingencies that activated the affect program, and which
prove useful in deciding which behaviors and responses to select and execute. The
behavior with the highest affective value is selected for execution, which simply means
that this behavior takes momentary control over the agent's actuators. This second
stage of the action selection process will be repeated as long as the affect program is
active, which means that multiple behaviors can become active at various moments
during that time period
instances of the affect programs described in earlier chapters. In particular, we created
instances for the Surprise, Seeking, Fear, Joy, and Distress systems. Let us focus for
a moment on a particular instantiation for Marvin's Fear affect program.
Figure 7-3 illustrates an example of a Fear affect program instantiated in our
simulated robot. This affect program's main purpose was to detect dangerous con-
tingencies as represented by two main events: the presence of Marvin's predator (i.e.
the evil blue-pool pony) and the detection of dark environments. To this end, we
implemented a set of releasers which detected these two different contingencies and
provided sensory-specific information related to the distance or range of the robot with
respect to these threatening stimuli. In a similar fashion, we implemented three main
behaviors that represented the set of responses necessary to deal with these threats:
a Flight response, a Fright response and a Fight response. The so-called three "Fs"
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Figure 7-3: An Instance of the Fear Affect Program. This figure illustrates an in-
stance of the Fear affect program implemented in the simulated robot described in
Section 5.3.
represented different possible responses that would deal with the prototypical situa-
tion of facing a dangerous event, based upon the sensory-specific information of this
event.
In this particular evaluation scenario, Marvin's Fear affect program would select
the flight behavior if the robot's distance to the predator, whenever detected by its
releasers, would be less or equal than 3 meters, but more than 2 meters. When such
contingency was detected, and the Fear affect program was the active program (i.e.,
its affective value was higher than that of all other affect programs, as described in
the first stage of the action selection process), it would control the execution of the
flight response as illustrated in Figure 7-4. The specific response coded by the flight
behavior consisted on a startled expression and a set of commands to the robot's
actuators controlling its linear velocity so that the distance between the robot and
the predator would be increased until the predator was no longer in sight.
Similarly, Marvin's Fear affect program would select the fright behavior if the
robot's distance to the predator, whenever detected by its releasers, would be less or
equal than 2 meters, but more than 1 meter. At such range, a flight response might
not be useful, as the predator is almost within reach of the robot and an attempt to
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Figure 7-4: Flight Response. This sequence of frames illustrates how the Flight
response becomes the selected response, as part of the second stage of action selection.
Activity of releasers indicate the "predator" is present (red arrow) and the distance
r between it and the robot is less or equal than 3 meters, which is the distance that
would trigger such response.
escape might not be successful. In such contingencies, a "play dead" response might
be of better use as it does not draw the attention of the predator until a possibility for
escaping arises. When such a contingency was detected, and the Fear affect program
was the active program, it would control the execution of the fright response as
illustrated in Figure 7-5. The specific response coded by the fright behavior consisted
on a set of commands that would stop all of the robot's movements and the robots
head would be tilted down, "playing dead".
Finally, Marvin's Fear affect program would select the fight behavior if the preda-
tor would be detected withing 1 meter of range of the robot. At such distance, a flight
response is impossible, and the fright response would not work either given that the
distance is so short that the predator's attention would most likely be drawn by the
robot. In such event, the only other option is to fight the predator. When this kind
of event was detected, and the Fear affect program was the active program, it would
control the execution of the fight response as illustrated in Figure 7-6. The specific
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Figure 7-5: Fright Response. This sequence of frames illustrates how the Fright
response becomes the selected response, as part of the second stage of action selection.
Activity of releasers indicate the "predator" is present (red arrow) and the distance
r between it and the robot is less or equal than 2 meters, but greater than 1 meter
which is the distance that would trigger such response.
Figure 7-6: Fight Response. This sequence of frames illustrates how the Fight re-
sponse becomes the selected response, as part of the second stage of action selection.
Activity of releasers indicate the "predator" is present (red arrow) and the distance
r between it and the robot is less or equal than 1 meter, which is the distance that
would trigger such response.
response coded by the fight behavior consisted on a set of commands that would
control the robots linear velocity so that it would attempt to run over the predator,
as illustrated in the figure.
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7.3 Anticipatory and Consummatory Behaviors
Our evaluation of the affective behavior demonstrated by the robot Marvin, described
in the previous section, suggested a more fundamental organizational principle for
action. Considering the notion of distal and proximal stimuli, and the different routes
for behavior activation, we delved deeper into these issues and found inspiration from
earlier observations in psychology and neuroscience as to how behavior might be
organized in a more effective and modular manner.
Sir Charles Sherrington (1906), a pioneer in research on neural mechanisms of
spinal reflexes, provided at the beginning of last century a general conceptual frame-
work for how adaptive behavior is generated. Specifically, he introduced an influential
distinction that categorized behavior in terms of preparatory (also referred to as an-
ticipatory or appetitive) and consummatory responses.
Preparatory behavior is flexible and thus it can vary considerably. It usually
implies the exploration and appraisal of the environment, which can later be com-
bined with previous experience. According to Sherrington, these responses were trig-
gered by visual, auditory, and olfactory perceptual systems-what he called "distance-
receptors"-which provide information at a spatiotemporal distance that gives organ-
isms the opportunity to prepare for environmental contingencies. An essential feature
of preparatory behavior is that it corresponds to the first part of a sequence of multi-
ple behaviors that together promote survival by bringing an organism into proximal
contact with a goal or incentive.
Consummatory behaviors, on the other hand, correspond to more rigid, fixed ac-
tion patterns that serve to fulfill a particular goal. A consummatory response is essen-
tially the end of the sequence of motivated behavior enunciated above and is usually
triggered by tactile and taste perceptual systems-what Sherrington called "proximal-
receptors"-that inform organisms about what should be the appropriate immediate
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Table 7.1: Comparison of Preparatory and Consummatory Sensorimotor Pathways.
responses in order to enhance their welfare. Usually, these behaviors result in consumn-
matory reactions, such as the ingestion of foodstuff (nutrients) or withdrawal from
life-threatening situations, as depicted in our previous scenario with Marvin and its
main predator.
Table 7.1 relates both preparatory and consummatory behavior, according to their
main features.
7.4 Approach and Avoidance
Related to Sherrington's consummatory and anticipatory ideas, the concepts of ap-
proach and withdrawal responses also acquired significance at the time. Schneirla
(1959), in his biphasic "A-W Theory", was among the first to argue for the exis-
tence of two fundamental behavioral processes: one for approach and another for
withdrawal that might be the end result of completely different systems. He stated:
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Sensorimotor Pathways
Preparatory Consummatory
Composed of flexible-responses that are Composed of fixed responses that are
non-specific to a particular stimulus specific to the different stimuli encoun-
(e.g., approach) tered in the environment (e.g., chewing,
gnawing)
Triggered by distance-receptors (e.g., Triggered by proximal-receptors (e.g.,
visual and auditory systems) gustatory, olfactory and tactile sys-
tems)
Provide information at spatiotemporal Provide sensory-specific information
distance, which is used to determine about the kind of stimulus present, and
the general preparatory response thus the kind of response that is most
appropriate for such stimulus
Allow organisms to prepare for soon-to- Allow organisms to fulfill goals (e.g.,
be proximal contingencies enhance welfare)
"Much evidence shows that in all animals, the species-typical pattern of
behavior is based upon biphasic, functionally opposed mechanisms insur-
ing approach or withdrawal reactions according to whether stimuli of low
or high intensity, respectively, are in effect. This is an oversimplified
statement; however, in general, what we shall term the A-type of mech-
anisms, underlying approach, favors adjustments such as food-getting,
shelter-getting, and mating; the W-type, underlying withdrawal, favors
adjustments such as defense, huddling, flight, and other protective re-
actions. Also, through evolution, higher psychological levels have arisen
in which through ontogeny such mechanisms can produce new and qual-
itatively advanced types of adjustment to environmental conditions" -
Schneirla (1959, p. 4)
It seems reasonable then to believe, that there are in fact anticipatory and consum-
matory components for both approach and withdrawal systems. Konorski (1967) fur-
ther classified the basic activities of organisms into four different categories: "preser-
vative preparatory", "preservative consummatory", "protective preparatory", and
"protective consummatory".
The term "preservative" corresponds to approach, while the term "protective"
corresponds to withdrawal.
Based upon these ideas, we modified our affect program abstraction so that it
would incorporate this basic action organizational principle as part of its overall
architecture, as illustrated in the Figure 7-7 and Figure 7-8.
7.5 Evaluation of Sensorimotor Pathways
To test these ideas, we implemented a variety of affect programs in the robot Coco,
which served as evaluation testbeds for the notions of preparatory and consumma-
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Figure 7-7: Pathway for Consummatory Behaviors. This figure illustrates the main
organizational principle for action in the proposed framework as it relates to the notion
of a separate sensorimotor pathway for consummatory behaviors that help bring the
organism to be in proximal contact with goal objects, thus promoting survival.
Figure 7-8: Pathway for Preparatory Behaviors. This figure illustrates the main
organizational principle for action in the proposed framework as it relates to the
notion of a separate sensorimotor pathway for preparatory or anticipatory behaviors
that help the organism prepare to deal with environmental contingencies.
tory pathways. In particular, we implemented the Seeking affect program, as the
main mechanism to explore the world, approaching objects of interest, and more im-
portantly promoting and coordinating responses that would correspond to solutions
to impending internal needs (e.g., recharging the battery when its levels are low).
The complete description of the Seeking affect program will be deferred until the
next chapter. For now, let us focus on how different sensorimotor pathways were
implemented.
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7.5.1 Coco's Distal and Proximal Releasers
In Section 6.6, we presented the idea of releasers as the main computational processes
that filtered information resulting from perceptual systems. Releasers thus act as a
mechanism that provides an assessment of perceptual information in order to deter-
mine whether a particular stimulus is of affective significance and therefore should
motivate behavior.
We extended this mechanism to include the notion of perceptual distance, which,
although related to the classic perception issue of distal versus proximal stimuli
(Heider, [1930]/1959; Koffka, 1935; Brunswik, 1956; Gibson, 1979), it is not as con-
cerned with the differentiation between the "actual" object (distal stimulus) and the
images it produces on the receptors (proximal stimulus), as it is with determining the
relative distance of a stimulus from the robot's perspective. In other words, proximal
and distal releasers are implemented as the means to identify percepts that are either
close to (proximal) or at certain reachable distance (distal) from the robot.
There are many different kinds of releasers defined for Coco that were built as part
of our implementation of the Seeking affect program. By exploiting the regularities
of the environment in which Coco was situated (e.g., the circular shape, color, and
actual size of balls) we incorporated a straightforward measure of distance in the
robot's visual perceptual system. This gave Coco the ability to detect whether balls
that were conceived as appetitive stimuli, and thus were affectively significant, were
within reachable distance.
The following scenario, as depicted in Figure 7-9 illustrates these concepts further.
In this scenario, Coco was situated in our lab environment and the object of interest
(i.e., the purple ball) was placed within the robot's visual perceptual field. As soon as
an appetitive stimulus is detected by the robot's distal releasers, the information re-
lated to the goal's spatiotemporal distance is sent via the preparatory pathway, where
152
Figure 7-9: Distal and Proximal Releasers. This sequence of frames illustrates how
the distal and proximal releasers that are used in Seeking Affect Program work. Distal
releasers detect affectively significant stimuli at a spatiotemporal distance and send
that information through the preparatory pathway, as described in the text, triggering
an approach behavior until the significant stimulus is within certain pre-determined
range, in which case the approach behavior is stopped.
ultimately an approach behavior, mediated by the Seeking system ensues. Frames
1 thru 4 illustrate this behavior. As soon as the object of interest is within certain
specified range, the distal releasers stop responding to their preferred contingency,
and thus the approach behavior also ends, as illustrated in frames 5 thru 7. Finally,
separating the stimulus from the robot, illustrated in frames 8 thru 11, triggers the
same responses all over again, until the stimulus is within reach (frame 12), when the
scenario ends.
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7.5.2 Coco's Sensorimotor Pathways
Distal and proximal releasers trigger very different affective responses mediated by
the Seeking affect program. Through the preparatory pathway, distal releasers signal
the presence of an "interesting" stimulus in the robot's world. This stimulus might
be of interest to the robot because it has an affective significance, whether this has
been pre-programmed (detected through a Natural Releaser), or learned as we will
describe later on (and thus detected by a Learned Releaser), or because it is a novel
stimulus and thus is worthy of investigation. In any case, distal releasers detect this
kind of stimuli and trigger flexible approach responses, in the case of an appetitive
stimulus, or avoidance responses in the case of an aversive one.
Conversely, through the consummatory pathway, proximal releasers signal the
detection of stimuli that are in close contact with the robot, and thus can be be
potentially manipulated or consumed, which would activate a consummatory behavior
that is specific to the kind of stimulus being detected.
To complete the scenario described above, a combination of both preparatory and
consummatory behaviors needed to be demonstrated. We thus implemented an In-
terest behavior as part of the Seeking affect program, which would correspond to
a Consummatory behavior for Coco. Figure 7-10 illustrates this scenario. As with
the previous case, the robot was placed in our lab environment and the purple ball
was used as an appetitive stimulus. Frames 1 thru 8 illustrate how the preparatory
behavior (e.g., approach to target) ensues, once an affectively significant stimulus is
detected by the robot's distal releasers. Frames 9 thru 12 illustrate how the consum-
matory behavior of Interest, which simply executed side-to-side movements of the
robot's head, ensued once proximal releasers detected the object of interest within
close reach. Notice how as soon as the proximal releasers are active, the flow of in-
formation through the preparatory pathway changes and the preparatory behaviors
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Figure 7-10: Preparatory and Consummatory Responses. This sequence of frames il-
lustrates how the different sensorimotor pathways work, by activating first a prepara-
tory behavior (approach) when a distal releaser has detected an affectively signifi-
cant stimulus, and second, activating a consummatory behavior (interest-moving
the head side to side) once the stimulus is proximal to the robot, as detected by a
proximal releaser.
are inhibited.
The separation of anticipatory and consummatory pathways into two different
sensorimotor routes, as demonstrated in these scenarios, is advantageous for several
reasons, as it:
* Modularizes behavior
* Promotes learning
* Facilitates chaining responses, from preparatory ones to consummatory ones
that are essential for the organism in its efforts to attain goals
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* Promotes the reuse of preparatory responses (i.e., approach can be targeted at
a recharging station or at a person)
* Relates directly to the notions of appetitive and aversive events (Craig, 1918),
which would connect to approach and avoidance responses.
7.6 Affect Programs in the Robot Yuppy
To end this chapter, let us briefly review some of the full instantiations created for
the robot Yuppy, which corresponded to our first attempts at synthesizing affective
behavior. It should be noted that these instantiations do not necessarily follow all
the principles enunciated above in an exact manner, but rather served as inspiration
for their design.
Yuppy was used as the first platform to study affective processing on a real-
time system that used real sensory and motor systems. This posed some interesting
questions regarding the extension of a model of affect to be used in a robotic system, as
most previous models of affect had been primarily used to drive synthetic characters.
As part of this instantiation of the framework, we implemented a set of ba-
sic Affect Programs for Yuppy, which included the following: Anger, Fear, Dis-
tress/Sorrow, Joy/Happiness, Disgust, and Surprise. This set of affect programs
roughly corresponded to those proposed by several theorists as the basic emotions
(Ekman, 1992; Johnson-Laird & Oatley, 1992; Panksepp, 1998), only in our case
these were extended to the notion of basic affect programs.
The Surprise Affect Program
The circuits implemented by the Surprise Affect Program dealt with novelty, anticipa-
tory expectancy, and other issues that have been considered essential components of
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Figure 7-11: Illustration of an instance of the Surprise Affect Program in the robot
Yuppy. Three main pathways were coordinated by Yuppy's Surprise Affective Evalua-
tion mechanism. The first pathway mediates startle responses due to the occurrence
of high intensity sounds. The second pathway mediates Orienting Responses (OR) of
the robot's head to attend to and "foveate" the object of interest. The third pathway
mediates full ORs that align the robot's body and head so that it faces the object of
interest,: perhaps to initiate an approach response toward it.
a general attentional system, including orienting to sensory stimuli, executive func-
tions such as the detection of target events, and maintenance of a general "alert"
state (Posner & Badgaiyan, 1998).
Figure 7-11 illustrates the Surprise Affect Program's set of Releasers (left side of
figure) and associated Fixed Responses (right side of figure). There are three main
pathways that are executed and coordinated by the Surprise Affective Evaluation Unit
whenever its Releasers are present. The first pathway mediates Startle Responses-
also referred to as the Acoustic Startle Reflex--due to the occurrence of high intensity
sounds. The second pathway mediates Orienting Responses (OR) of the robot's head
to attend to and "foveate" the object of interest-usually a pink bone as described
in Section 5.1. The third pathway mediates full ORs that align the robot's body and
head so that it fully faces the object of interest, allowing its sensory system to collect
more data regarding the stimulus and if appropriate, perhaps initiate an approach
response toward it.
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Figure 7-12: Illustration of an instance of the Fear Affect Program in the robot Yuppy.
Three pathways were coordinated by Yuppy's Fear Affective Evaluation mechanism.
The first pathway mediates cowering responses that were evoked when the presence of
Yuppy's predator (the blue pool-pony) was detected. The second pathway involves the
regulation of expressive behavior as it pertains to fear. Any threatening stimulus (i.e.,
blue pool-pony or darkness) would elicit a fearful expression to different extents. The
final pathway regulates navigation for the robot according to the level of brightness
perceived by the robot's vision systems. If the robot is headed toward a dark region,
navigation is controlled so that the robot veers away from that region.
The Fear Affect Program
The Fear Affect Program implemented as part of Yuppy's emotional repertoire dealt
mainly with "dangerous" contingencies for the robot, which ranged from situations
in which its sensory systems would not work properly (e.g., dark environments for its
vision system), to the detection of "predators" (e.g., blue pool-ponies as described in
Section 5.1).
Figure 7-12 illustrates the three main pathways coordinated by Yuppy's Fear Eval-
uation Unit. The first pathway regulates a Cowering Response that is elicited when the
blue pool-pony is detected. The second pathway involves the regulation of expressive
behavior as it pertains to fear. Any threatening stimulus (i.e., blue pool-pony or a
dark environment) would elicit a fearful expression to different extents. Finally, the
third pathway regulates navigation for the robot according to the level of brightness
perceived by the its vision systems. If the robot is headed toward a dark region, nav-
158
~Cc - -- ·1-~
Fear Expression
Nývz-,ire Avoidir re)
Figure 7-13: Illustration of an instance of the Joy Affect Program in the robot Yuppy.
Three different pathways are coordinated by the Joy Affective Evaluation Unit. The
first pathway regulates interactions with people through a Greet-Person Response.
The second pathway regulates joyful expressions given the presence of any or all of
the aforementioned stimuli. Finally, the third pathway mediates approach responses
toward stimuli that were deemed "interesting" (see text).
igation is controlled so that the robot veers away from that region. This makes sense
from an adaptive perspective as the robot's primary sensors (i.e., its visual sensors)
do not work very well under such environments.
The Joy/Happiness Affect Program
The Joy Affect Program orchestrates affective processing of appetitive stimuli, which
includes the detection of "friends" (i.e., people and pink pool-ponies), "food" (i.e.,
pink bones), and toys (i.e., green cylinders or big yellow balls).
Figure 7-13 shows the three different pathways that were coordinated by the Joy
Affective Evaluation Unit. The first pathway regulates interactions with people. Once
the presence of a person has been detected, a greeting response is initiated. The sec-
ond pathway regulates joyful expressions given the presence of any or all of the afore-
mentioned stimuli. The third pathway mediates approach responses toward stimuli
that have been deemed "interesting". The measure of how interesting each stimulus
is depends on the confidence-indicated by the level of activation of its Releaser-that
the stimulus corresponds to any of the objects the robot has been pre-programmed
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to consider as appetitive stimuli1 .
The Distress/Sorrow Affect Program
The Distress Affect Program is occupied with responding to certain kinds of stressful
stimuli in the robot's environment. For instance, all regulatory mechanisms release
distress when their error signal (drive) goes above certain threshold. Responses to
this kind of stimuli typically lead the robot to pursue the needed resources in its
environment (e.g., seeking people to interact with, or pink bones and yellow balls to
play with).
Yuppy's regulatory mechanisms included:
* Recharging Regulation: Monitors the robot's battery level (composed of two
different batteries, one on the synchrodrive base and one on the body proper).
* Imitation: A particular instance of a social drive that "urged" Yuppy to promote
interaction with people by imitating sounds.
* Play: A different instance of a general social drive that urged Yuppy to interact
with people by triggering Fixed Responses that appeared to be dancing moves.
* Fatigue: Unlike the previous two mechanisms, Fatigue regulated Yuppy's activ-
ities by shutting-out the external world instead of promoting interactions with
it.
Figure 7-14 shows the three different pathways that make up the Distress Affect
Program. The first pathway regulates seeking behaviors. Having no stimuli in sight
will increase the activity of the Distress Affective Evaluation and Control Unit, which
will promote the execution of a Look-Around Response in which the robot scans its
'Pre-programming the robot to "like" or "dislike" certain stimuli is akin to our innate predispo-
sitions to different stimuli in the world.
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Figure 7-14: Illustration of an instance of the Distress Affect Program in the robot
Yuppy. Three different pathways are coordinated by the Distress Affective Evaluation
and Control Unit. The first pathway regulates seeking behaviors in search of objects
of interest. The second pathway regulates sorrowful expressions according to the
activity level of the Distress Affect Program. Finally, the third pathway mediates
control responses that help the robot maintain balance of its regulatory mechanisms.
environment seeking out for any object of interest. The second pathway regulates
sorrowful expressions according to the activity level of this affect program. Finally,
the third pathway mediates control responses that help the robot maintain balance of
its regulatory mechanisms. Some of these responses include overt behaviors, such as
the Imitate and Dance responses, or internal actions such as the simulated "resting"
that balanced its fatigue drive.
7.7 Affective Phenomena
The robotic instantiations of the framework provided us with the opportunity to assess
the kinds of affective phenomena that could be synthesized and thus the feasibility
of the framework as a model for affect.
7.7.1 Fast Primary Emotions IDP 1.21
Section 6.1.1 discussed one kind of affective phenomena that has been shown to be
pan-cultural and for which homologues exist in other species. This type of affect
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has been defined by many as the primary emotions. They are primary in the sense
that these are innate, pre-organized, and more primitive mechanisms that process
affective information and from which other affective phenomena might be derived.
This is precisely the approach we followed in this work, by implementing the affect
program abstraction. We believe that a set of more primitive mechanisms exists,
such as those reviewed in Chapter 4, which deal with innately prepared stimuli in
very specific, stereotyped ways. The affective processing of these stimuli and the
subsequent control and coordination of ensuing responses is thus the primary function
of Affect Programs, as described throughout this thesis.
Given the instantiation of the framework described in the scenarios above, fast
primary affective processing is possible, as implemented with the instances of affect
programs described above.
7.7.2 Emergent Emotions and Emotional Behavior IDP 1.1
The following anecdotal account illustrates a scenario in which emergent emotions and
emotional behaviors were produced with the Cathexis framework. In this scenario,
two different people interact with the robot Yuppy, each of them holding a pink
bone, which, as it was mentioned above, elicits activity in the primary Joy Affect
Program. Inadvertently, one of the participants involved in this scenario was wearing
a a red sweater. Unbeknown to any of the participants, the color of the sweater
was detected by the Pink Bone Releaser indicating the presence of the bone, albeit
with a lower confidence2 . This resulted in the activation of the Look-At-Stimulus
Response targeted toward one pink bone (the one being held by the participant with
the red sweater) more than the other. Thus, the robot would focus on the pink
2 JIn normal people, vision systems are robust enough to distinguish among the color spectrum.
However, the artificial vision system used with Yuppy was not always able to distinguish between
certain shades of red and pink, thus generating false positives in the detection of objects that would
trigger affective responses.
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bone that this person held, and much like the behaviors observed with Braitenberg's
vehicles, from an observer's point of view, this appeared to be an emergent emotion
of the robot, "liking" or "preferring" one pink bone, better than the other3 . After
analyzing the situation, to us, designers of the system, it was readily apparent what
was really happening: The combination of the red sweater and the pink bone acted
as a super stimulus for the robot, much like those used in ethological experiments
(Tinbergen, 1951), thus resulting in the observed behavior. Notwithstanding this
realization, it is interesting to observe that such emergent emotional reactions can
take place in our robotic systems, considering there is plenty of evidence showing
that similar kind of behaviors can be observed in real animals, as it is the case with
fixed action patterns and their activation through super stimuli and "fake" sign stimuli
(Tinbergen, 1951; Lorenz, 1973).
7.7.3 Emotion Blends
As it has been suggested before, all affective phenomena are believed to be derived
from the primary emotions. One common suggestion made by many adherents to
the affect programs theory is that emotions which do not fit the model of primary
emotions are simply blends of activity in one or more affect programs (Izard, 1977;
Plutchik, 1994). For instance, according to Plutchik (1994), fear and surprise would
generate alarm, whereas joy and fear would produce guilt.
It seems clear from the work of Izard, Ekman, Plutchik, and others that there
can be blends of basic affects. In fact, Cathexis does support the synthesis of such
blends when two or more of the basic affect programs are activated simultaneously
at levels below their activation thresholds. When activity surpasses the activation
3 When naive observers took part of this experimental scenario it was common to hear expressions
such as "It likes you", referring to the fact that the robot would seem to prefer one person (rather
than the bone) instead of the other.
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thresholds in any of these systems, the winning Affect Program will tend to inhibit
other active Affect Programs.Thus, although it is possible to synthesize affective blends
in the model, it is less apparent, and rather unlikely, however, that these mixtures
can account for the whole domain of affective phenomena, which includes moods,
temperament, and other kinds of affective processing that are important to consider
in a model.
7.7.4 Other Affective Phenomena
Many researchers distinguish emotions from moods. The differences among these
affective phenomena are not completely clear, however, nor the specific function of
moods with respect to emotions or affect in general. A possible interpretation for
moods is that they correspond to low level activity of the same affective process-
ing systems responsible for coordinating emotional responses, but which, given their
lower level of activity, do not issue specific stereotypical responses (i.e., overt motor
behaviors that deal with a specific contingency), but rather modulate all cognition,
including further appraisal of affective stimuli. Thus, moods may serve the purpose
of assessing the propitiousness of the environment for specific action. We follow this
approach in Cathexis, and model moods as low levels of arousal of the same Affect Pro-
grams. In other words, while high arousal of Affect Programs will surpass activation
thresholds and thus will tend to inhibit other Affect Programs, mild arousal may very
well allow several Affect Programs to be concurrently active, leading to the chance of
a modulation of multiple systems without issuing a specific response. This represen-
tation is consistent with the enormous subtleties of human moods, since the possible
combinatorial states of the primary Affect Programs (taking into account their overall
intensities, time courses of activity, and the interactions within their Releasers) are
enormous (Panksepp, 1994). It is also consistent with the common observation that
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moods seem to lower the threshold for arousing certain emotions because Affect Pro-
grams that are aroused at low levels, as it happens in the representation of moods, are
already providing some potential for their full-blown activation. Finally, it is consis-
tent with the observation that the duration of moods appears to be longer than that
of the emotions, since at low levels of arousal, the intensity of the Affect Programs
will decay more slowly.
7.8 Summary
This chapter presented several experimental scenarios that illustrate the notion of
affect programs as instantiated in our framework. We have shown how behavior can
be generated and controlled by the activity of the affect programs and introduced a
scheme for the organization of behaviors that is based upon earlier ideas and observa-
tions from psychology which divide action into two different sensorimotor pathways:
a preparatory or anticipatory pathway and a consummatory one.
We further showed how these principles prove to be effective in the organization
and control of behavior, as mediated through affect programs.
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Chapter 8
Affective Learning
The sway that the response-reinforcement framework (Spencer, Thorndike,
Hull, Skinner) has held on the behavioral sciences for nearly a hundred
years is finally ending. The strength of this framework lays in provid-
ing concepts and methods for studying the effects of hedonic (reinforcing)
stimuli on the repetition of specified responses acquired in instrumental
training situations of various kinds. Its weakness lays in the invalidity
of its central assumptions, stimulus-response association and response-
reinforcement, which could not deal with motor equivalence and flexibility
(or "intelligence") in behavior (Bindra, 1978, p. 41)
All of us can relate to the great power of our emotions. Not only do they govern our
impulses and actions, but also direct our attention to the events in the world that
could be significant to us, as embodied organisms situated in the different environ-
ments we inhabit.
A very important function of affect programs, as repeatedly mentioned through-
out this work, consists of determining what objects, events or contingencies are of
importance to the survival of the organism. As such, affect programs are great re-
sources for the individual, as they allow it to detect contingencies of importance in
the world and prepare the appropriate responses to deal with them. These responses,
as we have discussed earlier, might be the stereotypical responses that have proved
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useful in our evolutionary past, or they can be whatever other responses we have
learned as relevant throughout our interactions with the world, and thus have been
incorporated to our behavior repertoires.
8.1 Multiple Stages for Affective Learning
Based on evidence stemming from multiple disciplines that have studied affective
phenomena from different standpoints, we propose that affective learning occurs in a
sequential set of events that take place when an organism is exposed to signals or cues
that predict affectively significant events. The proposed model is depicted in Figure 8-
1. This model indicates: (a) the hypothetical psychological constructs that occur at
each stage; (b) possible behavioral correlates; and (c) the computational components
that are associated with, and support the events in each stage. Although the model
suggests a sequential order, the fact that the behavioral components follow this order
is not meant to imply that the brain mechanisms underlying these different behaviors
and stages also function in a sequential order. In fact, quite the contrary occurs and
depending on what is being studied, parallel processing (and even competition) occurs
in the underlying brain mechanisms. The main issue that we want to point out with
this model is that the formation of associations based on affectively significant events,
produces predictable behavioral changes that are associated with multiple learning
systems involving a variety of processes.
The model can be described as follows. The first stage shown in Figure 8-1 repre-
sents an "attention" (also often called "arousal") stage that involves the response to
novel stimuli, most usually associated with "orienting responses" (ORs). In addition
to the relational behavior associated with the ORs, novel stimuli also elicit complex
autonomic changes (e.g., changes in heart rate and blood pressure, hormonal release
into the bloodstream). If the eliciting stimulus is not of affective significance (either
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directly or because it has been associated with a stimulus that is), the OR habituates
until it is no longer generated. This first stage of affective learning will be described
in Chapter 9.
In contrast, the co-ocurrence of otherwise neutral stimuli with affectively signifi-
cant ones, would elicit specific behaviors associated with the next stage. This second
stage corresponds to the first step in the development of associative affective learning.
In this stage, neutral stimuli acquire affective significance and thus become important
to the organism, as they become reliable predictors of events of biological importance.
The development of affective significance associations is related to the appearance of
learned specific and non-specific responses, as will be discussed in more detail later.
Non-specific :responses have been referred to as preparatory, since they occur regard-
less of the nature of the learning contingencies and presumably in order to prepare the
organism for the specific events that will follow. For instance, predicting the presence
of a predator through signals in the environment, might trigger a set of preparatory
responses that include accelerating the heart rate, releasing specific hormones such as
adreno-cortisol, and sending blood to the limbs, all in preparation for escape. Specific
responses, on the other hand, have been referred to as consummatory, as they end the
preparatory phase of behavior and consist of actions that are specific to the affective
event (e.g., escaping once the predator is actually detected). Thus this second stage
is perhaps the most important stage in affective learning, as it is in here that stimuli
are "coded" with affective value and meaning is ascribed, at its simplest level, to the
events occurring in the world. This stage is described in this chapter.
In the third stage, this same kind of meaning is ascribed, but this time to actions.
In this stage, flexible responses are learned based on the association of the outcome
of an action (in affective terms), and the action itself. This stage comprises a set of
highly complex events for which there is yet no complete understanding. However,
we do know that the learning of more flexible responses starts to occur and when
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Figure 8-1: A multi-stage model of affective learning.
the events that led to this learning are repeated in a predictable manner, learning
reaches asymptotic levels and the production of these responses become habitual.
Some examples of these kinds of interactions are presented in Chapter 9.
Finally, in the fourth stage, these habitual responses are organized into behav-
ioral "chunks" composed of sequences of behaviors that represent the highest form of
sensorimotor integration.
8.2 Attributing Affective Significance
As mentioned earlier, in their most basic form, affect programs are closed and appear
to offer limited response flexibility. Their releasers are pre-wired and their responses
are often short and stereotyped. Like many other traits, however, affect programs are
deeply developmentally ingrained.
A major aspect of this thesis involves the extension of the affect program ab-
straction so that fixed affective responses can be gradually refined and eventually
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Figure 8-2: Development and subsumption of affect 
programs
subsumed into more complex and flexible responses 
that reflect culture and individ-
ual development.
In this view, the central role of affect programs is 
maintained, but it is now possible
to introduce new higher-processing elements into 
each emotional response. This is
in many ways similar to what Izard refers to as Affective-Cognitive 
structures (Izard,
1993), and what Damasio (1994) refers to as secondary emotions.
This refinement or learning process can occur both 
on the input, as well as the
output sides of affect programs. On the input side, 
while basic or primary affect
programs are elicited by natural releasers, secondary 
affect programs will be elicited
by learned releasers, which correspond to stimuli to 
which the organism has become
sensitized through experiencing its environment. On 
the output side, primary affect
programs have fixed, stereotypical responses. Secondary 
affect programs, on the other
hand, will implement more flexible responses that can 
exert control over the fixed ones,
either inhibiting, enhancing, or simply bypassing them. 
The resulting abstraction is
illustrated in Figure 8-2
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Several mechanisms that demonstrate the feasibility of affective learning have
been implemented as part of this work. A preliminary implementation consists of an
associative network comparable to Minsky's K-lines (Minsky, 1986), in which salient
stimuli (e.g., features and percepts representing objects and agents) are connected
to primary affect programs when these have become active throughout the robot's
interaction with the world.
During emotional learning, connections within this network are changed according
to a modified Hebbian rule that prevents saturation of the connection weight between
the new releaser and the active emotional system.
We have used various forms of Hebbian learning including simple Hebb, postsy-
naptic rules, and covariance rules. Figure 8 below, shows an example of the results
obtained using a postsynaptic Hebbian rule similar to that described in (Floreano &
Mondana, 1998) and shown in Equation 8.1
Aw = w(-1 + x)y + (1 - w)xy (8.1)
Where w is the weight between both units, x is the activity level of the presynaptic
unit (learned releaser), and y is the activity level of the postsynaptic unit (emotional
system).
8.3 Emotion-Based Learning Systems
Based on the affective significance of events, emotion-based learning allows the robot
to take into account internal needs and external stimuli in deciding what should or
should not be learned in a particular situation.
Using this model, we have implemented several different emotion-based learning
systems with Yuppy. These include examples of both nonassociative and associative
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learning.
8.3.1 Affective Conditioning
Using the model for affective learning described above, we have developed several
systems of affective or emotional conditioning across different sensory modalities (e.g.,
pairing tactile and auditory stimuli, or visual and auditory stimuli). Some of these
systems include examples of alpha conditioning, as well as classical fear and appetitive
conditioning. Figure 8-4 illustrates one example of affective conditioning in which the
Fear affect program acquires new releasers for specific sound frequencies.
Figure 8-3 illustrates this classical scenario of fear conditioning. A natural releaser
(presence of the blue pool-pony) generates a fearful response corresponding to the
Flight behavior (frames 4 and 5). Different tone frequencies played with a flute,
however, do not produce any activation in the Fear affect program, thus the Flight
behavior does not become active either (frames 1 thru 3). If both stimuli are presented
simultaneously (frames 6 thru 8), the Fear affect program forms a new learned releaser
for the sound stimulus (see top chart of Figure 8-4) After only one trial, the newly
formed releaser for the specific sound frequency that was paired with the blue pool-
pony is capable of producing some activation of the Fear emotional system. After
several more trials, the connection between the sound frequency releaser and the Fear
affect program is strong enough to produce activation of the Flight behavior, and
thus an emotional memory is formed (frames 11 and 12).
These results suggest that emotional conditioning is possible under the proposed
model using a robot that operates in the real world, with real sensing and real action.
Furthermore, it demonstrates how extending the affect program abstraction with
learning mechanisms may be used to mediate and bias the robot's action-selection
process.
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Figure 8-3: Fear Conditioning. This sequence of frames illustrates our first attempt
toward affective learning. In this fear conditioning scenario, the robot is trained to
predict the occurrence of the predator via a particular sound frequency.
8.3.2 What is Learned in Affective Conditioning?
The left hand side of Figure 8-4 illustrates the associations made in this affective
conditioning scenario. Essentially, what has been learned here corresponds to an
association of the neutral stimulus (i.e., the sound frequency), and the affective value
of the affectively significant stimulus (i.e., the evil blue pool-pony), as determined by
the activity of the Fear affect program. This means that the neutral stimulus has
acquired the properties (affective value) of the affective stimulus and now can also
mediate the same kind of responses that this stimulus generates.
Besides learning associations to the specific affective value of events, could we
create a model that would also learn about the general motivational implications of
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Figure 8-4: Results from Yuppy's affective conditioning to a sound frequency after
pairing the sound with the blue pool-pony. Activity of the Fear affect program and
the weight of its new connection to a sound releaser is illustrated on the top chart,
whereas the occurrences of both stimuli are plotted in the bottom (right hand side of
figure).
these events, and which would be influenced by regulatory mechanisms, as described
in Section 3.2?
In order to do this, we added a new construct to the affect program abstraction.
This construct would represent the appraisal of events, as related to their general
motivational significance and how they might be influenced from regulatory mecha-
nisms. We called this construct Incentive Value, and it is formalized in Equation 8.2
and depicted in Figure 8-5.
I (t) = A (t) - M (t))) (8.2)
Where Ii(t) is the incentive value for affect program i at time t; Ai(t) is its affec-
tive value, and M (t) is the summed motivational influence exerted by regulatory
mechanisms.
175
m
Regl.tr
Affective Motivational
Value Contingencies
Figure 8-5: Computing the Incentive Value of Events. This figure illustrates how the
Incentive Evaluation Unit computes the incentive value of the different contingencies
detected by the affect program's releasers. This incentive value refers to the general
motivational value that those contingencies represent and which can be influenced by
regulatory mechanisms such as those described in Section 6.7. The specific activity
pattern follows the description of Equation 8.2 in the text.
An interesting consequence of this addition is that now affect programs have two
main evaluative processes: a "liking' pathway, as mediated by the affective value
of events, and a 'wanting' pathway mediated by the general incentive value of the
same events. This corresponds to the same notions described in Section 3.3.1, and
illustrated in Figure 8-6.
Interestingly enough, these same process have direct relationship with the sepa-
ration of sensorimotor pathways into preparatory and consummatory behaviors de-
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Figure 8-6: 'Liking' and 'wanting! pathways 
in affect programs. This figure illustrates
the two pathways that mediate evaluative processes 
in the affect program abstraction.
A 'liking' pathway mediated by the affective 
value of events, and a 'wanting' pathway
mediated by the general motivational value of 
these same events.
scribed earlier, and as such are useful in the 
evaluation and control of such kinds of
responses.
8.4 Incentive Salience
The process through which these events, or 
their perceptual and sensory features to
be precise, acquire affective significance and 
hence the ability to promote and elicit
actions and responses is referred as Incentive 
Salience (Panksepp, 1998; Balleine,
2004; Berridge, 2006).
The concept of incentive salience or incentive 
learning arose from studies that fol-
lowed traditional paradigms of learning. These: 
studies posed questions regarding the
nature of rewards (i.e., unconditioned stimuli), as changes 
in their quality, quantity,
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and time of presentation (delay) produced systematic and striking effects on behavior.
Given predominant behaviorism thought, these effects were initially attributed to in-
trinsic properties of material objects, but as more emphasis was placed on underlying
neural mechanisms, incentive motivation came to be viewed as part of those brain
processes that mediate adaptive behavior. (Bindra, 1968; Bolles, 1972; Bindra, 1978;
Toates, 1986; Dickinson, 1994).
It is important to distinguish this associative process of incentive learning from
other types of learning, such as those discussed in Chapter 4. Incentive learning is
different from learning relationships among environmental stimuli, which provides a
propositional-type of knowledge base regarding the structure of the world, and which
organisms can do without the intervention of unconditioned, rewarding stimuli. This
type of learning is usually referred to as declarative learning or stimulus-stimulus
learning, whose major neural substrates are the hippocampus and anatomically closely
related neural systems (Squire, 1992; Squire & Zola, 1996; White, 1996; White &
McDonald, 2001).
Incentive learning is also different from Habit Learning, which corresponds to
the traditional stimulus-response learning whose major neural substrates have been
attributed to the neostriatum and related neural systems (Knowlton et al., 1996;
White, 1997; Graybiel, 1998; Hikosaka, 1998).
Summarizing, incentive learning or motivation refers to processes involving envi-
ronmental stimuli predicting the perception of unconditioned stimuli. This type of
learning is crucial in organisms and it has been implemented as part of this thesis
allowing the robots to seek out and anticipate various rewards in their environments.
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8.5 Neural substrates of Incentive Learning
The system that mediates incentive learning, together with flexible approach/avoidance
responses has been named differently by many: Gray (1990) called it a Behavioral
Activation System, Depue & Iacono (1989) calls it a Behavioral Facilitation System,
and more recently, Panksepp (1998) has called it a Expectancy/Seeking System. Re-
gardless of the name, most researchers now agree that this is a general incentive or
appetitive motivational system that regulates "wanting" as opposed to just "liking".
This system is part of the mammalian brain and regulates what could be called
an exploration, interest, curiosity or investigative mechanism that leads organisms
to eagerly pursue available resources and extract meaning from the various situa-
tions in their environments. As part of the latter function, this same system helps
the organism signify the importance of novel stimuli because of their association to
opportunities for consummatory behavior.
As with all other emotions, this system might be initially without intrinsic cog-
nitive content, it gradually helps define the perception of causal connections in the
world. In essence, it drives mental phenomena that, in humans, would be associated
to the experience of persistent feelings of interest, curiosity, sensation seeking, and
perhaps even the search for "higher" meaning.
The main circuits for this emotional system are concentrated in the extended
Lateral Hypothalamus (LH) continuum, running from the Ventral Tegmental Area
(VTA) to the Nucleus Accumbens (NAS), as depicted in Figure 8-7. This system
responds unconditionally to homeostatic imbalances and environmental incentives. It
spontaneously learns about environmental events that predict resources, although the
detailed mechanisms of such learning are still not well understood.
Electrical Brain Stimulation (EBS) of this circuit will elicit energized exploratory
and search behaviors in animals (Ikemoto & Panksepp, 1999).
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Figure 8-7: This figure depicts the main circuitry involved in incentive learning. This
system is evoked by (1) regulatory imbalances; (2) external unconditioned stimuli
and (3) conditioned stimuli that predict the occurrence of unconditioned stimuli and
thus the opportunity for consummatory behavior. Reprinted with permission from
Berridge, K. C. and Robinson, T. E. (2003), Parsing reward, Trends in neurosciences,
26(9), 507513.
Similarly, when NAS DA transmission is artificially enhanced using such methods
as local tissue microinjections of various substances (e.g., amphetamine), it activates
a state of incentive motivation and exploratory arousal, thereby generating flexible
approach-seeking behaviors toward salient environmental stimuli. Conversely, the
disruption of NAS DA transmission should blunt the ability of organisms to approach
salient stimuli. It is not that animals lose the ability to recognize salient stimuli. Their
perception and memory-retrieval processes remain intact, even though it is likely that
some aspects of their attentional resources are compromised. Such animals simply are
not aroused into sustained attentional-investigatory patterns by novel stimuli. It is
also not the case that animals lose the physical capacity to perform instrumental tasks
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or consummatory responses. Clearly, animals lacking NAS DA are not behaviorally
incompetent. Rather, their deficits may arise from NAS DA no longer being able
to amplify behaviorally energized states of expectancy. In other words, the output
of the declarative-perception system to the approach motor system is compromised.
Also, there may be deficits of positive feedback between the incentive modulator and
the declarative-perception system. On the other hand, well-established conditioned
responses in familiar environment contexts (i.e., habits do not appear to be disrupted
by decreased NAS DA transmission. In sum, the NAS DA system is more involved
in addressing unfamiliar situations or stimuli which deserve to be investigated and
determining whether novel stimuli predict rewards rather than in dealing with familiar
situations where organisms already have stable behavioral priorities (i.e., they have
habits).
In humans, the affective state produced by stimulation of this system doe not
resemble the pleasurable feelings we normally experience when performing several
consummatory behaviors, but rather it resembles the "energization" felt when antic-
ipating rewards.
Traditionally, all behaviors have been divided into appetitive and consummatory
behaviors. The difference being that the former are oriented toward the seeking and
approaching the various stimuli (resources needed for survival) found in the world,
whereas the latter are the specific interactions and responses generated once these
resources are found. The system mediating incentive learning thus appears to control
appetitive activation-the search and exploratory behaviors-that all organisms must
exhibit before they engage in consummatory behaviors.
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8.6 An Approach to Incentive Learning in Robots
As mentioned above, incentive learning or motivation are processes that allow or-
ganisms to effectively seek out and anticipate various rewards in their environments.
While research in robot control-and more generally, in agent architectures-has in-
volved approach and avoidance behaviors in one way or another(Blumberg, 1996;
Breazeal, 2000), not much has been done in terms of implementing an integrated
system that regulates a variety of processes that orient attentional resources to novel
events, in order to extract "meaning" from these sensory experiences, and to ener-
gize a unique class of investigatory and appetitive approach responses to a variety of
affectively significant stimuli.
Our approach to building such system as part of an integrated robot architecture
follows the same line of modeling described in Chapter 6. That is, we have imple-
mented a simple mechanism for incentive learning or motivation as an instance of the
Affect Program kind. As such, this system has all the properties of affect programs,
including a set of releasers, activation and saturation thresholds, an associated decay
function, and a set of associated responses (behaviors). In fact, this system is perhaps
one of the best examples of affect programs as it involves not only the more fixed re-
sponses that account for rapid emotional responses, but also the idea of learning and
subsumption of these systems.
It may strike as odd to some that an approach and incentive system, such as the
one being described here, might be considered a candidate for an affect program as
these implement emotional processes. However, this system actually has an important
affective component which is in fact the primary reason for motivating approach
behaviors in the first place. The affective component corresponds to what some
would refer to as interest, curiosity, expectation, vigilance, or anticipation, which, in
fact, have been considered by many to be part of the so-called set of basic emotions
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(Tomkins, 1962; Izard, 1971; Frijda, 1986; Panksepp, 1998; Plutchik, 2001).
An important feature of this system is that its organization is broadly diffused
through much of the architecture, including integration with perceptual, attentional,
learning, and motor processes that have to be coordinated in order to generate suc-
cessful approach responses. In other words, for successful approach, the robot must be
able to recognize environmental stimuli, in addition to the ability to change behavior
as a function of experience in order to maximize the probability of obtaining material
resources needed for its "well being". Thus, the overall approach system presumably
consists of motor, attentional, motivational, emotional, mnemonic and other cognitive
sub-processes. Although each one of these sub-processes can be studied separately,
we argue that in normally functioning organisms, a global system helps coordinate all
of the sub-processes needed for adaptive approach toward goals. More recently, from
a more psychodynamic perspective, this system has been called the Seeking system.
Here we shall continue to argue that the meso-accumbens DA system is a part of such
preparatory approach-seeking system.
Drawing upon these ideas, the Cathexis model was extended to incorporate a
specific affect program that mediates all flexible approach and avoidance responses
for the robot and also regulates incentive learning. This affect program was named
the Seeking affect program as it has been described by Panksepp (1998) and it is
depicted in Figure 8-8.
8.7 The Seeking Affect Program
Figure 8-8 summarizes a conceptual model that highlights the role of the Seeking
affect program in regulating behavior and learning. A crucial aspect of this affect
program is that it has distinct sensorimotor pathways for approach and consummatory
responses as it was described in Section 7.5.2. Essential components underlying the
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Figure 8-8: The Seeking Affect Program
approach responses include preparatory and consummatory appraisals (assessing the
affective significance of the stimuli), a system involved in the formation of habitual
approach/avoidance responses, and incentive-cue formation systems (see Section 8.8
below) that essentially implement the concept of incentive learning as described above.
It can also detect salience of environmental stimuli i.e., novel stimuli, conditioned
stimuli, and innately salient stimuli by contrasting present input with previous mem-
ories. Thus, an important feature of the current view is the recognition of two distinct
types of approach response systems: a habit response system which operates in well-
trained animals and a flexible response system which operates preferentially when
animals are learning about incentive contingencies in their environments.
In other words, the Seeking affect program can facilitate flexible approach re-
sponses in the presence of various salient stimuli (e.g., incentive stimuli and novel
stimuli). In summary, the primary role of the Seeking affect program is to facilitate
flexible approach responses by modulating incentive motivation processes. Let us
develop this idea further by describing two stages of instrumental approach perfor-
mance.
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8.7.1 Motivating Exploratory Behavior
The Seeking affect program plays an essential role in invigorating flexible approach
responses when the robot encounters salient stimuli (e.g., incentive and novel stimuli).
Distal releasers and anticipatory appraisal processes detect various salient stimuli
(e.g., arising from all novel events) and energizes the Seeking affect program, which
in turn will spread its activation to flexible approach-seeking behaviors. Figure 8-8
highlights the routes of control involved in such processes.
8.8 Results for An Incentive-Cue Formation Sys-
tern
It appears that the brain is organized in such a way that the detection of uncondi-
tioned stimuli can automatically promote learning. The brain is tuned to the appear-
ance of novel stimuli, and the Seeking affect program is activated especially by those
that are associated with affectively significant events. Although these associations
are not essential to consummatory reactions per se, they do establish an implicit
knowledge of situations within which consummatory behaviors can be optimally ex-
pressed. The Seeking affect program is critically involved in such incentive learning
processes. More specifically, changes in the Seeking affect program may first be in-
volved in investigatory activities and more gradually in signifying the importance of
environmental stimuli because of their association with opportunities for consumma-
tory behaviors. This linking of external events with opportunities to stimulate various
proximal sensory receptors is here conceptualized as the "incentive learning effect".
Thus, heightened levels of the Seeking affect program add incentive properties to
declarative knowledge so environmental stimuli that are predictive of unconditioned
stimuli come to facilitate and energize approach (or avoidance) responses. Normal
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activation of the Seeking affect program, on the other hand, maintains such incentive
motivation, thus, a decrease in activity of the Seeking affect program reorganizes in-
ternal mechanisms involved in incentive representations of declarative knowledge so
that environmental stimuli that are not predictive of the perception of unconditioned
stimuli will no longer activate approach responses.
The following scenario illustrates the results obtained when placing our simulated
robot in a situation in which neutral stimuli are contingent on incentive stimuli, and
thus, come to signal their occurrence once incentive salience has been attributed to
them, as described herein. In this scenario, Marvin is situated in an environment in
which the recharging station (an incentive stimulus) is detected by the robot's distal
releasers. The robot's battery level is low and thus an impendingneed of recharging is
mediated by the robot's Seeking system. Figure 8-9 illustrates this scenario. In frames
2 thru 5, it is shown that the detection of the recharging station triggers an approach
response as mediated by the Seeking system. In a similar manner, in frames 6 thin 8,
the detection of the recharging station by proximal releasers elicits the consummatory
grasping response also controlled by the Seeking program, which increases the battery
level to appropriate values and ends the scenario. Throughout this time, however,
the neutral stimulus represented by the purple block has been contingent in all of
the activity of the Seeking system. By means of the same associative learning rules
described earlier, two new releasers are associated to the Seeking system. The first
releaser is a distal releaser for the purple block that is associated to the preparatory
pathway of the Seeking system, whereas the second releaser is a proximal releaser for
the same purple block, but which is associated to the consummatory pathway and
thus it would be used by this affect program to trigger grasping responses targeted
at the purple block.
The second part of this scenario illustrates the results obtained when placing our
simulated robot after the processes of incentive salience, described above, have taken
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Figure 8-9: Incentive Salience. This sequence of frames illustrates how the Seeking
Affect Program works, triggering approach responses to a recharging station or food-
stuff (lower red arrow) in response to a regulatory goal (low battery level). In the
process, the neutral stimulus (upper red arrow) will be detected as well and incentive
or motivational properties will be attributed to it as it is a cue that predicts the
occurrence of the goal, and thus it facilitates consummatory behavior.
place. The setup is the same as before and is illustrated in Figure 8-10. In frame 1,
the robot is shown with the two same stimuli, only the stimulus marked as neutral has
already been attributed the motivational properties of the incentive (the yellow block).
In frames 2 and 3, it is shown that the detection of the previously neutral stimulus
now also triggers an approach response as mediated by the Seeking system. This
happens because the purple block now has general motivational value, based upon
the incentive learning that occurred in the last scenario. In frames 4 and 5, the robot
detects the presence of the recharging station, and given its higher incentive value,
an approach response targeting this incentive ensues. Finally, in frames 6 thru 8, the
detection of the recharging station by proximal releasers elicits the consummatory
grasping response in the same manner as before, which increases the battery level to
appropriate values and ends the scenario.
Thus, the Seeking affect program plays an important role in integrating reward-
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Figure 8-10: Incentive Learning Associations. This figure depicts the kinds of associa-
tions made when hebbian learning takes place under the incentive learning paradigm.
Incentive salience is attributed to the purple block (neutral stimulus ) by means of two
simple S-S associations: (1) between the stimulus and the general incentive ('want-
ing') pathway of the Seeking system, which mediates approach responses; and (2)
between the same stimulus and the affective-specific ('liking') pathway of the same
system.
related information on specific aspects of the environment into conditioned approach-
seeking reactions. Once such conditioning has been established in a specific context,
however, heightened the activity of this affect program is no longer necessary for
its expression, unless the robot experiences new opportunities for consummatory re-
sponses in those contexts. The following figure highlights key routes involved in such
incentive modulation processes. As described above, the Seeking affect program is
only involved in learning in the sense that it modulates the initial behavioral re-
sponses to potential incentives, and the development of conditional incentive stimuli
(i.e., the automatic valuation of neutral environmental events). It is not involved in
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Figure 8-11: Incentive Attribution. This sequence of frames illustrates how the Incen-
tive Salience Model works by attributing incentive or motivational properties to an
otherwise neutral stimulus. In the frames, the purple block acquired incentive prop-
erties and now the robot approaches it whenever detected, by doing so, the robot
has come closer to the goal (yellow block), which when detected, is approached and
a final consummatory behavior corresponding to a grasp response is executed.
declarative memory formation or retrieval nor in procedural learning, which are types
of learning out of scope from the present work.
It should be noted that all approach and navigation-related behaviors include
the implementation of the Nearness Diagram (ND) obstacle avoidance algorithm
(Minguez & Montano, 2004).
8.9 Habit Learning
Many acts that we perform regularly become so routine that we carry them out almost
without conscious effort. We depend on these habits to free us to think and to react
to new events in the environment. For instance, as I write this chapter, I repeatedly
press the combination of keys that allow me to save the document. I do this in a
preventive effort to maintain a saved version of the document with the latest changes.
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Figure 8-12: Obstacle Avoidance. This sequence of frames illustrates how the ap-
proach behavior subsumes an obstacle avoidance behavior, which implements the
Nearness Diagram (ND) Navigation by Minguez & Montano (2004).
This trivial task seems to be happening somewhere outside the realm of consciousness
as I do not even notice when it happens, and only now, that I stop to think of an
example of a habitual response do I realize that it has been happening all along.
The formation of habits is an essential aspect of learning, and as it was described in
Chapter 4.3, its neural underpinnings are dissociated from all other types of learning
that we have described and reviewed so far, and which seem to be related to the
hippocampus system and anatomically close neural systems (Squire & Zola, 1996;
White & McDonald, 2001).
Previous sections presented work toward the development of refined affect pro-
grams that subsume the activity and functionality of primitive ones on their input
side (learning mechanisms for the acquisition of new releasers). This work addressed
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the issue of incentive learning or affective conditioning, which corresponded to stage
2 of affective learning. This chapter describes the development of a learning mech-
anism for the output side of affect programs that implements simple habit learning,
and which corresponds to some of he interactions involved in the third stage of the
model for affective learning described at the beginning of the chapter.
8.9.1 Definitions
Before discussing the different mechanisms involved, some definitions are due. Let us
start with describing the type of learning addressed in this chapter. Habit learn-
ing refers to the traditional type of stimulus-response (S-R) learning, also called
reinforcement-response learning. In this type of learning (see Figure ??) organisms
may accidentally or unintentionally make any response (R) in the presence of an en-
vironmental stimulus (S). If a reinforcer (S*) is encountered at around the same time
as these events, an association between the stimulus and the response is strength-
ened or enhanced, thus increasing the probability that the stimulus will elicit the
same response in the future. In the S-R model, any response that is performed can,
in theory, become associated with any stimulus that happens to be present if the
two are temporally contiguous with a reinforcer. This function of reinforcers was
originally described by Thorndike (1911), who referred to it as the "stamping-in" of
stimulus-response (S-R) bonds. The basic mechanism was adopted by Hull (1943) for
his theory of learning, and later elaborated by others (Estes, 1959; Schacter, Chiu &
Ochsner, 1993). Because this type of learning is thought to proceed in an automatic,
unconscious manner, it has been called "habit" learning by Mishkin (1984).
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8.9.2 Correlational Learning
Most biologically plausible models of learning assume that modifications of synap-
tic efficacy (or more generally, the strength of the connection among computational
processing units) can account for a variety of forms of learning.
All learning mechanisms contributed as part of this thesis follow three main prin-
ciples:
1. Simplicity: These mechanisms rely on simple correlational learning rules that
have a limited set of features and functionality that makes them accessible for
analysis.
2. Specificity: These mechanisms are not intended to be general purpose learning
systems. Their activity and resulting mapping is constrained by the affect
programs to which they belong. Thus, all learned relations are tied to that
affect program's domain.
3. Biological feasibility: These mechanisms have interesting relations to biolog-
ical data that supports their main assumptions and constructs.
We have implemented a habit learning mechanism that, as with our approach
to incentive learning, follows these principles and focuses on learning rules that can
account for not only the temporal coincidence of events, but also their temporal order.
Most accounts of synaptic plasticity-which is considered as the main mechanisms
to support learning and memory in the brain-rely on neural activity to change
synaptic function. Usually, the notion of some correlational learning rule is used to
model this type of plasticity. A correlational learning rule, often called a Hebbian
learning rule1 , uses the correlation between presynaptic activity and postsynaptic
1Donald Hebb (1949) proposed a learning rule for the modification of synaptic strengths that
can be summarized as follows: If neuron A repeatedly participates in the activation of neuron B, the
synapse from A to B is strengthened.
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response to drive changes in synaptic efficacy (Churchland & Sejnowski, 1992).
8.9.3 Beyond Temporal Coincidence
Hebbian learning rules, such as those described as part of the incentive learning
mechanisms, are correlational because the changes in the efficacy of the connection
between computational units is tied to the associations between inputs. However,
there are several cases in which just using temporal coincidence is not sufficient in
order to learn certain relationships about events. Consider for instance the case of
an organism learning a sequence of events (or actions) that lead to a specific reward.
In such cases, learning the specific order of events (or actions) is important and thus
capturing information relative to the temporal order of such events becomes necessary.
Hebbian learning rules are sensitive to the temporal coincidence of inputs, but
not to their temporal order. In other words, a simple Hebbian learning rule is not
sensitive to whether input A follows input B, or viceversa. Therefore, a Hebbian rule
would not be sufficient to develop the predictive relationships that occur between
stimuli during an instrumental conditioning task as defined above in Section 8.9.1.
Predictions are very useful for organisms to prepare themselves for the future,
given their current state, the state of the environment, and the possible set actions
that could be performed. With a robot the case is not different. For a robot to fulfill
its many different and often conflicting goals, it has to decide what action is most
appropriate given a specific situation. In such case, predictions become useful in many
ways. For instance, they can be compared to actual events and thus compute possible
errors to improve their prediction in the future, which would increase the probability
of achieving better performance (such a mechanism is believed to be in place in the
Effective-Reinforcement Hypothesis described in Section 4.4.3). Similarly, predictions
can be used in order to prepare a set of actions in anticipation of a particular event,
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which would also yield better performance.
Given the importance of predictions, it is conceivable to expect that there exist
several predictive systems in the brain that act at a variety of spatiotemporal scales.
8.9.4 Predictive Learning
Predictive learning is a requisite of the type of learning involved in habit learning. In
other words, we would argue that habit learning requires the existence of anticipatory
mechanisms which predict or signal the expectancy of a reinforcer, and in which
the temporal order of actions is accounted for so that the appropriate relationships
between those actions and their outcomes can be learned.
Previous work, both theoretical and modeling, has focused on the need of such
mechanisms to explain animal learning (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Sutton & Barto,
1981). The work presented here extends these ideas and ties them to an affective
perspective. The following sections present some modeling approaches and arguments
that address predictive mechanisms as a principal component in the implementation
of habit learning.
A Global Predictive Learning System
Information about reward is passed to many different brain structures in part through
diffuse ascending systems of axons that originate in small nuclei in the midbrain and
basal forebrain (e.g., Cooper 1970). This work extends those ideas and implements
a system that in a similar way, sends information to other systems regarding the
expectancy of reward and thus modulates how stimulus-response associations are
formed.
A predictive system, labeled P, receives convergent input from perceptual systems,
as well as inputs carrying information regarding the occurrence of rewards or any
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other salient stimuli. This predictive system computes its change in activity over
time, which can be described as:
6(t) = V(t) - V(t) (8.3)
V(t) = wjXy + r(t) (8.4)
j=1
Where V(t) is the net input to the predictive system at time t, including the reward
stimulus r(t), and V(t) is a running average that can be represented by Equation 8.5
V(t) = AV(t) + (1 - A)V(t - 1) (8.5)
where 0 < A < 1 is a constant that defines how much into the past, the activity
is averaged. As A approaches 0, the average reaches farther into the past. As A
approaches 1, the averaging interval becomes short, and the output of P thus closely
approximates the net input V(t) at time t.
From Equations 8.3 and 8.5, we obtain:
6(t) = (1 - A) [V(t) - V(t - 1)] (8.6)
The output of P reflects a scaled temporal difference between the current net input
and the previous running average of the net input.
Any change in the strength of the connections between the perceptual system
units and rewarding stimulus and P follows a simple correlational rule, such as that
generalized in Equation 8.7
Aw(t) = rx(t)6(t) (8.7)
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Thus, the output 6(t) is not simply the magnitude of the reinforcer, but rather a
comparison of the net input throughout time.
When a rewarding stimulus is first met, it increases the ouput of P because at
that time, the output 6(t) is proportional to r(t) + V(t - 1), where V*(t) is the total
net input to P not contributed by r(t). As the actual delivery of information about
the reward rises and falls to baseline, the running average V(t) will follow slowly.
During learning, the weights are changed according to Equation 8.7 until the running
average of the input V(t) from the perceptual systems correctly predicts delivery of
reinforcement, so that 6(t) = 0. This kind of predictive mechanisms has been used in
a variety of engineering contexts (Sutton & Barto, 1981; Sutton, 1988). Here, these
mechanisms are used to drive prediction so that it can be used as a global signal that
drives learning of habits.
8.9.5 Implementing Habit Learning
This section describes the extension the affect program abstraction with learning
mechanisms on its output side. Once again, the idea is that the fixed responses that
are triggered by various stimuli, as they activate any given affect program, will be
subsumed into more flexible responses that reflect the learning of the robot. As it was
illustrated in Figure 6-2, these flexible responses, which may be composed of multiple
action sequences, will be able to exert control (inhibition or enhancement) over the
more fixed ones, and even bypass them through their direct coupling with actuators.
1. To construct and reinforce contexts: The predictive signal is a general response
to affective stimuli and does not differentiate among the different kinds of such
stimuli. The combination of specific releaser input, the predictive signal, and
input from specific affect programs (e.g., fear), can specify a more detailed
context for the processing of behaviors.
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2. To selectively enhance certain behaviors, and focus attention: As releasers
present repeated coherent input patterns, loosely termed here as contexts, the
dopamine-like signal can increase signal-to-noise ratio in the selection of behav-
iors, exerting a focusing effect whereby only the strongest inputs are selected
and weaker activity is lost.
Mechanisms analogous to this one have been suggested and believed to be medi-
ated by the interactions of D1 and D2 families of dopamine receptors in striatal
neurons (Nicola, Surmeier & Malenka, 2000). In addition, such mechanism
would correspond to some of the ideas described in the "switching" hypothesis
reviewed in Section 4.4.3.
3. To use the signal as a reinforcer of behaviors that are active during appropri-
ately rewarding contexts: In conjunction with predictive Hebbian learning (see
Section 8.9.4 above), we have used this signal for the acquisition of behaviors
that lead to certain outcomes (i.e., habit learning). This strategy corresponds
to the effective-reinforcement hypothesis, suggested by Schultz (1998), that was
reviewed in Section 4.4.3. The main idea is illustrated in Figure 8-13 and can
be described as a two-stage learning process. In the first stage, the predictive
system acquires responses to reward-predicting stimuli. In the next step, the
resulting predictive signal would specifically strengthen those connections that
are active at the time of the reward-predicting stimulus, whereas the inactive
ones are left unchanged. This essentially constitutes a three factor learning rule
where the changes in connection strengths depends on the pre-synaptic activ-
ity (input from releasers), the post-synaptic activity (activity level of behavior
unit), and the predictive signal.
Thus, a, simple learning rule to modify the weights in those connections is de-
scribed in Equation 8.8
197
Releaser
Li-..'
"'pu
3-Factor
Hebbian Rule
Behavior Units
Prediction
Units
Reward
Reinforcement
Figure 8-13: Predictive hebbian learning in the formation of habits
Aw = e p'. i . b (8.8)
where p is the 'wanting' signal, i is input activity from releasers, b is the activity
from a behavior unit, and E is some learning rate.
There are many other alternatives for Hebbian rules, and this one is only sug-
gested as part of this implementation. The important issue here is the incorpo-
ration of predictive models in the form of three-factor Hebbian learning rules.
4. To reinforce behaviors that were active some time steps before the predictive
signal: This is the same strategy as in 3. The only difference is that this time
the 3-factor rule considers traces of pre- and post-synaptic activity as well as
the existence of the predictive signal. This requires some kind of memory, or
as Schultz calls it, an eligibility tracing mechanism (yellow ellipse in Figure 8-
13; (Schultz, 1998). Although the existence of such tracing mechanism is not
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known, mechanisms mediated by NMDA receptors and nitric oxide (NO) have
been suggested as possible candidates (Houk, Adams & Barto, 1995).
8.9.6 Competition Between Systems
The mechanisms for habit learning just described run in parallel with those existing for
incentive learning. They, however, are mechanisms that are both located at different
places (output and input sides of affect programs, respectively) and designed for
very different purposes in mind. However, there are certain tasks in which both
mechanisms might be doing the same exact type of learning. Consider for instance
a scenario in which, through incentive learning, an association is learned between a
previously neutral stimulus S and a reinforcer or unconditioned stimulus S*. Through
this association, an unconditioned response R usually triggered through S* will also be
triggered now by S. So far no problems. Consider now, that, through habit learning
mechanisms, an association will be made between the stimulus S and the response R
as long as there is a contingent presentation of the reinforcer S* together with the
stimulus S.
This shows how two different learning systems actually may compete with one
another in learning the same type of information. The interesting thing here, however,
is that there is actually evidence that this is the case in the mammalian brain as well.
The type of learning mediated by the amygdala (stimulus-unconditioned stimulus
associations) competes with that of the striatum (stimulus-response associations)
(White & McDonald, 2001).
8.10 Limitations and Extensions
The declarative-perception system that mediates learning of stimulus-stimnulus rela-
tionships, such as as those mediated by the hippocampus is a complex assembly of
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heterogeneous cognitive processes, outside the scope of the present work, that repre-
sent knowledge about the environment allowing organisms to acquire and recall the
relationships among environmental objects and events without the essential interven-
tion of unconditioned stimuli (i.e., stimulusstimulus or declarative learning). A future
extension of this affect program might involve the construction of such system.
8.11 Summary
Incentive learning or motivation in the present thesis refers to processes involving
environmental stimuli detected by distance releasers predicting the perception of un-
conditioned stimuli, usually detected by proximal releasers, which allow agents (in
this case our robot), on future occasions, to effectively seek out and anticipate vari-
ous rewards in their environments both (material objects as well as immaterial ones,
like safety).
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Chapter 9
Affective Interactions
The solutions implemented by affect programs, in order to deal with the contingencies
that organisms face in their environments, must involve the activity of a variety of
mechanisms that operate at various levels. We have suggested that the coordination
and synchronization of these mechanisms is, at an operational level, the main reason
for emotion. Yet, emotion, as we have defined it here, must interact with a number
of processes in order to effectively implement these solutions.
This chapter describes some of the interactions between affect programs and other
mechanisms we have deemed important in producing coherent and intelligent behav-
ior. To illustrate these principles and ideas, we focus on the interactions between
affect and attention.
9.1 Modulation of Attention
Information flow through the affect programs has been arranged in such a manner
that it promotes taking actions specifically to obtain more information from the world.
This is commonly referred to as goal-directed perception (Maes, 1995).
Drawing its inspiration from current knowledge on information-processing in the
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Figure 9-1: Information about external stimuli reaches the amygdala by way of direct
pathways from the thalamus as well as by way of indirect pathways from the thala-
mus to primary and associative cortices and then to the amygdala (pathways shown
correspond to auditory cortex). Bypassing the cortex in the direct pathway allows
for a fast response from the amygdala but does not benefit from cortical processing
and thus only low-level features of the stimulus may be detected. LeDoux (1996) has
speculated that this direct pathway may be responsible for those affective responses
we do not fully understand. (Adapted from (LeDoux, 1993) and (LeDoux, 1996).)
amygdala (see Figure 9-1) in which information regarding possibly significant stimuli
reaches the evaluation centers of the amygdala through different pathways (LeDoux,
1996), the perceptual systems in Cathexis initiate two different pathways from which
information about external and internal stimuli reaches Affect Programs. Figure 9-2
shows an example of affective processing through these pathways. The low activation
pathway is a direct connection from simple perceptual systems to an Affect Program.
Because of its simplicity in processing information, this is a faster transmission route
compared to the high pathway. However, it only provides the Affect Program with a
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Figure 9-2: Affective-processing pathways in the Cathexis framework. Perceptual
systems are connected to affective evaluation systems via two separate pathways: a
direct or low pathway that provides emotional systems with fast, but simple repre-
sentations of a stimulus, and an indirect or high pathway that involves more complex,
time-consuming processing, but provides a richer representation of the stimulus
crude representation of the stimulus. The high pathway, on the other hand, involves
more complex, time-consuming processing that provides a richer representation of the
stimulus.
This mechanism of multi-scale activation pathways allows for flexible affective pro-
cessing and facilitation of attention as the robot can initiate appropriate responses
before fully identifying a particular stimulus. In addition, the multiple time scales
are useful to integrate and deal with perceptual processes that are computationally
expensive (e.g., auditory processing and vision). To illustrate this, consider the fol-
lowing experimental scenario in which a ball is passed in front of the robot. In such
situation, simple vision systems might detect features of the stimulus (e.g., motion
and color), and send this information, via the low pathway, to systems that can initi-
ate appropriate responses (e.g., orienting towards the stimulus and perhaps looking at
its approximate location). At the same time, more complex processing systems may
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be at work determining the nature of the stimulus. Once this information is available,
it is sent, via the high pathway, to the appropriate systems in order to enhance or
suppress ongoing responses (e.g., allow an approach response if it is a ball, suppress
it otherwise).
Arranged in these two pathways, we implemented different perceptual systems for
our robots based on visual and auditory processing that were capable of providing
both stimuli features (e.g., color, shape, motion, intensity of sounds), and objects
(e.g., people, specific sound frequencies, styrofoam bones and horses).
9.2 Orienting Responses and Habituation
While attention has usually been related to almost every aspect of cognitive processing
(e.g., from the modulation of perceptual processes, to the control of goal-directed
behavior and even further to the mechanisms that may mediate consciousness), rarely
has attention been related to emotion.
Given our functional perspective on emotion and affective processing, we argue
that attention is inherently related to the notions of affect programs, as the many
functions that comprise what has been referred to as attention are also essential
functions of affect programs in their role of coordinators of responses that deal with
an organism's biologically significant contingencies.
As defined in Chapter 3, from an operational point of view, attention corresponds
to the set of mechanisms that serve to provide coherent control of behavior. When
organisms are confronted with a variety of stimuli, they must be able to selectively use
some of the features (including both sensory-specific and general affective features)
of certain stimuli in the attentional space, and ignore others, while performing some
specific behavior in response to environmental events.
As part of our solution to generate coherent behavior from an affect programs
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perspective, we have implemented an instance of the Surprise affect program which
deals with issues of novelty and behavioral functions that may be described as aspects
of attention, including most notably the modulation of Orienting Responses (ORs).
An illustration of this affect program is depicted in Figure 9-3. As this figure
indicates, the preparatory pathway for this system deals with the detection of dis-
tal stimuli that are usually novel to the agent and thus promote head ORs. The
consummatory pathway, on the other hand, deals with events that are proximal and
may be of attentional importance. Thus, when such events have been assessed as
affectively significant, full body ORs are produced, which have two main effects: (1)
by virtue of the perception-processing pathways described earlier (see Section ??), a
full OR toward an affectively significant stimulus guarantees that the agent directly
faces such stimulus and thus it can process it further with higher perception systems
(i.e., it guarantees the apportionment of further processing of the stimulus)'; and (2)
it facilitates the activity of other affect programs such as the Seeking or the Fear sys-
tems which might implement a more appropriate solution to the specific contingency,
once it has been fully evaluated.
Interestingly enough, recent research suggests that the central nucleus of the amyg-
dala is involved in these same attentional functions (Holland & Gallagher, 1999).
Thus, our implementation of a Surprise affect program, while at a much higher level
of abstraction, is consistent with current knowledge of some of the neural substrates
behind the interactions between affect and attention.
1 This is an example of taking an action specifically to obtain more information about the world.
A process usually referred to as goal-directed perception.
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Figure 9-3: The Surprise Affect Program. This figure illustrates a pictorial descrip-
tion of the Surprise affect program which deals with behaviorally separable functions
that have been described as aspects of attention, including the detection of novel
stimuli and the mediation of Orienting Responses (ORs). As indicated in the figure,
the preparatory pathway for this system detects distal stimuli that are novel to the
agent and promote head ORs. The consummatory pathway deals with events that are
proximal. When such events have been assessed as affectively significant, full body
ORs will be produced.
9.3 Mediation of Orienting Responses
Affectively significant events must be capable of interrupting an organism's activities
be they the execution of a particular behavior or ongoing stimuli processing. In
our simulated robot, and through the activity of the Surprise affect program, novel
stimuli as detected usually by distal releasers (e.g. sudden sounds, or the appearance
of an object in the visual field) raise the affective value of this system, which, when
selected through the action selection process described before, triggers and controls
head Orienting Responses (ORs).
With repeated presentation of these same stimuli, however, and with no other sig-
nificant consequence (i.e., the stimulus is not assessed to be of affective significance),
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these ORs are diminished and habituate over time. We achieve this behavior through
the habituation mechanisms described earlier in Section 6.6.2.
9.3.1 Results of ORs and Habituation
The following scenario illustrates the results obtained when placing our simulated
robot in a situation in which novel stimuli are detected by its distal releasers. In
this scenario, Marvin is located in an environment in which a prominent object (i.e.
a big red ball) suddenly appears in the robot's perceptual field, as detected by its
laser range finder systems, which feed directly into the robot's releasers. Figure 9-4
illustrates this scenario. In the first frame, the red ball (marked by a yellow arrow)
appears in the robot's perceptual field. In frames 2 and 3, it can be seen how this
event triggers a head OR on the robot, which is mediated by the Surprise affect
program. The extent of the OR can be seen both by the movement of the robot's
head, as well as through the robot's visual system (i.e., images captured from the
robot's camera) as illustrated in the lower right segment of each frame. The red ball
has no specific significance to the robot. In other words, it was not included as part
of the affective stimuli that the robot would be interested in, and in this particular
case, it had not acquired any learned significance either. In frames 4 and 5, the
response is retracted and the robot's head faces the same direction as its body. The
continued presence of the stimulus, triggers the same activity through the Surprise
affect program, which can be seen in frames 6 to 9. After a couple more occurrences
of this kind of activity, the releasers habituate and hence so do the ORs, as seen in
frames 10 and 11 where the OR was much smaller, and finally in frame 12, where
ORs are no longer generated.
These results are also consistent with research on amygdala function, which have
implicated this set of nuclei in the control of orienting behavior toward salient and
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Figure 9-4: Habituation of Orienting Responses (ORs). Through the mechanisms of
habituation described in Section 6.6.2, attention to stimuli can be modulated and the
onset of ORs will habituate over time, as the stimulus that triggered the response
(marked by the yellow arrow) is not deemed to be of affective significance for the
robot.
novel stimuli. Even as early as 1951, researchers noted that electrical stimulation of
the amygdala complex produced both "attentional" and "affective" responses, which
habituated over time when the stimulus was presented repeatedly (Kaada, 1951).
These findings have been confirmed more recently and they have showed that once the
stimulus is paired with food delivery or with other affectively significant stimulus, the
ORs reemerge, often attaining a level considerably higher than that which occurred
when the stimulus was first presented. This kind of potentiation is suggested to be a
product of the same sort of associative and affective learning processes we described
in this work.
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These ideas were also tested to some extent, by instantiating the Surprise affect
program on the physical robot Coco. In the following scenario, we demonstrate how
the same affective-attention interactions prove useful in integrating different sensory
modalities, as well as promoting goal-directed attentional processes in a physical
robot.
This scenario illustrates the results obtained when placing Coco (our baby gorilla
robot) in a situation in which novel novel sounds with abrupt onsets (e.g. the sound of
the experimenter calling the name of the robot) generate head ORs and facilitates the
apportionment of further processing of the present stimuli, which ultimately results in
complete body ORs. In this scenario, Coco is situated in our lab and the experimenter
calls the robot's name while positioning himself on either side of the robot. These
abrupt sounds are detected by Coco's auditory processing systems, which feed directly
into the robot's distal releasers. Figure 9-5 illustrates this scenario. In the first
frame, the experimenter calls the robot's name. In frames 2 and 3, it can be seen
how this event triggers a head OR on the robot, which now facilitates the processing
of stimuli via other sensory modalities, in this case the robot's visual system. This
simple behavior, which mediates goal-directed perception, All of these responses are
mediated and coordinated by the Surprise affect program. Given that the detection of
people is an event deemed to be of affective significance to the robot (i.e., it was hard-
wired into its affect program's releasers), the appropriate response can be coordinated
and executed. In this instance, the Surprise affect program's proximal releasers detect
the presence of the experimenter and a full body OR ensues as seen in frames 3 and 4
(notice the position of the robot with respect to previous frames). Had the presence of
a person not been of affective significance, the head ORs would have habituated much
as it was described in the results of the previous scenario with our simulated robot.
In frame 5, the experimenter repeats the procedure (i.e., calls the robot again), this
time from the other side. In frames 6 thru 8, the robot exhibits once again head ORs
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Figure 9-5: Full Orienting Responses to Affective Stimuli. If a stimulus is evaluated
as being of affective significance, as it is the case with detecting a person for the robot
Coco, the Head Orienting Responses do not habituate, but rather a full Body Ori-
enting Response is produced. It is worth to note that the Head Orienting Responses
occur in response to an auditory stimulus, when the experimenter calls the robot's
name.
toward the approximate location of the detected sound, which facilitate the detection
of the person and hence promote full body ORs. The same procedure is repeated in
frames 9 thru 12. An important consequence of these results is the idea mentioned in
Section 9.2, which suggested that the activity of an attentional system such as this
implementation of the Surprise affect program, facilitates the activity of other affect
programs such as the Seeking or the Fear systems which might implement a more
appropriate solution to specific contingencies. In this scenario, this would mean that
after the full body ORs are generated, the activity of the Surprise affect program
transiently dissipates, and an affect program that deals with contingencies related
with the detection of people might ensue.
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9.4 Incentive Salience and Attention
Consider the notion of incentive salience we reviewed in Chapter 3 and which was
ultimately implemented as part of the Seeking affect program. Based on these ideas,
what does it mean to really 'want' something? If that "something" corresponded to
a particular goal, such as obtaining a Ph.D., would this mean that one would work
"harder" in order to obtain that goal? Would one also work more focused and less
distracted in order to attain the object of desire? It seems reasonable to suggest
this, at least from a colloquial perspective. Like the issues described in the previous
section, these are separable functions that can be associated both with attentional
and affective processing.
How might we implement such kinds of interactions? The first answer to our
problem came in the form of the Seeking affect program. We had already implemented
'wanting' signals as part of this system (described in Chapter 8), now we only needed
a way for these signals to be able to modulate and influence attentional processes.
Along came the Surprise affect program, which as we reviewed earlier, deals with
novel stimuli and attentional responses including ORs. If you recall, in Section 6.3.3
we described how affect programs could influence each other by sending excitatory or
inhibitory input which was taken into account when computing the affective value of
the affect program. Now everything was in place, and we could explore these novel
ideas on the modulation of attention by incentive motivational processes, simply
by connecting the Seeking and Surprise systems via their incentive ('wanting') and
affective ('liking') value signals, respectively.
The end result of such ideas is illustrated in Figure 9-6. The incentive value of the
Seeking system, which depends on the multiplicative effects of regulatory mechanisms
(i.e., drive signals) was thus connected as an inhibitory input to the Surprise system.
In vernacular terms, this means that when impending motivational needs arise (e.g.,
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Figure 9-6: 'Wanting' Modulation of Attention. This figure illustrates how we imple-
mented a simple yet powerful mechanism for the modulation of attentional processes
via the 'wanting' signal of the Seeking affect program. With such mechanism, goals
that have a high incentive value can be pursued by the robot with little, if any dis-
tractions, whereas goals that have lower motivational values will be pursued in a less
coherent manner and external stimuli will cause distractions, triggering ORs via the
Surprise affect program.
the need to recharge the battery in the case of our simulated robot), as long as an
incentive is detected (e.g. the recharging station) which has sufficient incentive value,
the Seeking system should promote approach responses while at the same time, it will
also inhibit the activity of the Surprise system, hence reducing possible distractions
which would correspond to the detection of novel stimuli in the robot's path toward
the incentive goal.
This is precisely what happened! To test these ideas, we set up two different
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scenarios in which the robot's battery level was set to be low and a recharging station
was placed nearby, so that it would be easily detected by the robot's distal releasers. In
the first scenario, we implemented the interactions between affective and attentional
processes as described above, and watched the results of the behaviors this produced.
In the second scenario, we artificially amplified these interactions by doubling the
output value of the Seeking system's incentive value signal, which was also connected
as an inhibitory input to the Surprise system, and also watched the behavioral results.
Figure 9-7 illustrates the first scenario. In the first frame, the incentive (i.e.,
recharging station) is marked by the top most red arrow, and two other neutral
stimuli (a red ball and a purple block) also marked by the other two arrows, were
placed in the same environment as distracting stimuli for the robot. The robot's
battery level was set to a low value, which would generate positive multiplicative
effects in the incentive value of the recharging station, and hence of the Seeking affect
program, once its releasers detected this incentive. In frames 2 and 3, it can be seen
how the detection of the recharging station triggers the approach response, which we
now commonly associate to a preparatory response controlled by the Seeking system.
In frame 4, the red ball is also detected, as is the purple block, but the saliency of the
red ball triggers a head OR on the robot, mediated by the Surprise affect program.
In frame 5, these head ORs where repeated and later followed in frame 6 by full
body ORs. In frame 7, the position of the robot was such that the purple block was
salient and also triggered a head OR. Finally, in frames 8 and 9, the robot resumes its
approach response targeted at the incentive goal (i.e., the recharging station--yellow
block). In frame 10, proximal releasers detect the yellow block and a consummatory
response corresponding to a grasping behavior, as mediated by the Seeking program
ensued, which ultimately increased the battery level to appropriate values and thus
no impending motivational needs were present, which ended the scenario. It should
be noted that this experimental scenario took place for several minutes and only the
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Figure 9-7: Modulation of Attention - Distraction. This sequence of frames illus-
trates the robot's attempt to pursue a goal, when multiple objects exist in the path
of the goal (yellow block). In the case of a low incentive value for the goal, all other
neutral objects trigger Orienting Responses (ORs) through the Surprise Affect Pro-
gram, causing distractions which result in the robot's active pursue of the goal to
be interrupted. Thus, the robot's behavior is not coherent and it dithers between
approaching the goal or exploring the novel objects.
key events are represented in the illustration.
These results suggest that at normal levels of incentive value, the 'wanting' signal
is not sufficient to inhibit the attentional distractions produced by novel stimuli in the
path of the agent when pursuing incentive goals. As we described earlier, in order to
test whether this idea was possible at all, we implemented another scenario in which
the 'wanting' signal was amplified.
Figure 9-8 illustrates this second scenario. All conditions are the same as in the
first scenario, with the only difference that the 'wanting' inhibitory signal coming
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from the Seeking affect program and into the Surprise affect program was amplified
by doubling its actual value. The first frame shows the robot in the same environment
and in the same position with respect to all objects. In frame 2 it can be seen that
the detection of the recharging station also triggers the approach response mediated
by the Seeking system. In contrast to the first scenario, however, when the red
ball is detected in frame 3, the robot comes to a full stop (a surprising event to
us), and as if it hesitated, slowly reinitiated its path toward the incentive goal in
frames 4 and 5. No head ORs were triggered by the detection of either distractor and
in frame 6, the detection of the recharging station by proximal releasers elicits the
consummatory grasping response controlled by the Seeking program, which finally
increased the battery level to appropriate values and ended the scenario. In contrast
to the first scenario, the amplification of the 'wanting' signal did have the anticipated
modulatory effects in the Surprise affect program, thus demonstrating the possibility
of modulation of attention by means of incentive salience processes. Furthermore,
from a behavioral perspective, it was clearly shown how the robot appeared more
"focused" in its pursuit for the goal, something that could also be assessed by the
amount of time it took to achieve its goal, which was less than one minute.
Interestingly, recent evidence stemming from research on hyperdopaminergic mu-
tant mice showed that these animals, which have a dopamine transporter (DAT)
knockdown mutation that preserves only 10% of normal DAT, and therefore causes
mutant mice to have up to 70% elevated levels of synaptic dopamine in comparison
to normal mice, exhibited quite similar responses when pursuing goals in their en-
vironments. In a runway task, these mice demonstrated enhanced acquisition and
greater incentive performance for a sweet reward. As described by the researchers,
"Hyperdopaminergic mutant mice leave the start box more quickly than wild-type mice,
require fewer trials to learn, pause less often in the runway, resist distractions better,
and proceed more directly to the goal" (Pecifia et al., 2003). As with our simulated
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Figure 9-8: Modulation of Attention - No Distraction. This sequence of frames
illustrates the robot's attempt to pursue an incentive, when multiple objects exist in
the path to the goal (yellow block) and the Surprise Affect Program, which mediates
Orienting Responses (ORs) to novel stimuli, is modulated via the incentive value of
the Seeking Affect Program (The 'Wanting' Pathway). This 'wanting' signal was
amplified 2x and connected through an inhibitory interaction to the Surprise Affect
Program as illustrated in Figure 9-6. In this case, having a high incentive value did
focus the robot's attempts and produced coherent approach behavior targeted at the
incentive.
robot and its amplified 'wanting' signal, these observations seem to suggest that
hyperdopaminergic mutant mice attribute greater incentive salience ('wanting') to
rewards.
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Chapter 10
Toward a Computational Theory of
Affect
The computational model described in previous chapters ties together theories and
evidence stemming from various disciplines that have a long-standing tradition in the
study of emotion. This computational account introduced the notion of an affect
program as the primary theoretical construct for investigating the function and the
mechanisms of emotion, as they are instantiated in a variety of embodied agents.
As many researchers in Artificial Intelligence will attest, building systems that
exhibit autonomous and intelligent behavior is a highly complex research endeavor
for which many questions remain open. We believe that when we commit to such a
task, with the main purpose of instantiating affect programs into these systems to
understand the set of computational problems they face in their specific environments,
we are in fact providing a very rigorous test of the theory of emotion upon which the
computational account is based.
We would thus argue that in the same manner that we have drawn inspiration
from other fields, these disciplines would also benefit from the lessons learned through
an approach like the one described in this thesis, especially as they refer to the many
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seemingly unimportant, but in fact quite relevant, issues raised by attempting to
instantiate a mechanistic account of affects into an embodied system. To capture
several essential features of emotional systems, an approach like this forces us to
think about them at multiple levels of abstraction, as well as at several spatial-
temporal scales. Furthermore, it requires that we address details that would otherwise
be considered unimportant at the level in which most psychological constructs are
thought of within these disciplines.
This chapter summarizes some of the lessons learned and freely speculates about
interesting ideas that might be related in some way or another to the notions put
forward in this thesis, and that as such would correspond to possibly interesting
future research undertakings.
10.1 Summary of Contributions
The following are the main contributions made by this thesis:
* From a more theoretical perspective, one of the main contributions of this work
consists on a reconceptualization of the notion of emotion into one that departs
from traditional views that focus on the experience of emotion, and instead
views emotions as functionally distinct processes-rather than states'-which
implement specialized solutions to prototypical situations that organisms (or
robots) regularly face in their environments.
* We presented a unified computational framework for the study of emotion
that accounts for different affective phenomena, including a variety of emotions
1I thank Roz Picard for rightly suggesting that "snapshot views" of these processes could represent
instantaneous affective states as well, and could be treated as such when these descriptive levels are
useful.
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and mood-like activity, and integrates these with several notions traditionally
deemed to be integral components of intelligent behavior.
* As the main component of this framework, we introduced a novel computa-
tional construct for an affect program as a biologically plausible abstraction for
emotion. The primary function of affect programs is to mediate, control and
synchronize the activities and interactions of several subprograms, including
those that govern perception, attention, physiological regulation, goal selection,
motor control, expressive social communication processes, action selection and
learning, and so forth. Each of these affect programs establishes a mode of oper-
ation for the robot, which involves the coordinated adjustment and entrainment
of these subprograms (responses) so that the whole system exhibits coherent be-
havior as a response to the confrontation with specific eliciting situations.
* We presented a model for incentive salience, which attributes motivational prop-
erties to stimuli and actions that signal the occurrence of events of emotional
(biological) significance. An incentive salience approach contrasts with other
views that propose that reward or incentive learning, as mediated by the brain's
mesolimbic dopamine systems, is based upon global teaching signals that code
for the errors in the prediction of reward. These views have found further ac-
ceptance in the neurosciences given that elegant computational counterparts,
such as the reinforcement learning models, seem to work in a similar manner.
However, an incentive salience approach, such as that proposed in this thesis,
provides an alternative explanation for the activity of these same brain systems
and through simple and localized learning rules, together with the organizational
principle that separates action into preparatory and consummatory behaviors,
can account for some of the evidence seen in experimental paradigms. Some-
thing that reinforcement learning models, at least in their original form, cannot
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account for.
* We proposed an agent architecture that follows an affective-based decomposi-
tion and which provides a novel alternative to the control of intelligent robotic
systems. In this approach we suggest that a different organization of action is
pursued, one based not upon the desired external behaviors of the robots, but
rather on the set of prototypical fundamental situations that the robots will
encounter, and view these as affective situations for which a set of coordinated
responses can provide solutions, much in the spirit of these biological schemas
we have referred to herein as the affect programs.
* Finally, we proposed a multi-stage model of affective learning that relates evi-
dence from psychology and neuroscience regarding classical paradigms of asso-
ciative learning and bridges these notions with a possible computational sub-
strate, in the form of affect programs.
10.2 Some Lessons Learned
In AI, we have long strived toward creating systems that can exhibit autonomous,
and intelligent behavior. Depending on the approach taken, these efforts vary from
symbolic computational approaches, to those that deal with neural networks, genetic
algorithms and robotics. As philosophers have long suggested, autonomy is, and
should be, a central tenet of AI, just as it has been with the philosophy of the mind
(Dennett, 1987; Griffiths, 1997).
Traditionally, we have not taken advantage of the many fruits that a research
agenda into computational emotion would provide. Partly due to previous cognitive
and symbolic efforts that looked deceptively simple to achieve and thus gave the
impression that these were uninteresting challenges to pursue, and partly because
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our own notions and uses of these psychological constructs led us to work at different
levels of abstraction that not always produced fruitful results or which seemed to be
resolved questions altogether.
10.2.1 Mechanistic Precision and Psychological Constructs
Throughout this work, we have suggested that affect, like any other construct, can be
studied from many different standpoints and at many different levels of abstraction.
Given our design principles (described in Section 6.1), we follow a computational
perspective that attempts to elucidate these issues at the mechanistic level. We are
interested not only in accounting for high-level constructs, but also for determining
how these could be implemented in robots that are situated in real environments.
In following this approach, we have faced an interesting predicament related to
how certain theoretical constructs, such as the notion of reinforcement and reward, or
the general conception of how Pavlovian conditioning works, which are widely used
in our high level discussions and theories, might mean completely different things or
cease to exist altogether when considered at a much lower level of abstraction.
Consider for instance the notion of reward. Rewards, like emotions, motivations,
and many other "big words" have come to elicit many different meanings and thus
act like the "suitcase" terms that Minsky (2006) and others have talked about before.
Rewards are a central tenet in all of our discussions about motivation and they are,
no doubt, an essential component of many of the psychological explanations we use
for intelligent behavior and learning. Without the notion of reward, contemporary
learning theories would be meaningless, as would their computational counterparts.
Although the notion exists since earlier times, Thorndike's and Pavlov's experiments
certainly "stamped-in" (forgive the pun) the idea of rewards in our current discussions
about learning. In Pavlov's classical conditioning paradigm, for instance, we have
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come to use the term "reward" when referring to the Unconditioned Stimulus (US)
that evokes Unconditioned Responses (URs). From these constructs many have taken
to believe several things: for one, that USs are innately detected, which Pavlov never
intended to mean, and in fact he clearly stated otherwise; and second, that we can use
these high-level constructs without paying much attention to some of the details they
entail. Is food a reward? We believe so. Is food a US? It must be, if we consider the
experimental preparations that are widely used in the behavioral neurosciences. But
is this really the case when we think of these constructs at a mechanistic level? Food
cannot be reward, at least not in its natural form, unless it has been signified as such
(through associative processes that link the sensory properties of the foodstuff with
nutritional features that are innately rewarding) by the organism that is consumming
it. Food pellets like those given to rats in behavioral experiments, or a slice of
pepperoni pizza that we might have for lunch, are not natural rewards. They act
like ones now, but they came to do so by a necessary association via the very basic
learning and affective processes that we attempted to elucidate in this work.
Thus, we would argue that only by addressing these kinds of constructs at specific
levels of abstraction will such issues arise. These situations are not typically faced
by those who attempt to model the same phenomena at higher levels of abstraction.
These other models abstract much of these issues, and thus decision-making processes
such as action selection arbitration become not a matter of conflicting actuators and
choosing, executing and controlling the selected response, but rather selecting one of
several possibilities represented by an input vector, for instance.
These issues are certainly not novel, as we are clearly not the first ones attempting
to build robotic creatures that can be endowed with mechanisms and processes like
the ones described in this work. However, we shall make an effort to call attention
to them as we believe they are of high importance to a general understanding of the
complex processes that are involved in intelligent behavior.
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More than forty years ago, for instance, W. Grey Walter faced similar predica-
ments while attempting to recreate these phenomena in his mechanical "tortoises".
While attempting to have his Machina speculatrix replicate conditioned reflexes, the
high-level abstraction of conditioning, as used by Pavlov and his disciples of the time
became quite problematic for his low-level needs, as he intended to recreate such con-
structs in a physical machine made out of tubes, relays and simple circuits2 . Walter
attempted to seek out guidance by constructing a working model of how Pavlovian
conditioning could work, as explained by the high level psychological constructs used
at the time. He already had a model of a machine that could move via a. reflex which
was responsive to light. As Walter described, "it was a simple addition sum to pro-
vide a second reflex circuit to be made responsive to sound." The further addition
of a conditioning association between the two reflexes turned out to be no simple
operation (as perhaps it could be in a higher level model) but in fact would require
a higher level of precision. His attempts fruitfully ended in the creation of a Condi-
tioned Reflex Analogue (CORA) which could be demonstrated on the bench in his M.
docilis, but which would require even much more precision if it were to be included
in M. speculatrix, which was a mobile machine (Walter, 1961).
Like Walter's "tortoises", our computational models for controlling robots are
intended to include parsimony, goal-seeking, and incorporate positive and negative
tropism. It seems clear to us that even though our current technology is advanced
enough to build fairly complex robots with humanoid form, that caln perform tasks in
dynamic environments, the nature of these tasks make them seem much more complex
than the simple overt behaviors of "approach", "avoid", "like", and "dislike", that
are possible with our models. However, we would argue that we are still far from
elucidating the very basic mechanisms responsible for such kind of behaviors and their
21 am indebted to Rod Brooks for pointing out to me Grey Walter's similar predicaments and
directing me toward his fascinating work on mechanical tortoises.
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organizational principles. However, it should also be clear that if our goal is to mimic
behavior, then we have already achieved this, thus the engineering goal with respect
to these simpler tasks has already been attained. Our contention here is more related
to obtaining an understanding of the general organization of such constructs from
scientific goal of obtaining an understanding of the mechanisms underlying affective
processes, and as such these simple behaviors are of high interest to us.
Let us end this argument with a much more succinct example. By forcing pre-
cision onto psychological constructs such as Pavlovian conditioning, other processes
have been elucidated, including that of Evaluative Conditioning (Houwer, Thomas &
Baeyens, 2001), which corresponds to an associative process that even though might
be directly related to the Pavlovian paradigm, exhibits marked differences and might
ultimately be the process by which a stimulus such as a food pellet becomes to mean
a "reward" later on, once it has been associated with affective and motivational pro-
cesses like those described in Chapter 8.
10.2.2 Meaning Machines
Based upon this work, we have also come to think of emotions as valuation engines
that effectively tag stimuli in the world by deciding which events are significant and
which are not, and in what sense they are so (e.g., in the joyous, the infuriating, or
the fearful sense), thus providing meaning of the world to the organism. As such,
emotions can be seen as significance or meaning machines, that bias action, modu-
late perception and attention and which lay the foundation for other more cognitive
processes by giving affective meaning to the world contingencies.
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10.2.3 Action Comes Before Abstraction
Action is fundamental in the notion of autonomy, which as we alluded to before,
has been considered paramount to the problem of intelligence. Our primary means
for dealing with the world are largely motivational, and from our viewpoint, mainly
regulated by our affect programs. From our psychoevolutionary perspective, emotions
came about as a set of responses, both preparatory and consummatory, that facilitated
solutions to life's fundamental situations. Our basic approach to engineering affect,
and hence to controlling robots, suggests that instead of building general purpose
learning systems we focus on how these affect programs can reduce the learning
space via local learning systems that become active once there are contingencies of
importance to the organism (or robot). Likewise, we propose to build control systems
that are not based on broad organizations of behavior, but rather which are organized
into different pathways, preparatory and consummatory, both for perception and for
action. Finally, we propose to create effective action programs that can be released
by commonly faced situations and tasks. These action programs are nothing but
our affect programs, which can later be used as schemes for higher more abstract
processes.
Could the same programs (i.e., the same mechanisms for assigning affective and
incentive value, as well as those for synchronizing and coordinating responses) be
combined with more abstract releasers and responses? If releasers are not of the ma-
terial kind, based primarily on our perceptual systems, but rather based on abstract
thoughts and the learned relationships between stimuli, could we not start to eluci-
date the meaning of secondary or more cognitively produced emotions? The Seeking
system, as it currently stands, is integrated with motor behavior which results in ap-
proach and exploratory responses. If this same control programs were to be integrated
with abstract thought, might they seek out solutions to imagined situations based on
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imagined or abstract actions? Might a mechanism such as this be the basis for cog-
nitive constructs such as planning or even creative processes? Highly speculative, of
course, but definitely worth thinking about.
Consistent with these ideas, though, is the evidence that stems from subjects
who exhibit pathological cases in which these kinds of systems become overactive
and the "imagination" of such individuals seems to run amok, determining causality
where only simple correlations might exist and ascribing reality to fantasy (Ikemoto
& Panksepp, 1999).
10.3 On Engineering Affect: Related Work
To explore both what we can learn from our understanding of affect programs and
to suggest how this understanding might be improved by our work in computational
modeling, we distinguish between different kinds of computational models of emotion.
Depending on the goals and the nature of the model, we divide these efforts into
shallow and deep models of affect.
10.3.1 Shallow Computational Models
One of the earliest models that included a notion of emotion, from a symbolic classi-
cal Artificial Intelligence perspective, was the work of Colby in his PARRY program
(Colby, 1974). PARRY was a program with which one interacted via a computer ter-
minal. PARRY was designed to respond to the users with exaggerated affective terms,
and thus the idea was to model a simplistic account of human paranoid schizophrenia.
Like PARRY, other text-based work related to emotion, or at least to the un-
derstanding of narrative accounts that included emotional terms was Dyer's BORIS
program (Dyer, 1982). Also based on symbolic approaches, BORIS was a narrative
analyzer that could make simple inferences regarding the affective terms and states
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that made part of these stories.
Most of these models were essentially reasoners that could analyze emotional terms
and thus make inferences regarding related emotional states. These systems treated
emotions simply as labels that had no meaningful connections to many of the issues
related to affective phenomena, and in no way accounted for how these emotional
labels were generated in the first place, what would be their eliciting conditions, their
components, or how would they interact with other constructs and processes.
From these efforts, multiple models came about, including Clark Elliott's Affective
Reasoner (Elliott, 1992), that attempted to alleviate some of these shortcomings. The
Affective Reasoner was based on the model by Ortony et al. (1988), which was (and
still is) a predominant cognitive theory of emotion. Elliott's model allowed users to
interact with simple characters enhanced with multimedia capabilities (e.g., music),
who appeared to have different emotions and could reason about them, hence the
name of the model.
Other earlier accounts, which were embedded in more complex agent architectures
that included functional systems for perception, planning and action, included the
work by Reilly (1996) and the Oz agents. Part of a wider project to create emotional
agents at CMU, Reilly's work would focus primarily on the exploitation of emotional
expression to create believable agents. That is, on the use the expressive signals of
affective processes in order to suspend disbelief in humans that would interact with
these agents in short-lived experiences.
Most of these models were based upon the cognitive appraisal theories reviewed
in Section 2.2.1. The main reason why these were the predominant theories upon
computational models were based was that the problem could easily be reduced to a
fairly direct mapping between the cognitive appraisal taxonomies and production rules
that implemented them in a symbolic fashion. One has to be careful in ascertaining
what is it exactly that these models account for. For instance, in the case of Elliott's
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Affective Reasoner, the implemented agents seem to be able to reason about the kind
of emotion they would be in, given a particular situation. The important thing to
note here is that the goals and application for which these models are built are an
important indicator of the kind of model that is provided. In the case of models that
are built for entertainment purposes, such as Reilly's (1996) and even Elliott's (1992),
the main purpose is not to understand affect from a computational perspective, and
thus these cannot be evaluated as such. If that were to be the case (i.e., use them
to understand affect), we would argue that these models would not provide much
information regarding what emotions are and what are the kinds of computational
problems they involve, but they would provide information regarding how people
interpret and reason about emotional situations.
In a similar fashion, other models have been developed as part of robotic sys-
tems (or their control architectures to be more precise) that do have to sort complex
computational tasks in their environments, which would require the set of solutions
for which we believe emotional systems were adapted. At a glance, these models
seem more complex and are in fact linked to the robot's architecture in interesting
manners. However, with the exception of a few, most of these models have restricted
their use of emotional processing to that of directing expressive behaviors that would
"trick" humans into suspending disbelief (albeit in the short-term) and thus facilitat-
ing human-social interactions. Indeed, a very interesting aspect in which emotions are
involved (and contribute to its regulation) corresponds to that related to the signaling
of internal states that are essential to regulate social communication and interaction.
This is certainly an exciting area that has recently drawn attention in robotics re-
search and many important questions in this respect remain open. However, as we
have argued throughout this thesis, we do not believe emotions evolved as superordi-
nate programs simply to modulate social communication. Rather, we see their main
function to be that of directing the activities and interactions of subprograms that
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regulate perception, attention, motivation and goal choice, action selection, learn-
ing, motor control, and so on, as part of the implementation of solutions that have
provided adaptive in recurrent life and survival-related fundamental situations.
This type of models in which systems can mimic the appearance of having emotion,
or which can recognize and respond to emotion in simple ways, but otherwise do not
involve the set of computational issues involved in affective processing, are what we
refer to as shallow models of affect. Let us further clarify that by "shallow" we do
not mean for any negative connotation to be ascribed to these models. We simply
mean that their goals and applications should be considered when discussing about
their explanatory power, as they are not developed with the purpose of understanding
affect from a computational perspective.
10.3.2 Affect-Related Models: Reward Learning
The hypothesis that dopamine signals between neurons are an important component
in the neural substrates that causes reward learning has gained great prominence in
recent years. This view puts forward the idea that the activity of mesolimbic dopamine
neurons acts as a global, teaching signal that modulates learning processes in order
to 'stamp in' and associatively reinforce new associations between stimulus-stimulus
or stimulus-response contingencies.
A major appeal of this learning hypothesis for dopamine function results from
the realization that elegant computational models based on reinforcement learning
(Sutton & Barto, 1981), which were not originally developed with such explanatory
purposes in mind, do fit the data stemming from electrophysiological studies on the
phasic activity of dopamine neurons as they may code for errors in the prediction of
rewarding events (Schultz et al., 1997; Montague, Hyman & Cohen, 2004; Schultz,
2006).
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Although these models are not models of affect in the sense posited in this thesis,
they certainly are related to specific affective processes. These models attempt to
account for some of the constructs related to incentive or reward learning, at least
with respect to the 'liking' and learning components of reward, described in earlier
chapters. As such, a brief review of their main features and their relation to that
relevant aspect of the framework proposed herein (i.e. that which relates to the
Seeking affect program) is in order.
Reinforcement learning models based on temporal difference (TD) learning, such
as those proposed initially by Sutton (1988) and Sutton & Barto (1998), and which
are based on earlier prediction error models that suggested a plausible progression of
associative learning (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972), are the most widely adopted com-
putational accounts for both Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning, and now for
dopamine activity as well, as suggested above. These models, albeit elegant and prac-
tical in their computational nature, do not account for several key findings in the rich
literature of such phenomena.
Thus, at least with respect to explaining affective phenomena such as those de-
scribed in this thesis, reinforcement learning approaches do not account for moti-
vational influences on reward learning, nor do they account for influences in atten-
tional processes as evidenced by large bodies of work (for a review see (Dickinson &
Balleine, 2002)).
In particular, TD-based models do not take into consideration how motivational
shifts (like those described with physiological mechanisms like hunger or thirst) exert
immediate effects on behavior and learning. A recent and notable extension to such
models has been proposed by Dayan & Balleine (2002) in an attempt to compensate
for such explanatory deficiencies. This model includes extensions that relate the
pursuit of rewards to two different predictive systems: one for Pavlovian conditioning
and one for instrumental conditioning, and which take into account some motivational
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influences in incentive learning. The model, however, as an extension to TD-based
algorithms, still suffers from the rigidity in the selection of actions as they relate to
the pursuit of rewards, a notable feature of this type of model.
In terms of the organizational principles suggested in our framework (i.e. consum-
matory and preparatory pathways for behavior), we should mention that a signature
finding of Pavlovian conditioning is the notion of conditioned responses, which implies
more than just the predictions of rewards. The extent of the Pavlovian conditioning
paradigm reaches the behavioral level in order to consider the consequences of such
predictions, as evidenced by learned or conditioned responses, such as the approach
response to the purple block that signals the occurrence of the yellow recharging sta-
tion in the case of our simulated robot. The Pavlovian consequence of such signals is
a preparatory behavior such as the approach response (undeniably observed through-
out experimental studies). Thus the organism (or robot) will approach the signal
(be it a light, the approximate location for a sound or another object) regardless of
whether or not doing so is optimal (or even functional) for obtaining the reward3 . In
TD-based models, the performance of such responses is not accounted for, and much
less so when they could imply the reduction of reward.
Furthermore, traditional models do not account for the important attentional
processes involved in classical conditioning paradigms. Our framework suggested a
possible interaction effect between the 'wanting' signal particular of incentive salience
processes, and the modulation of attentional processes in the form of inhibition of se-
lective Orienting Responses, which resulted in fewer "distractions" when our robot
attempted to pursue a goal. At a much lower level of attentional processes, however,
Dayan and colleagues have shown how Kalman filters could be used to extend at-
tentional processes beyond the issue of managing limited attentional resources and
3See the work on training chicks to access food by Hershberger (1986) for an interesting arrange-
ment that demonstrates this issue.
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suggest how such mechanisms might work to determine what it means to be an im-
portant and relevant stimulus from an affectively significance perspective (Dayan,
Kakade & Montague, 2000).
We should mention that most of the models reviewed here are still based on the
same principles of temporal difference learning, and while these extensions account
for specific phenomena (e.g., motivational influences, attentional influences) none
of these models provide a comprehensive account (at the architectural-level) that
integrates all of these features as we have proposed in the current framework. In all
fairness, however, this is not the goal of such models, as they are not models that
attempt to account for the synthesis of affect, but rather focus mainly on the idea of
reward learning in classical paradigms. As such, they would only be comparable to
the Seeking affect program described herein, which in contrast to these reinforcement
learning approaches, is based on the notion of incentive salience and can offer an
alternative explanation for the system-level function of dopaminergic systems in the
brain, as proposed by others (Panksepp, 1998; Ikemoto & Panksepp, 1999; Berridge &
Robinson, 2003; Berridge, 2006; Robbins & Everitt, 2006; Salamone & Correa, 2002;
Salamone, Correa, Mingote & Weber, 2005).
A very interesting and recent work by Ahn & Picard (2006), also attempts to
model the activity of such Seeking system, albeit at a higher-level of abstraction.
This work provides a probabilistic account for affective-cognitive interactions, and
uses affective signals in order to influence decision-making processes, in a way similar
to that proposed by Damasio's somatic marker hypothesis (Damasio, 1994; Damasio,
1999). Although their affective models are limited to binary states of "feeling good"
or "feeling bad", this work is one of the few attempts to integrate both extrinsic
and intrinsic motivational inputs in the processes of learning and decision making. It
would be interesting to see how a model such as this would scale if it were to consider
a wider span of affective processes or states, such as those described in this framework.
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We believe these accounts are complementary perspectives on a similar process. While
our work proposes a biologically plausible mechanistic account for affect programs,
including the Seeking system, their account would account for higher-level cognitive
interactions, but both approaches follow similar assumptions with respect to the
activity of dopaminergic systems and the existence of 'wanting' pathways.
Finally, McClure, Daw & Montague (2003) have suggested a model for incentive
salience that relies on the same associative learning mechanisms of temporal difference
learning methods, but which does not take into consideration any of the motivational
factors that are at the essence of the incentive salience ideas. It essentially equates
incentive salience to associative predictions of reward. In that sense, it differs signif-
icantly from accounts of incentive salience as an integrative motivational process in
which physiological states have multiplicative interactions that contribute to deter-
mining the incentive value of stable learned signals such as it its proposed by Toates
(1986) and Berridge (2004), and which is precisely modeled in our framework.
To close these ideas on the learning hypothesis of dopamine activity, it should
be mentioned that recent evidence indicates that dopamine is neither necessary, nor
sufficient, to mediate changes in hedonic 'liking' of rewards. Likewise, other recent
evidence suggests that dopamine is not needed for new learning either, and also not
sufficient to directly regulate learning processes through teaching signals based on
errors in the prediction of rewards. Instead, growing evidence indicates that dopamine
does contribute causally to incentive salience processes, as used in a framework like
the one proposed here. Dopamine seems to be necessary for normal 'wanting', and in
fact sufficient to promote cue-triggered incentive salience (Berridge, 2006).
As a general overview, table 10.1 summarizes the main approaches to synthesize
affect from a computational perspective, as well as those models that in spite of not
being proposed for the synthesis of affect, are related to a particular component of
affective processes (i.e. reward learning) and as such provide interesting contributions
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to the field.
10.4 Future Work
Affective processes involve such a wide variety of mechanisms and phenomena, that
clearly one single framework, even if it is composed of many subprograms for atten-
tion, behavior, learning and so forth, leaves behind much to be explained, and many
interesting possibilities for extensions and future work. This section reviews some of
the most interesting ones, from our perspective, and which seem as natural extensions
of the work presented here.
10.4.1 Social Emotions
While there is considerable evidence to support a psychoevolutionary approach to
emotion like the one presented here in the form of affect programs, a different account
might be needed to explain social, more cognitive emotions, such as Guilt, Jealousy,
Shame, and other complex psychological constructs such as love. The approach taken
in this work has been that through learning and developmental processes, some of
these emotions could be accounted for, but clearly other affect programs exist in the
mammalian brain that were not studied in this framework and which might be essen-
tial to build such developmental strategies. We are referring to affect programs such
as those for maternal care, which might be the basis of attachment processes, and sep-
aration distress, which might be intimately related to affiliation processes and social
phenomena, among others. In any case, other social accounts for emotion (without
recurring to extreme views that discount biological determination) might certainly
be appropriate and useful approaches to explore from a computational standpoint
(Frank, 1988).
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Table 10.1: Comparison of Models of Affect or Affect-Related Phenomena.
Cognitive Models Dimensional Models Reinforcement Affect Programs -
Learning Models Cathexis
- Emotions as states - Primary emotions - Not models of affect, - Emotions as processes
- Labels of primary - Secondary emotions but include - Primary emotions
emotions - Mood-like states affect-related constructs - Secondary emotions
- Labels of secondary - Non-emotional states - Rewards modeled as suggested as learning
a emotion (e.g. sleepy) values processes
- Non-emotional states - Emergent emotions
U - Moods as tonic-level
activation of affect
programs
- Parameter-based simple
account for temperament
- Mainly directed at - Primarily for signaling - Many possible - Action is at center stage,
signaling of emotional emotional state (i.e., behaviors determined and regulated
. . state (i.e., Emotional Emotional expression) - Not "motivated" by by affect
S0 expression) - No organization for affect, but influenced by - Separation of
- No organization for behavior suggested "reward" sensorimotor pathways
• behavior suggested into preparatory and
consummatory behaviors
- Emotional expression
- Responses other than
relational behavior
possible
- No specific learning - No specific learning - Temporal difference - Nonassociative learning
interactions addressed interactions addressed learning (e.g., habituation)
. -Some include by these models - Reinforcement based - Evaluative conditioning
; "affective tags" (i.e. on errors in prediction - Incentive learning
S$ labels of emotion of reward
assigned to objects) General conditioning
- Appraisals - Theoretical models - Do not account for - Motivations directly
theoretically involve may include interaction motivational, influence affective
complex cognitive with bodily processes attentional, or any other processes and learning
4 processes that interact and attention (through interactions (but see - Modulation of attention
0 to produce affect an arousal dimension) (Dayan & by incentive value
a - Computational models - Computational models Balleine, 2002; Dayan et - Stimulus vs.
do not account for other do not account for these al., 2000; McClure et goal-directed action
interactions, but see interactions (but see al., 2003) for extensions
(Thagard, 2006) (Ahn & Picard, 2006) to this type of model
for an example that uses that attempt to account
the valence and arousal for some motivational
dimensions to account and cognitive
for motivational and interactions)
cognitive interactions)
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10.4.2 Misbehavior
Under certain conditions, organisms exhibit a variety of behaviors that defy expla-
nation in traditional drive reduction theories or response reinforcement models such
as the ones reviewed above. Such behaviors are often called "misbehaviors" as they
appear to be unrelated to the contexts in which they occur, and inappropriate with
respect to the stimuli that are present in such events.
These phenomena include responses such as autoshaping, misbehaviors, and dis-
placement behaviors, reviewed by Bolles (1972) as part of his motivational theories,
but initially identified in the late 1960's by others (Breland & Breland, 1961; Brown
& Jenkins, 1968; Williams & Williams, 1969). In a classic example, racoons being
trained to put "money" (coins) into a metal box would exhibit non-reinforced be-
haviors in which the racoons started rubbing the coin against the inside of the box,
taking it back out and clutching it firmly for several seconds, before finally letting
it go. This misbehavior occurred as if the racoons were "washing" the coins, much
as they wash food before eating it. Interestingly, these misbehaviors became worse
as time went on, in spite of non-reinforcement by the experimenters. Similarly, pi-
geons that were presented with light signals followed by freely available food, came to
start pecking robustly at the light signal whenever it came on, despite the fact that
they had never been reinforced to do so-rats exhibit similar behaviors, gnawing and
biting the lights when presented under similar conditions. This kind of behavior is
known as autoshaping, due to the similarities of this phenomenon to instrumental or
operant conditioning (also referred to as "shaping"), in which an animal's response
such as pulling a chain or pressing a lever is increased by the reinforcement given by
the experimenter. As suggested by Berridge (2000), however, autoshaping is purely
an incentive process that requires no reinforcement whatsoever. Thus, there is no
rational reason for the animal to work for a reward, less so to peck at or bite the sig-
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nal for it, at least when attempting to explain such phenomena from a reinforcement
perspective. Finally, displacement behaviors are also commonly reported, including
schedule-induced polydipsia, in which animals drink exorbitantly large amounts of
water for no apparent reason while under certain eating (not drinking) training con-
ditions, or self-grooming and scratching, displayed when an animal apparently has a
conflict between different motivations, such as the desire to pursue an incentive, while
at the same time being fearful of that incentive.
As early as 1972, Bolles had suggested that these misbehaviors could not operate
by the response reinforcement and drive reduction theories that were the darling the-
ories of the moment. Still now, our models for action selection and reward learning,
and the generally accepted models for classical conditioning, such as reinforcement
learning models, cannot account for these phenomena and do not even bother con-
sidering explanations for it4 . There is a motivational explanation for some of these
misbehaviors, however, and it relies precisely on the notion of Incentive Salience pro-
posed by Berridge & Robinson (1998), and which provides the theoretical basis for
our computational approach to incentive learning, as described in Chapter 8.
In our framework, misbehaviors such as those exhibited by the racoons, and au-
toshaping can be accounted for as they would be mediated by the 'wanting' signal
related to the incentive value processes discussed in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8. The
S-R association that is learned between the neutral stimulus and a consummatory
behavior via a three-factor hebbian rule, is modulated by this 'wanting' signal. In
some cases, depending on the contingencies and the learning rates associated to these
hebbian rules, the 'wanting' signal can amplify this S-R association (which is usu-
ally learned at a slower rate than other associations) and make the neutral cue (CS)
4I am indebted to Patrick Winston for drawing my attention to misbehaviors, including autoshap-
ing and displacement behaviors which led me to think about possible ways a framework like the one
described here could account for these phenomena.
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to be highly 'wanted', in such way that a consummatory behavior (e.g., chewing or
gnawing), which would otherwise be associated to a specific goal stimulus (e.g., food),
would now become associated to the neutral cue and thus activated by proximal re-
leasers that provide sensory-specific information about such stimulus. In this sense,
our robots would "chew" the lights (neutral stimuli) that signal the occurrence of the
rewarding stimuli. In the case of our simulated robot, the "grasping" behavior would
also apply to the purple blocks which are neutral and usually only trigger preparatory
responses (i.e., approach behavior).
In other words, the neutral stimuli (CSs such as a light or the purple block in
our simulated world) that predict food to a hungry pigeon or a robot that needs to
recharge its battery, become attractive, potentially "consumable", and possibly even
'liked' food-like or rewarding objects (Berridge, 2006). They elicit approach responses
like those demonstrated in Chapter 8 and even consummatory behavior that would
ordinarily be directed to the incentive stimulus itself. All this activity is modulated
by motivational processes (e.g., regulatory mechanisms such as hunger or recharging
need) in such a way that they have multiplicative effects on these object's attributed
incentive value, but when these motivations are no longer present (i.e., the animal is
no longer hungry or the robot does not need to recharge its battery), the same signal
is simply a predictive signal, lacking any motivational properties.
Displacement behaviors are more elusive, however. The specifics of how adjunct or
displacement behaviors are produced remain an open question, but what we do know
is that they are under the control of the same dopaminergic systems that mediate the
neural circuits involved in the seeking system, and thus are directly related to the
interactions between these same 'liking' and 'wanting' pathways that are at the essence
of our model for incentive salience. Robbins & Koob (1980) showed a dissociation
between water-deprived drinking and polydipsia in rats. Lesions to the dopaminergic
systems projecting to the nucleus accumbens eliminated the adjunct drinking behavior
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in the lesioned animals, yet they could still exhibit drinking behaviors when water-
deprived. This suggests a possible motivational origin for such behaviors, but the
answer remains at large and it is not clear that a model such as the one presented
here would account for displacement behaviors.
Another possibility for the occurrence of such behaviors might be at the action
arbitration level. It has been theorized that displacement behaviors occur as the
possibly conflicting motivations neutralize each other and in the process, this neu-
tralizing effect disinhibits the displacement behavior which thus becomes active. The
details of such activity remain a matter of speculation, at best. Notwithstanding,
from a mechanistic perspective, for our model to account for such possibility the
computation of behavior value and the arbitration scheme would have to be modified
from an excitatory winner-take-all strategy to an inhibitory looser-take-all one. This
would be consistent, nonetheless, with current thinking on basal ganglia mediated
action selection, which is thought to involve a double inhibition (i.e., disinhibition)
of tonically-active behaviors.
In any case, the implementation and further accounting for misbehaviors is cer-
tainly an interesting question which remains open and quite amenable for future work
as an extension of the ideas presented in this thesis.
10.4.3 Incentive Value and Vigor
Our notion of incentive value is a simple one, as it only considers the multiplica-
tive effects that physiological mechanisms such as those regulating hunger or thirst,
would have over the incentive value of rewarding events or of those neutral stimuli,
once incentive salience has been attributed to them. An idea related to the 'liking'
and 'wanting' systems is the notion of vigor which describes the strength or rate of
responding that organisms exhibit when working for rewards. In other words, this
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notion refers to how "hard" organisms would work for rewards, which, from our per-
spective would be directly related to how much these rewards are 'wanted'. Thus,
incorporating the notion of vigor to account for the simple, and well-established ob-
servation that hungrier animals would work harder (e.g., circumvent more obstacles)
for food than satiated animals is a natural extension of this work. Incorporating a
notion that includes the costs of executing certain actions could certainly make the
computation of incentive value a much complete one. To this end, one could look at
the quite recent work by Niv, Daw, Joel & Dayan (2007) which attempts to account
for such ideas and relate them to the tonic activation of dopamine neurons.
10.4.4 Other Interactions
Investigating other affective interactions is certainly a matter worth pursuing:
* It would be a natural extension to this work to consider how affective processes
interact with other constructs and processes that were theoretically included in
our framework, but not actually implemented, such as the influence of affect in
low-level attention processes like the ones described in earlier sections (Dayan
et al., 2000), or how a process like that of incentive salience could account for
superstitious behaviors and attentional regulation when affective significance is
attributed to neutral stimuli through processes that were coincidental but not
really contingent.
* Likewise, there are well-established relations between affect and memory storage
and retrieval. The proposed framework only hints as to how associative repre-
sentations, mediated by affect, might trigger memory-congruent events, but no
real implementation or model is in place, beyond the associative learning rules
described earlier.
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Like these, there are multiple kinds of interactions, some established, some hypo-
thetical, that would provide interesting avenues of research as an extension of this
work. Some examples would include affective-immunological interactions, affective-
cognitive expectancies in the control of action (Dickinson & Balleine, 1993; Dickinson
& Balleine, 2002), and the highly complex and controversial implications of emotion
and consciousness (Panksepp, 2005; Ellis & Newton, 2005)
10.5 Afterthought
One of the most interesting issues that we believe rises from this work is the recon-
ceptualization of affect and how this might change our view of the mind.
From an evolutionary perspective, and after reviewing the practical issues in-
volved in modeling affect programs and instantiating them into embodied systems,
we would argue that the mind is essentially a host of affective capabilities that can
act as valuation engines that effectively tag the stimuli in the world by deciding which
is significant or not, and in what sense (i.e., with respect to any of the basic emo-
tions), thus providing meaning of the world to the organism. As such, emotions are
meaning machines, that bias action, modulate perception and attention and lay the
foundation for other more cognitive processes by giving affective meaning to the world
contingencies.
In other words, from an affective perspective, we can view the mind as a set of
evolved, domain specific programs, each functionally specialized for solving differ-
ent adaptive problems that came about throughout our evolutionary past, including
the need to avoid danger, seek out resources and "solutions" to impending internal
motivational problems (e.g., obtain energy through foodstuff, hydrate, regulate tem-
perature, choose mates, and so forth), and which become active by a different set of
environmental cues that are partly hardwired, and partly learned as we showed in the
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results of this work. This set of programs correspond to the affect programs. These
affect programs schedule, control and synchronize the resources of the organism so
that the right subprogram can be executed and a coherent solution implemented for
any of the prototypical situations that have recurred in the organism's course of its
life.
In this work we have shown how a few of such affect programs, named here as
surprise, seeking, fear, joy, and distress can sort a variety of situations that robots
face while being situated in their world attempting to achieve and maintain a set of
specific goals.
Each of these affect programs establishes a mode of operation for the robot, which
involves the coordinated adjustment and entrainment of several different subprograms
(behaviors)-activating some, deactivating others, adjusting the functioning param-
eters of yet others, and in some cases even creating new instances of others through
learning both on the input side or the output side of the affect program-so that the
whole system acts in a coherent fashion, producing coherent behavior as a response
to the confrontation with specific eliciting situations.
While most theories of emotion described in Chapter 2 attempt to reduce emotion
to different dimensions, and different components, our approach suggests that emo-
tions are not reducible to anything different than what we have described here. That
is, they can only be reduced to the set of coordinated evaluation-action programs for
which they have evolved instructions on how to command and process all of them
together.
A computational approach to studying affect requires the design of a framework
that delves deeper into many of these computational issues, attempting to understand
the sorts of representations (at various descriptive levels) of the prototypical situations
or problems that the robot will address, and the different programs of specialized
solutions, that will be implemented as the synchronization of appraisal mechanisms,
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Figure 10-1: A multi-stage model of affective learning.
action arbitration strategies, attention modulation algorithms, learning models and
motor control subprograms.
It is the design of such a framework, what we call a deep model of affect, and it is
precisely this kind of model that we have built as part of this work and thus one of its
main contributions. We have attempted to tie evidence stemming from multiple fields
that have studied affect long since there were ever an interest in Artificial Intelligence
approaches to this construct. This work has resulted in a variety of ideas, including
the proposal that affective learning follows a sequence of stages such as those depicted
in Figure 10-1, and which ultimately relate the many psychological constructs that
are part of coherent, intelligent behavior, to the plausible computational substrates.
We hope that this framework, and the ideas contained herein, serve as a start-
ing point and fresh perspective for the study of affect, from a computational stand-
point. The space of affective programs is as vast as the minds of different species and
the many environments that helped them evolve. Thus, inordinate possibilities and
lessons to learn remain possible.
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